

**DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL**

**MASTER OF ARTS-PHILOSOPHY
SEMESTER -III**

INDIAN METAPHYSICS

CORE 301

BLOCK-2

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

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First Published in 2019



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FOREWORD

The Self Learning Material (SLM) is written with the aim of providing simple and organized study content to all the learners. The SLMs are prepared on the framework of being mutually cohesive, internally consistent and structured as per the university's syllabi. It is a humble attempt to give glimpses of the various approaches and dimensions to the topic of study and to kindle the learner's interest to the subject

We have tried to put together information from various sources into this book that has been written in an engaging style with interesting and relevant examples. It introduces you to the insights of subject concepts and theories and presents them in a way that is easy to understand and comprehend.

We always believe in continuous improvement and would periodically update the content in the very interest of the learners. It may be added that despite enormous efforts and coordination, there is every possibility for some omission or inadequacy in few areas or topics, which would definitely be rectified in future.

We hope you enjoy learning from this book and the experience truly enrich your learning and help you to advance in your career and future endeavours.

INDIAN METAPHYSICS

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Unit 1 Prameya:Padartha

Unit 2 Man,God And World As Basic General

Unit 3 Being And Essence

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BLOCK-2 INDIAN METAPHYSICS

Introduction to Block

Unit-8 The objective of this unit is to make the students familiar to the general Indian understanding of the human person.

To enable the students to appreciate some of the profound notions of Indian philosophy, especially with respect to the human being

Unit-9 The main aim of every Indian system is to show the way to salvation. The way to salvation is written in the language of renunciation (*Sannyasa*). But this idea cannot be said to represent the whole life of every Indian. Therefore for a complete philosophy of man one has to read the systems as well as *the activities of humans*, the ethical codes and the epics.

Unit-10 • Understand the orthodox systems of the Nyaya and Vaisesika. Elucidate the Nyaya theory of knowledge. Discuss the Nyaya theory of causation. Recognize Nyaya conception of God and proofs for the existence of God. Be aware of the categories of Vaisesika. Appreciate the Vaisesika theory of Atomism.

Unit-11 We, in our day to day communication as well as understanding, use terms such as “Human” and “Person.” But, for centuries, a number of eminent thinkers have differed in their views and theories

Unit-12 One of the important counter-movements in India that challenged the authority of Vedas and questioned its teachings is Caravaka philosophy. It sought to unsettle most of the traditionally held views and beliefs such the existence of God, soul and life after death. That is why it was called heterodox school of philosophy

Unit-13 • explain the Sâmkhya theory of causation; elucidate the distinction between Purusa and Prakrti; discuss Sâmkhya views on evolution; analyze Sâmkhya account on pramânas (Sources of valid knowledge); illustrate Sâmkhya explanations on bandage and liberation; and discuss the Sâmkhya views on God.

Unit-14 In this unit we will detailed discuss the skeptical views of nagarjuna, jayarasan bhat and sriharsa.

UNIT 8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS ON HUMAN PERSON OR MAN

STRUCTURE

- 8.0 Objectives
- 8.1 Introduction
- 8.2 The Self in Indian Philosophy
- 8.3 Existence of the Self
- 8.4 Properties of the Self
- 8.5 Contemporary Discourse on the Self
- 8.6 The Goal of Life: *Purusarthas*
- 8.7 A Materialistic Critique
- 8.8 Let Us Sum Up
 - Key Words
- 8.10 Questions for review
- 8.11 Suggested readings and references
- 8.12 Answer to check your progress

8.0 OBJECTIVE

- The objective of this unit is to make the students familiar to the general Indian understanding of the human person.
- To enable the students to appreciate some of the profound notions of Indian philosophy, especially with respect to the human being.

8.1 INTRODUCTION

In this unit, we can attempt no more than a very schematic outline of Indian thought and comment here. After all, is there one monolithic Indian thought about human being and her/his make-up? Still, we can point out some general lines of thought and trust that the reader will be able to make a more detailed critical reflection for himself (or herself) in particular cases. In the

first place, any understanding of reincarnation (and this doctrine is pretty widespread in India) implies a rather dualistic understanding of the human person and one where the body is seen as a replaceable, discardable appendage to the real “me”. The essential self remains unchanged through a variety of rebirths in different “bodies”. Platonism with a vengeance and the deck is stacked heavily in favour of the spirit. And if it is true that the doctrine of *maya* can be read in terms of not so much world-negating (the more traditional interpretation) but as world-relativising (with reference to the Absolute), this too is frequently vitiated by the popular understanding of *Moksa* wherein liberation is a process of finally severing all links of the authentic self from the world of matter. Once again, matter is very readily handled. A passing thought. Was Carvaka (leaving aside the discussion whether the school was actually founded by a person of that name – or was it a nick-name, a term of contempt, given to them by their critics?) really so rabidly materialistic and irreligious in intent? Or was it more of a reaction against the dominant other-worldly, pro-Spirit type of teachings so favoured by the Brahmins – and later on provoked or even maligned into statements of gross hedonism by its powerful adversaries who, after all, have also dominated early critical remarks on the school. It would be refreshing (to be, at any rate) to recognise that early Indian thought didn’t suffer gladly the anti-matter prejudices of the ancients.

Thus we first begin with the understanding of self in Indian philosophy, which leads us to appreciate the goal of human life. Finally we propose a materialistic critique of Indian philosophy.

8.2 THE SELF IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

The Brahminical or orthodox (*astika*) schools of Indian philosophy, especially the Vedantins and the Nyaya-Vaisesika argue that the self or *Atman* is a substantial but non-material entity. The *Katha* and *Chandogya* Upanishads, for example, define the Brahminical conception of the self as follows: The light of the *Atman*, the spirit is invisible, concealed in all

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beings. It is seen by the seers of the subtle, when their vision is keen and clear. The *Atman* is beyond sound and form, without touch and taste and perfume. It is eternal, unchangeable, and without beginning or end: indeed above reasoning. The Upanisads put it succinctly: “An invisible and subtle essence is the Spirit of the whole universe. That is Reality. That is Truth. THOU ART THAT.”

As Peter Pravos (2010) indicates, the Brahminical view on the nature of the self as portrayed in the Upanishads can be summarised as four major theses:

- 1) The self exists;
- 1) The self is immortal and without beginning or end;
- 1) The self is essentially non-material and;
- 1) The self is identical with Brahman, the highest reality.

The heterodox (*nastika*) schools in Indian philosophy, such as the Carvaka materialists and the Buddhists, question the Brahminical arguments for a substantial, persistent and non-material self on metaphysical, moral and political grounds. The Buddhists and the Carvaka oppose the Hindu caste system and believe that the Vedas are full of falsehoods, self-contradictions and tautologies. The Carvaka accuse the Brahmins of being impostors who abuse the words of the Vedas and interpret them to suit their own egoistic needs. The Vedas are in their opinion nothing but a means of livelihood for the Brahmins who are lazy, lacking in intellect, energy, self respect and sense (Pravos 2010). The views on the self by the Carvaka and the Buddhists are illustrated by the following two quotes: “The soul is but the body characterised by the attributes signified in the expressions, ‘I am stout’, ‘I am youthful’, ‘I am grown up’, ‘I am old’, etc. It is not something other than that.” “A sentient being does exist, you think, O Mara? You are misled by a false conception. This bundle of elements is void of Self, in it there is no sentient being. Just as a set of wooden parts receives the name of carriage, so do we give to elements the name of fancied being.” (Parfit 1984)

. Doctrine of No-Self (Anatmavada, Nairatmyavada) on Buddhism:

“Look upon the world,” says the Buddha, “as void, having destroyed the

view of oneself as really existing, so one may overcome death; the king of death will not see him who thus regards the world.”

The doctrine of No-self means two things:

- (i) The self is an aggregate of impermanent mental and bodily processes;
- (ii) The world is unsubstantial and void; it is an aggregate of impermanent qualities devoid of substances.

The self is impermanent. It is an aggregate. It is a series of successive mental and bodily processes which are impermanent. There is no permanent self. The self is a stream of cognitions (vijanasantana). There is a continuity of constantly changing mental processes in it. Sometimes they are intermittent.

So the self is sometimes compared to sleep and dream. The course of organic life is compared to dreamless sleep, in which consciousness is evoked by external stimuli, which is compared to dream. Conscious processes break in upon the stream of the subconscious processes.

The self is an aggregate of body and four kinds of mental processes, feeling, perception, disposition, and self-consciousness. The body is not permanent. It is an aggregate of vital organs and their functions. It is an aggregate of changing qualities.

The Buddha is emphatic on the denial of the permanent self in the following texts.

‘The world is empty of a self, or of anything of the nature of a self. The five seats of the five senses, and the mind, and the feeling that is related to mind: all these are void of a self or of anything that is self-like.’ “When one says ‘I’, he refers either to all the aggregates combined or any one of them and deludes himself that that was T. One could not say that the body was T or that the feeling was T- or any other aggregate was ‘I’.

There is nowhere to be found in the aggregates ‘I am’. ‘Since neither self nor aught belonging to self can really and truly exist, the view that holds that this I who am world, who am self, shall hereafter live permanent, persisting,

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eternal, unchanging, abide eternally; is not this utterly and entirely a foolish doctrine ?’ ‘This self of mine is the knower, the enjoyer of the fruits of my good and bad actions: it is eternal and immutable, it will continue for infinite time: this thought is very childish’, ‘The body is not-self j feeling is self; perception is not-self; disposition is not-self ; self-consciousness is not-self. All dharmas are not-self’.

The five aggregates are impermanent. They are not the so-called permanent self. Belief in permanent self is a wrong view of the self (satkayadrsti). The last text does not mean that the self is eternal and transcendental. It clearly means that the five aggregates constitute the not-self. There is no permanent self. The self is an empirical aggregate. There is no self beyond them. This is the unique and original teaching of the Buddha.

Once the Buddha kept silent on the existence or nonexistence of the self. The wandering monk Vacchagotta said, “Is there the ego?” Buddha was silent. Again he said “Is there not the ego?” Still Buddha kept silent.

When the monk departed, the Buddha said to Ananda that the affirmative answer would lead to externalism (sasvatavada), and that the negative answer would lead to annihilationist (ucchedavada) But both are wrong views.

The ego or self is not eternal nor is the self-non-existent. If the self is non-existent, there can be no transmigration and reaping of the fruits of actions. The truth lies in the middle of the two extreme views. The phenomenal or empirical self exists.

The doctrine of No-self means also that the world is unsubstantial and soulless. All external things are aggregates of changing qualities. There is no permanent substance apart from impermanent qualities. The permanent identical substance is a fiction of the imagination. All forms of existence, material and psychical, are impermanent and soulless. They are subject to the inexorable law of becoming.

8.3 EXISTENCE OF THE SELF

Advaita (non-duality) is the Vedanta school associated with the philosopher Sankara (c. 788–820 AD) who is acknowledged as the leader of the Hindu revival after the Buddhist period in India. Sankara's metaphysics are based on the criterion that the real is that whose negation is impossible. From this criterion it follows that the self is real, because no one will say 'I am not'. Sankara writes clearly and succinctly: 'Just because it is the Self, it is impossible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable of refutation.' (Prevos 2010) Further, the Nyaya-Vaisesika subscribe to the conception of the self put forward in the Vedas as a substantial, persistent and non-material entity. They agree with the Vedantins that the self cannot be perceived, but only inferred. The later Nyaya school however rejected the idea that the self can only be known by inference and asserted that the existence of the self can be directly perceived. The idea that the self can be directly perceived is put forward mostly in polemical works against the Buddhists. The Nyaya argument for the existence of the self through the notion of agency: 'From the actions of the mind towards the contact of the sense-organ apprehending desirable objects, we infer the existence of the self'. An analogy offered by the Nyaya is that from the action of regular breathing we infer the existence of the agent who would act like a blower of the wind-pipe. The Nyaya are clearly referring to intelligent actions and not merely mechanical actions like that of a robot for example.

The Carvaka argue that the self is nothing but the body as characterised by consciousness. The Carvaka denial of a substantial self is based on the epistemological position that perception is the only valid source of knowledge. The Carvaka deny the validity of inference and other sources of knowledge (*darsanas*) usually accepted in classical Indian philosophy. From this position and the Brahminical assertion that the self can not be perceived they infer that the self can not exist because only that which can be perceived exists. This last premise is however not a fair representation of the Brahminical position because the Mimamsa and the later Naiyayikas insist that the self as the subject is directly cognised in every experience. In the

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available texts there is however no detailed discussion whether the Carvaka had any arguments to deal with the Mimamsaka and the later Naiyayikas.

The Buddhist reply to the Brahminical view of the self would be that there is no such entity. This view is illustrated by the debate between king Milinda and the Buddhist monk Nagasena. King Milinda is not convinced of the theory of the no-self for, “if there were no person, there could be no merit and no demerit . . .

“ (Conze 1959). Nagasena affirms that the theory of the not-self to the king by comparing a human being with a chariot. None of the individual parts of the chariot (the pole, the axle, the wheels etc.), are the chariot. Nor the combination of the parts is the chariot. Nagasena continues that he can not discover a chariot at all, only the word that denotes the idea of the chariot. The denomination chariot

— or self — takes place in dependence of the individual parts. In ultimate reality, the person can not be apprehended. Sankara takes issue with this theory, on the grounds that it provides nothing to hold together the various ingredients either at any one time or through progression in time (Prevos 2010).

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

- 1) Give a brief Brahminical view on the nature of the self.

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- 2) What is the Buddhist reply to the Brahminical view of the self?

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ATMAN

Atman is the immortal aspect of our mortal existence, the individual Self, which is hidden in every object of creation including humans. It is the microcosm which represents the macrocosm in each of us, imparting to us divine qualities and possibilities and providing us with consciousness and the reason to exist and experience the pains and pleasures of earthly life.

Atman is Brahman Itself, the very Self which descends into the elements of Nature through self-projection or manifestation and participates personally in the game of self-induced illusion and pure Delight. However, bound by the senses and limited by the ego, bonds, duality and perceptual knowledge, we, the jivas, do not perceive the truth. We go out, become involved and in the process forget who we are. It is like a person who travels to distant lands under a spell and forgets his roots, identity, and homeland.

When you look around, you rarely look in. When you are deeply involved with the world, you lose self-awareness and become immersed in the task at hand. It is how Nature created your mind and body to keep you bound. "The self-existent Lord pierced the senses to make them turn outward. Thus, we look to the external world and see not the Self with in us."

The Self is the silent partner in all our deeds and experiences, the observer and the indweller of all embodied beings. Its nature cannot be adequately explained or described in human language, as it is beyond the senses and the mind. "There the eyes cannot travel, nor speech nor mind. Nor do we know how to explain it to the disciples. It is other than the known and beyond the unknown."

It can only be experienced when all the sensory activity ceases to have an impact on the mind, when the mind itself is freed from the movement of thoughts and sense objects, and the torment of desires, which are the prime cause of all human activity and suffering, and subsides into quietude. The experience of the Self arises "When the mind and the five senses are stilled

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and when the intellect is stilledThey say that Yoga is complete stillness in which one enters that state of Oneness."

Although it is described as a flame, of the size of the thumb, which is said to exist physically between the eye brows, or psychically in the heart, its exact location is uncertain. It has no physical or mental aspect as such, other than as a mere reflection or an idea in the intelligence of the mind. However, unquestionably He exists, and He only is real. All else is false, or an illusion, which withers away, crushed by the weight of sins, decay of the world, and pressures of time.

We are told, "The adorable one is seated in the heart and rules the breath of life. All the senses pay homage to him. When He breaks out of the body in freedom from the bonds of flesh, what else remains? This Self is Supreme." We are also told, "Above the senses is the mind, above the mind the intellect, above that is the ego and above the ego is the unmanifested cause. And beyond is Brahman, who is omnipresent and without attributes."

The ego is Atman's poor cousin, the false center, which assumes the lordship and ownership of the mind and body, whereas in actual reality it is a mere reflection, a product of illusion and a mental projection, born out of sensory experiences and the accumulation of memories and thoughts. While the basis of Atman is reality, permanence and Bliss, the nature of ego is illusion, impermanence and suffering.

The ego of a living being is permanently soaked in ignorance and gloom and needs to be rescued from eternal doom and damnation by the indwelling Atman. The ego is a false reflection of it. The Katha Upanishad explains the relative status of the two selves in this manner, "There are two selves, the separate ego and the indivisible Atman. When one raises above I, me and mine, the Atman reveals Itself as the real Self."

The Mundaka Upanishad is more explicit and poetic, "Like two birds perched on the same tree, intimate friends, the ego and the self, dwell in the same body. The former eats the sweet and sour fruits of life, while the later looks on with detachment."

This symbolism is further expanded in this verse of the Katha Upanishad, "Know the Self as the Lord of the Chariot, body as the chariot itself, buddhi as the charioteer and mind as the reins. The senses are said to be the horses and selfish desires are the roads by which they travel. When the Self is confused with the body, the mind and the senses, they say that he appears to enjoy pleasures and suffer from sorrow."

Although Atman is located in all of us, we cannot know It or understand It adequately with our ordinary awareness. "There, no eye can penetrate, no voice, no mind. Nor do we know how to understand it or preach it." In the Kena Upanishad the teacher explains the difficulty of knowing the Self to the students in the following words, "If you think that you know the Self you know not." And the student admits, "I do not think I know the Self, nor can I say I know Him not."

In the Katha Upanishad, Yama, the Lord of Death explains to Nachiketa, "The Self cannot be known through the study of scriptures, nor thorough intellect nor through hearing learned discourses. It can be attained only by those whom the Self chooses." He reemphasizes the same point again elsewhere.

In the Kena Upanishad the problem is further explained and the way to reach Atman is also suggested, "The ignorant one thinks that the Self can be known by the intellect, but the enlightened one knows that He is beyond the duality of the knower and the known." Thus, intelligence may give you wisdom and discernment and pave the way, but it cannot give you the experience of pure Self.

The idea which is implied or suggested in the Upanishads is that Atman cannot be realized by ordinary consciousness, when the senses are active and when the mind is unstable, and buddhi, intelligence, is under the influence of desires, delusion and duality, which interfere with the process of knowing and the discernment of truth and right knowledge. There cannot be an experience of Atman when there is the gulf of "knowing" between the knower and the known. He who knows It (as an object), knows It not really.

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The mind and the senses stand between the two polarities of the knower and the known, or the subject and object. They prevent the being from knowing and realizing Atman as its very Self. The mind is an imperfect instrument with an inherent inability to understand and discern Atman. "The truth of Self cannot come to him, who has not realized that he is the Self. His intelligence cannot reveal the Self to him, beyond its duality of subject and object."

How does one realize Atman? What is the solution, or the process by which Atman becomes self-evident? The Upanishads are clear. "The self cannot be known by a person who does not restrain himself from unrighteous ways, who does not control his senses and still his mind, and who does not practice meditation or austerity," explains Yama to Nachiketa in the Katha Upanishad. He also adds, "This awakening which you have known comes not through logic and scholarship, but from close association with a realized teacher."

However, mere association with a spiritual master may not be very helpful, unless there is an inner and deep commitment and aspiration to know the transcendental Self. "The Self cannot be known through the study of the scriptures, nor through intellect, nor through learned discourses. The self can be attained by only those who the Self chooses. Verily to them does the Self reveals Itself."

Establishing the connection between the outer and the inner worlds is neither easy nor direct and straightforward. One has to pass through many intermediate states and stages, overcome many obstacles, remove many impurities, silence many noises of the mind and body, suppress undesirable qualities and negative tendencies to reach the final goal.

In the mortal world, the Self is subject to the illusion of states. The Mandukya Upanishad informs us that the self is fourfold: The wakeful Vaishwanara, the Universal Male (the ego), The dreaming Taijasa, the enjoyer of subtle objects and the Lord of the luminous mind, (the astral), The mysterious Prajna, the one who remains in deep sleep and who is the

Lord of Wisdom Atman the eternal, the incommunicable, the end of phenomena, and verily Brahman himself.

Every day, we go through these four states but we do not know who we truly are as we mistake the ego for the Self. Our minds do not have the purity or the force to know transcendental truths or the deepest truths of our own existence beyond the objective experience. The inward journey is difficult and mysterious, and we are inadequately equipped to discern the presence of the Self within us or its infinite truths. There may still be many profound truths and planes of consciousness between our wakeful and deep sleep states, which we may never know. However, what can be said about the ultimate experience of knowing the Self? What happens when a seeker reaches there? No one seems to know clearly, or describe adequately what happens when a seeker achieves union with the Self or Brahman. From the experience of others, we understand that the state of self-realization is beyond the faculties of the human mind and cannot adequately be translated into any human language, since words, which belong to the domain of the conditioned mind, do not carry the intensity or the luminosity of transcendental truths. Mysticism itself is a vague field and mystic experiences are even vaguer.

At the same time, we know that there is a palpable secret somewhere in the recesses of our own consciousness. We know it is there because in profound moment we can feel its presence. We know we are different when we are silent and deeply contemplative. Even with all the distractions which the world offers, the delight of the Self cannot be contained forever in the secret caves of the heart.

In the expansive states of the mind, in sublime states and profound moments when you feel connected to the world or Nature, and in moments of great vulnerability when you feel lost or helpless, the joy and the love of the soul gushes forth into your wakeful mind with the thundering sounds of a wild river and wake you up to the truth of the Self.

Thus, the Self who is the eternal witness does not entirely forsake you. If

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you manage to express the best of human nature, if you have compassion, love, tolerance and equanimity, and if you overcome the demons of your own mind, you will increasingly feel connected to him and see the world with his eyes.

In the journey of knowing the Self, you may also need the grace of God. In the Isa Upanishad we come across a vague reference to it when a seeker prays to Brahman in the following words, suggesting the importance of devotion. "The face of truth is hidden behind a golden lid, O, Pusan, may you remove the lid so that I may see the golden Truth!" When the request is granted and the Truth, which he was seeking, manifests itself, he reaches the indisputable conclusion in a state of bliss and exclaims, "In truth I am Him."

The Self is the ultimate mystery of human life. To know it is the ultimate goal, which a person may be destined achieve after numerous births by earning great merit. In him the cycle of creation reaches its full circle, when he discovers the Truth that remains hidden behind the golden lid. While people struggle and strive in the mortal world with vague yearnings and unfulfilled desires, a few manage to achieve the almost impossible dream of knowing who they are. And the world worships them.

8.4 PROPERTIES OF THE SELF

In fact, the discussion on the existence of the self cannot be separated from a description of the nature of the self. The Scriptures mention three properties of the self. The self is eternal, non-material and is identical with *Brahman*: the ultimate reality. Here we shall concentrate on the first two properties since there is not much argument on the last property in classical Indian philosophy. The eternality of the self follows according to Sankara from the essential irrefutability of its nature. Sankara is claiming here that since the self is not an effect, it has no beginning or end and is therefore eternal. The Buddhist would dispute this argument because they believe that anything that is uncaused, does not exist. Sankara argues for the immateriality of the self by stating that the existence of an eternal, immaterial self, distinct from

the body is a necessary presupposition for the achievement of liberation. The Scriptures would otherwise make no sense, which is an unacceptable conclusion for the Vedantins. This argument is of course not acceptable to the heterodox schools because they do not accept the Scriptures as a source of valid knowledge.

The Naiyayika uses an argument from language to ascertain that the self is distinct from the body. The Nyaya argument from language encompasses that since the word *I* is used in the Vedas and ordinary talk and since everything in the Vedas is true, the word *I* must refer to an existing entity. They hold that the word *I* must refer to a non-physical entity because: ‘If the notion *I* referred to the body, then just as another man’s body being as perceptible as our own body . . . the other man’s body would also be capable of being spoken of as *I*. No perceptible property and thus no physical property of an individual can be used to identify a person uniquely and the referent *I* must therefore be something non-physical (Prevos 2010). The persistence of the self is induced by the Naiyayika through the argument from memory. We have desires for objects that have been experienced in the past as being pleasant. One cannot desire a thing one does not remember and one cannot remember someone else’s experiences. They argue that there must therefore be a continuously existing self who had the experience in the past and who is desiring it in the present.

The materialists only accept the four elements air, water, fire and earth as the basic building blocks of reality and ultimate facts of the universe. The body is to the Carvaka a unique combination of these elements and the self emerges from these elements. They thus account for the higher principle of mind by the lower one of matter (Hiriyanna 1985). The views of the Carvaka have been fervently opposed by the other schools of thought (*darsana*) in classical Indian philosophy. It is clear from the materials at our disposal that Carvaka philosophy was viewed with far greater disrespect than any other *darsana*. Phil Hari Singh argues that there appears to be an underlying hostility towards the Carvaka that is not fully borne out by the analysis of

their doctrines (Prevos 2010)

To the Buddhists a person is not a single substance existing continuously through time, but a series of physical and mental states also called 'person states'. The Buddhist term for an individual, a term which is intended to suggest the difference between the Buddhist view and other theories, is *santana*, which means stream (Parfit 1984). Each person state consists of various psychological and physiological factors, the *skandhas*. These *skandhas* are not persistent in time but last only for one infinitesimal short period. The person states fleet away and give rise to new person states in an endless cycle of cause and effect. Because every single person state only exist for an infinitesimal short period of time, there cannot be a persistent self. The instantaneous succession of *skandhas* gives the impression of continuity, like the succession of twenty four still images per second gives the illusion of a moving image. Sankara's criticism against the Buddhist theory of momentary person states is that in the absence of a permanent self throughout the successive *skandhas*, what sense can we make of memory and recognition? Sankara writes: 'Remembrance means recalling to mind something after its perception, and that can happen only when the agent of perception and memory is the same . . . ' (Carr and Mahalingam, 1997).

8.5 CONTEMPORARYDISCOURSE ON THE SELF

The contemporary discourse on the self is predominantly physicalist in character, as noted by Prevos (2010). Physicalism in philosophy of mind is the view that consciousness and the self can be described and explained by the laws of physics. In this section I will evaluate the above described Indian views on the self in light of the physicalist philosophy of mind. C. Ram-Prasad offered some suggestions on how classical Indian philosophical material may contribute to current discussions in consciousness studies. Ram-Prasad proposes to bracket out the transcendental elements of the philosophy through 'interpretative compromise'. The role he sees for

Brahminical philosophy in contemporary consciousness studies is a deep critique of the dominant aims. The main critique that the Brahminical philosophy offers to the physicalist consciousness studies is the circularity of the physicalist studies: only when we know what it is that is to be studied can we study in it, but the purpose of the study is precisely to know what it is. The self of the Carvakas can be viewed an epiphenomenon, an incidental product of physical processes that has no effect of its own. The Carvaka theory of the self seems elegant but does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the self. The study of the Carvaka philosophy is however particularly difficult. We are left with only a few fragmentary survivals of the Carvaka, but all these are preserved in the writings of those who wanted only to refute and ridicule it. Carvaka philosophy thus remains to be saved from the essentially hostile atmosphere surrounding it.

Derek Parfit identifies two contemporary theories of the self: the Ego Theory and the Bundle Theory (Prevos 2010). On the *Ego Theory*, a person's continued existence cannot be explained except as the continued existence of a particular ego or subject of experiences. The ego theory explains the self like the Brahminical theories as a spiritual enduring substance. The rival view is the *Bundle Theory* according to which we cannot explain the unity of consciousness at any time by referring to a person. Instead we must claim that there are long series of different mental states and events. In Bundle Theory the self is only a fact of our grammar. Therefore, Parfit rightly calls Buddha the first Bundle Theorist and he states that given the advances in psychology and neurophysiology, the Bundle Theory and thus the Buddhist theory of the self may now seem to be obviously true.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

- 1) What is Carvaka's theory of the self?

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8.6 THE GOAL OF LIFE: PURUSARTHAS

The idea of *Purusartha*, or the goal of life, has played a very vital role in the history of Indian thought. The term '*Purusartha*' literally signifies "what is sought by men", so that it may be taken as equivalent to a human end or purpose. We know that a man, like other living beings, act instinctively; but he can also do so deliberately. This means he can consciously set before himself ends, and work for them. It is this conscious pursuit that transforms them into *Purusarthas*. Thus even the ends which man shares with other animal, like food and rest, may become *Purusartha* provided they are sought knowingly. We may thus define a *Purusartha* as an end which is consciously sought to be accomplished either for its own sake or for the sake of utilizing it as a means to the accomplishment of further end or goal. The word '*Purusartha*' consists of two words, viz, '*purusa*' meaning person and '*artha*' meaning aim or end. Hence, as defined earlier, *Purusartha* means aim or goal of human life. The *Purusarthas* that have been recognized in India from very early times are four: *Dharma* (duty), *Artha* (wealth), *Kama* (pleasure), and *Moksa* (liberation). Of the four, dharma and moksa are the one that man ought to seek but ordinarily does not; while *artha* and *kama* are the one that man is naturally inclined to seek (Sneha 2010).

The *Purusarthas* serve as pointers in the life of a human being. They are based on the vision of God which is evident in the creation He manifested and which can be followed by man to be part of that vision and in harmony with His aims. His worlds are established on the principles of dharma. They are filled with the abundance of material and spiritual beings and energies, who seek fulfillment by achieving their desires and liberation. Since man is God in his microcosmic aspect, he too should emulate God and manifest the same reality in his own little world. He should pursue the same aims, experience life in its fullness and be an instrument of God by serving the

purpose for which he has been created.

Artha: In one of the old Sanskrit lexicons, ‘*artha*’ is understood as meaning, money, a thing, and possessions. *Artha* also implies attainment of riches and worldly prosperity, advantage, profit and wealth. *Artha*, is a powerful urge in human nature. Acquisition of means for the material well-being, therefore, is a legitimate social and moral purpose. Today everyone is running after money. People need money to meet their basic necessities, for higher education, for luxuries of life, for name, fame, etc. However, if the urge to seek money or possessions is not restricted then it will lead to self-indulgence or greed and will bar the way to highest good i.e., *moksa*. It is given in one of the Pali texts, that “one who enjoys his wealth and does meritorious deeds with it, experiences pleasure and happiness”. It has therefore to be coupled with charity, also to Kautilya “wealth and wealth alone is important in as much as charity and desire depend on wealth for their realization.” *Artha* helps in the attainment of *Kama*. Further, Prof. Hiriyanna affirms that *artha* is ordinarily acquired for *kama* (Sneha 2010).

Kama: *Kama* is ordinarily termed as pleasure. The definition of pleasure in Kamasutra is the following: “*Kama* is the enjoyment of the appropriate objects by the five senses of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling, assisted by the mind together with the soul.” The urge to enjoy pleasures and satisfy desires, is the most powerful one serving as an incentive to individual progress, most effective. It is said, “All that man does is inspired by *kama*.” As Manu regarded *kama* as desire, one can say, it is a desire for pleasure. It can be sensuous pleasure, mental pleasure getting through satisfaction of the work, urge for sexual pleasure, etc. Everyone is seeking that, which gives them pleasure and luxuries of life. Nobody wants to stay at the bottom level. People feel money is the important factor in the attainment of the pleasures of life by fulfilling our desires. So one may put *artha*, as a means to *kama*, as an goal. But now, is that all? Is the purpose of human life fulfilled? How is this *artha* acquired? How well it is utilized in our life? To answer these questions, what one need to do is, to follow his dharma, which is the next

Purusartha.

Dharma: The Indian expression of right activities is dharma. In Mahabharata it is mentioned as an ethical concept, defined as that which is right and good. In Mimamsa, *dharma* is a means to the attainment of certain ends. This means that, ends like *artha* and *kama* should be acquired through righteousness, honesty and straightforwardness. One may, in fact, possess *artha* through stealing and can become rich and through it can get all pleasures of life. But is this the *dharma* of a person? In Mahabharata, *dharma* is stated as that which upholds the society.

Dharma is duty. It is the higher good to achieve the highest i.e., *moksa*. In all stages of a man's life either as a student or as a householder, as a forest dweller or an ascetic, dharma has to be accepted as paramount. An IAS officer has got lots of riches, money and pleasures in his life, but these are to be acquired by doing his duty with sincerity and honesty, and not with bribery, corruption or other mal-practices; only then it will add meaning to his life, otherwise *artha* and *kama* without dharma would be meaningless. *Dharma* is the most important urge and should be developed to regulate both *artha* and *kama*. If *dharma* is the common regulator, *moksa* or liberation, is the common aim, though difficult to attain. Under the wise regulation of *dharma*, desire has to be satisfied and wealth has to be produced and well used. But all the three urges have to be so adjusted and regulated as to lead a man to self- fulfillment in his search for the highest good. *Dharma* also refers to *Varnashrama* Dharma i.e., choice of duty on the basis of one's aptitudes and stage in life (Sneha 2010).

Moksa: Etymologically the meaning of *moksa* is to 'rid off' or 'release'. Also it is commonly understood as liberation. In Bhagavad-Gita, *moksa* is mentioned as the supreme tranquility and the highest bliss. It is delight in the self, contentment with the self, self- satisfaction and self-fulfillment. It is the highest end of life, attainable only by the individual himself, with the help and guidance of dharma. *Moksa* as the last end of human life signifies that

its attainment is impossible without first fulfilling the obligations of the other three. It is a state of non-action. It is not that on death *moksa* is attained. Being the ultimate value of man's social existence, the *Purusartha* of *moksa* is an end in itself. Beyond that, human being has nothing to attain. It is the stage where human cravings cease and along with that ceases the need for attainment and fulfillment. *Moksa* is realization and living of the truth namely *Aham Brahma Asmi* and *Tat Tvam Asi*. In other words it is waking up of human consciousness at the highest level of reality i.e., *paramarthik satta*. The liberated person neither acts nor causes others to act. He may work for the good of humanity without moral obligation. But he has no duties to perform. It is total destruction of egoism. We can call *moksa* as a sublime goal. It can be known through mystical experience. Many saints like Tukaram and Kabir have talked about it and ultimately we all have to aim at it and only then we will be able to come out of the reincarnation (Senha 2010).

8.7 A MATERIALISTIC CRITIQUE

The above treatment of the self and the goals of life may be critiqued from an atheistic or materialistic point of view. The term 'Materialism' is a commonly used and loaded term. There is a misconception that materialism is a modern age phenomenon. In reality this phenomenon is as old as the human mankind irrespective of the place and time. It has been mentioned in ancient Indian literature also. Charvaka and the Hindu sage, Brahaspati, its founder and champion have been associated with philosophical school of materialism in Indian literature ('Materialism' 2020).

Metaphysically, the Charvaka admits the existence of four elements - earth, water, fire and air-only and he rejects the fifth, the ether, because it is not perceived but inferred. Similarly, soul and God and the Hereafter are rejected. Everything which exists, including the mind, is due to a particular combination of these four elements. The elements are eternal, but their combinations undergo production and dissolution. Consciousness is regarded as a mere product of matter. It is produced when the elements

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combine in a certain proportion. It is found always associated with the body and vanishes when the body disintegrates. Just as the combination of betel, arecanut and lime produces red colour or just as fermented yeast produces the intoxicating quality in wine, though the ingredients separately do not possess either the red colour or the intoxicating quality, similarly a particular combination of the elements produces consciousness, though the elements separately do not possess it. Consciousness is the result of an emergent and dialectical evolution. It is an epi-phenomenon, a by-product of matter. Given the four elements and their particular combination, consciousness manifests itself in the living body. The so-called soul is simply the conscious living body.

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

- 1) What is the meaning of *Artha*?

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8.8 LET US SUM UP

By way of summing up we can assert that the views of the self in classical Indian philosophy span a wide spectrum of ideas. For the Brahmins, the self is a non-physical soul, a 'ghost in the machine'. For the Buddhists, the soul is a mere figment of the imagination. The Carvaka on the other hand, see the self as an epiphenomenon. The Brahminical theories of the self can be considered not true because the spiritual conception of the self does not correspond with empirical reality—if one concedes that religious experiences are not part of reality. The Carvaka theory could be true, but as is known to us it cannot provide any explanation, only a description of the self. The Buddhist or Carvaka theory of the self explains our natural beliefs

about a self without any of the metaphysical complications of the Brahmanical theories. The *Purusarthas* briefly express Indian understanding of the goal of human life, which also may be differently understood by various schools in India.

8.9 KEY WORDS

Lokayata : Belief only in this world. Stemming from pre-Vedic times, Lokayata would broadly mean ‘prevalent among people’ or ‘prevalent in the world’ (*loka* and *ayata*)

Purusarthas : The goal of life, *Purusarthas* that have been recognized

in India from very early times are four: Dharma (duty),

Artha (wealth), *Kama* (pleasure), and Moksa

(liberation).

8.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What is Carvaka’s theory of the self?
2. Explain the goal of life.
3. Explain the existence of self.
4. What is the meaning of *Artha*?
5. Give a brief Brahminical view on the nature of the self.

8.11 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

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8.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check your progress I

1. Briefly sum up of topic existence of self.
2. Refer to topic existence of self

Check your progress II

- 1 Refer to topic contemporary discourse on the self.

Check your progress III

1. Refer to topic Artha.

UNIT 9 JIVA AND DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

STRUCTURE

- 9.0 Objectives
- 9.1 Introduction
- 9.2 Vedic concept of Human
- 9.3 Concept of Human in the Upanishads
- 9.4 Chandogya Upanishad
- 9.5 Taittiriya Upanishad
- 9.6 Mandukya Upanishads
- 9.7 Katha Upanishad
- 9.8 Concept of Human in *Bhagavadgita*
- 9.9 Atman and Brahman
- 9.10 Human in need of liberation
- 9.11 *Buddhists* understanding of a human person
- 9.12 Jainism and Samkhya
- 9.13 Let Us Sum Up
- 9.14 Key Words
- 9.15 Questions for review
- 9.16 Suggested readings and refernces
- 9.17 Answers to Check Your Progress

9.0 OBJECTIVES

The main aim of every Indian system is to show the way to salvation. The way to salvation is written in the language of renunciation (*Sannyasa*). But this idea cannot be said to represent the whole life of every Indian. Therefore for a complete philosophy of man one has to read the systems as well as *the activities of humans*, the ethical codes and the epics. Keeping in mind what the ancient sages said about sacred literature we will evolve the idea of human. The main literature for the ancients is *Vedas*. The poetries in *Vedas* are meant to teach the *Vedic* way of life.

9.1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of Human person is very clearly derived from the western perspective. In the Indian tradition the concept seems to be strange and sometimes absent. The problem lies only in the method. The nature of the operation we are engaging in will be different. We will begin with the approach available in the Indian tradition rather than delving ourselves into fabrications. The Indian philosophy understands humans by placing them side by side with 'self'. "*Atmanam viddhi*" know thyself, would be the crux of Indian philosophy. Within the self is the spirit, the core of our being. Man is the conscious centre of all experience. The optimistic view of human person is seen in *Vedas*, *Upanishads* and in different schools. In this course let us study the concept of person as it emerged from these traditions.

9.2 VEDIC CONCEPT OF HUMAN

Vedas explore human's living in the universe. Among the *Vedas* the *Rig* and the *Atharvan* only explore a human's concrete and spontaneous experience in the universe. The *Sama* and the *Yajur* emphasize sacrificial rituals. The entire universe is seen as an extension of one's life. The initial approach to human life is his or her very breath. The *Rig Veda* terms human soul or self as *Atman*. The word *Atman* is derived from 'an' means to breath, 'at' means to move and 'va' means to blow. Hence it is the breath of life, the vital force. Hence the soul is the principle of breathing and controller of all activities. This spiritual principle is not opposed to body. Soon the human is identified with the whole of existence. According to *Purusa-Sukta* the human is conceived as a thousand headed and thousand footed giant, who is sacrificed (*Yajna*) by God. Accordingly the entire universe and the world of gods were made out of primordial human, the *Purusa*. The *Atharva Veda* begins with material composition of human and seeks to understand the unity behind the complexity. "Unified am I, quite undivided, unified my soul. Unified my sight, unified my hearing my breathing-both in and out-

Unified is my continuous breath. Unified quite undivided am I, the whole of me” (*Atharva Veda* XIX, 51). In the *Brahmanas*, *Prajapati* same as *Purusa* is the primeval human being. In the *Taittiriya Brahmana* there is an indication that the gods, the plants, etc, are various parts of humans. In *Rig Veda*, the *Atman* is sometimes referred to as animating principle or the essence. Brahman is the universal self. The term *Atman* is applied to *Brahman* in this sense. *Brahman* is known as *Paramatman*. 'Para' means ultimate and all other *Atmans* are called without 'Para' that they are not ultimate. *Atman* signifies the essence or the ultimate self of human. *Jiva*, the empirical self that stands for the totality of a human's transient sense faculties is contrasted with *Atman*. The *Atman* is “Unborn, undying, eternal, seated in the cavity (i.e., in the deepest recess of human) the human body and one's empirical self are subject to destruction. They are there to support the immortal self *Atman*. When a person dies the *Jivatman* will join again with *Paramatman*.

9.3 CONCEPT OF HUMAN IN THE UPANISHADS

Human nature is not a substantial unity of body and soul. Behind and beyond this unity *Atman* is the true constitution. The human body disintegrates and changes are inevitable. The changeless aspect of human persons can be arrived at, only through introspection. This helps one to transcend the empirical aspects to reach the inner reality of *Atman*. In *Rig Veda* *Atman* means breath or vital essence. Gradually *Atman* acquired the meaning of the soul or self. The *Upanishads* distinguish four states of consciousness where each determines a specific concept of the self. Only the last state identifies the true self. 1 The self may appear in the waking state in which it has the consciousness of the external world and the experience of gross objects. 2 The self may appear in the dreaming state in which it experiences subtle objects and has the consciousness of an internal world. 3 The self may appear in dreamless sleep in which there are no objects, gross or subtle, and no subject. In this state there is no pain or desire. In this state

there is the shadow of supreme bliss. 4 The self may appear in the fourth state of pure consciousness in which like in deep sleep there is enjoyment of positive bliss. This pure bliss is called *Turiya*. The analysis of these four states will lead to an understanding of the One, the *Paramatman*, the universal Self or *Sarvatman*.

9.4 CHANDOGYA UPANISHAD

In the *Chandogya Upanishad*, The definition of self is seen in four stages: A) Body-self B) the empirical-self C) the transcendent self D) the absolute self. The *Upanishads* reject the self from being identified with these first three stages. This has diverted the Indian thinkers from the study of empirical man. Indian philosophers focus their attention on the cosmic reality, which may not exclude human in their empirical state but definitely lacks the deep analysis of the same. A human is always related to cosmic principle. Just as there are elements like water, fire and wind that are present in the universe, so too is explained the body of a cosmic Human. Universal reality is the basis for human beings. This cosmic order is governed by gods and the physical universe is a replica of the cosmic universe. God is the within all things and humans cannot exclude God.

9.5 TAITTIRIYA UPANISHAD

In the *Taittaria Upanishad* it is elucidated that the search for *Brahman*, the deepest center of the human is not outward but inward. *Brahman* is the eternal truth, he is the wisdom and he is present in the innermost hidden cave without losing his transcendent presence in the highest heaven.

9.6 MANDUKYA UPANISHADS

The *Mandukya Upanishad* looks at human consciousness as illuminated consciousness. The Human is beyond wakeful, dream, deep sleep and etc.

We may speak of the four states of the individual, namely: the gross (*Sthula*), the Subtle (*Suksma*), the causal (*Karana*) and the self of human (*Atman*). The Mandukya Upanishad maintains that this fourth state, Atman is “neither internally nor externally conscious, nor conscious in both the ways, it is neither conscious nor unconscious; it is invisible, intractable, inapprehensible, indefinable...”

9.7 KATHA UPANISHAD

The Katha Upanishad explains human-on-earth: The creator of humans pierced the holes of his senses outward so that a human person naturally looks without. Some sages, the so called wise men searching for immortality looked within and found the self. Self-realization begins with the awareness of the earthbound body-self (*Annamayakosa*) dependent on and ultimately composed of food, a self which has shape and size and extension in space like other material objects, but is also alive, penetrated and vivified by breath. *Pranamayakosha* – the self of breath, which takes its shape form the *Annamayakosha*. *Pranamayakosha* gives *Annamayakosha* the power of transforming nourishment, growth, movement, sensation, sense perception in all its form. Humans have another sheath called *Manomayakosha* or the emotional body, which spreads throughout the body enlivened by the *Prana*. This is the body of feelings which may react or respond to any stimulus offered to any part of the body not only by physical yielding or resistance, but also by movements inspired by imagination, emotion, reflective reasoning as well as instinct. The feelings have made the life forms mobile and evolved into animals. There is a further depth of interiority, the dimension of intelligence and intuition. The development of intellect with the *vijnamayakosa* made animal forms human. Last of all is the *Anandanayakosa*, the interior, non-dual self. This sheath makes humans divine.

Check Your Progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

- Explain the Vedic Concept of Human Person

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- How are the Kosas described in Katha Upanishads

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9.8 CONCEPT OF HUMAN IN BHAGAVADGITA

The *Bhagavatgita* is more syncretic than synthetic. It combines the dualism of *Samkhya* with the absolutism of *Vedanta* and the personalist theism of *Bhakti* religion. *Bhagavatgita* says ‘every human is powerless and made to work by the constituents born of nature’. These constituents are seen as *Sattva*, goodness and purity, *Rajas*, understood as energy and passion and *Tamas* that stands for darkness, dullness and laziness (of will). *Prakrti* is the combination of all these three strands. In the evolution of matter *Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas* have irreducible functions. ‘There is a function of reflection displayed in thought, which is reduced to *Sattva*, a function of dynamism and creativity termed as *Rajas* and a function of limitation and individuality termed as *Tamas*’. The physical body, the five senses, the ego, the mind and the soul belong to the *Prakrti* of human. We can say that the soul stands nearest to the *Purusa*. The soul consists of intellect and will and is subject to the influence of *Gunas*. The senses and the ego can act through the mind and influence the soul, if the set up of *rajas* and *tamas* are predominant, the soul will be led astray. If *sattva guna* is strongly present

then the soul can discriminate between *Prakrti* and *Purusa* and remain integrated. Soul has to coordinate the *Prakrti* of human into functioning by keeping the *Gunās* in perfect balance. Otherwise *Purusa* and *Prakrti* can never reach the integrated stage in the process of evolution. In the process of evolution *Purusa* remains just a witness, unaffected by the evolution of matter. Matter around can obscure the *Purusa* in its pure consciousness.

9.9 ATMAN AND BRAHMAN

Already we have grasped some notion about *Atman* and *Brahman* when we were enquiring about the concept of the human person in the *Vedas*. In this chapter we will probe the link between *Atman* and *Brahman*.

Atman as Brahman

Brahman is ‘the magic power’ that is derived from sacrificial performance. From this arose the meaning of the power that creates and pervades the totality of the universe, the supreme reality. It is the ‘Real of the real’ (*Satyasa satyam*). *Atman* is the individual self. It is the highest and the most valuable type of being that we experience. But the self that we experience is not the absolute self. The individual self is the mixture of real and unreal, a product of knowledge and ignorance. Our investigation in this section about the true self will give access to the essence of *Brahman*, the absolute reality. The *Upanishads* identify *Atman* as *Brahman*. *Brahman*, which is the objective principle underlying the world, the mysterious power and the first cause of all that exists and *Atman*, that forms the essence of the human self are ultimately the same. The identification of *Brahman* with *Atman* reveals the spiritual nature of the absolute reality. This accounts for the existence of the selves and the physical world. *Brahman* is called “*Saccidananda*” where *Sat* is being, *Cit* is spirit and *Ananda* is peace, bliss. *Brahadaranyaka Upanishad* says:

He is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the understood understander. Other than he there is no seer, other than he

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there is no hearer, other than he there is no thinker, other than he there is no understander; he is your Self, the inner controller, the Immortal (Br. Up. 3. 7. 23)

The seers of the Upanishad thought that there cannot be any distinction between the essence of the inner reality of the cosmos, the Brahman and the inner reality of human, the *Atman*. This is because Brahman cannot be seen in parts. As the distinction between the *Paramatman* and the *Jivatman* dwindled, both are identified as one without the second. *Brahman* is the basis of the world. *Brahman* is the first principle in the universe, known through *Atman*, the same principle in human. *Chandogya Upanishad* states that the entire world is *Brahman*.

The *Upanishads* identify *Brahman* with *Atman* and these are termed as identity statements (*Mahavakyani*). For instance: “*Prajnanam Brahma*” – *Brahman* is consciousness. “*Ayam Atman Brahma*” – this *Atman* is *Brahman*; this *Brahman* is *Atman*. By discovering the identification of *Atman* and *Brahman* the individual discovers in the depths of his or her being the cosmic abundance of God. The oft quoted *Mahavakya* is “*Tad Tvam asi*” (Thou art that). This means that the divine reality (*Tad*) is in the heart of the disciple (*Tvam*). *Tad* and *Tvam* are Identical. The real self (*Tvam*) is no other than *Brahman* (*Tad*). Another phrase is “*So aham asmi*” (I am he or I am *Brahman*), “*Aham Brahma asmi*” (I am *Brahman*). Knowledge of *Brahman* – *Atman*

Atman’s identical experience with *Brahman* is a trans-empirical experience. “*Brahman* is known to him who says he does not know it.” (*Kena Up.*, 2, 3) We can only indicate that the absolute reality exists. One cannot describe *Brahman* in positive terms. Like *Brahman* is this, that and so on. But in terms of negative terms: ‘*neti-neti*’ method (not this, not that). The supreme *Brahman* is called “*Nir-guna*”, without any qualities, totally simple (“*ekam eva advitiam*”, the one without a second). *Atman* as distinct from *Brahman* In all our above contentions we could understand that a human’s *atman* is completely identified with *Brahman*. This view is supported by *Mandukya*

Upanishad and *Sankara* in his *Advaita*. But there are some *Upanishads* that maintain a distinction between *Atman* and *Brahman*. The *Atman* is one with *Brahman* as long as it is a part of *Brahman* and has its being outside time, but the *Atman* is distinct from *Brahman* in that it does not share *Brahman's* creative activity in time. The *Atman* may participate in *Brahman* but not *Brahman* Himself. *Katha Upanishads* speaks about this.

More subtle than the Subtle, greater than the great,

The self (*Brahman*) is hidden in the heart of creatures (here):

The human without desire, (all) sorrow spent, beholds it,

The majesty of the Self (*Brahman*), by the grace of the ordainer. (*Katha Upanishad.*, 2.20) According to *Bhagavatgita*, since the *Atman* is part of *Brahman* it is beyond the category of time, it is never born, it never dies, and it is eternal: “Never it is born nor dies; never did it come to be nor will it ever come to be again; unborn, eternal, everlasting is this Self, - primeval. It is not slain when the body is slain. If a human knows it as indestructible, eternal, unborn never to pass away, how and whom can one cause to be slain or slay?”

Since *Atman* shares *Brahman's* mode of being, *Atman* is said to be part of *Brahman*. And as it is perceived as minute part of *Brahman*, it should not be identified with *Brahman*. If *Gita* acknowledges the distinction between *Brahman* and *Atman* then it also admits that one *Atman* is different from another *Atman*.

9.10 HUMAN IN NEED OF LIBERATION

We are ultimately *Atman*. *Atman's* existence is dependent on material embodiment. Dependency to something would mean that *Atman* is tied to something and *Atman* is not free. In other words *Atman* is in a state of ‘bondage’ to the body (*Sthula* and *Suksma*). Bondage implies that *Atman*

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needs liberation. But when will this *Atman* be liberated? Can a human get out of the body and be liberated when one dies?

Liberation in Hinduism is controlled by the notions of *Karma* and *Samsara*. *Karma-Samsara* is a doctrine of reward and punishment in the Hindu system. All the systems in the Indian thought including the heterodox groups like Jainism and Buddhism seeks after the means of liberation from one's chains of slavery. Both *Karma* and *Samsara* are well knit to each other. Karma

'Karma pradhan vishva rachi rakha

Jo jas karai so tas fal chakha'

As it goes in Ramayana, the entire universe is governed by the Law of *Karma* and the most important section and the fundamental principle of this law is '*Jo jas karai so tas fal chakaha*' As you sow, so shall you reap. Thus the law of *karma* is the law of action and reaction, cause and effect and effort and destiny. The law of cause and effect forms an integral part of Hindu philosophy. This law is termed as '*Karma*' which is derived from the root '*kr*' which means 'to make, to do, to act'. *Karma* literally means to make a deed, action or cause. The concise oxford Dictionary of current English defines it as the "sum of person's actions in one of his successive states of existence, viewed as deciding his fate for the next". In Sanskrit, *karma* means "volitional action that is undertaken deliberately or knowingly". So this details self-determination and a strong will power to abstain from inactivity. The law of *karma* is valid in physical, psychical and moral spheres. Every time we think or do something, we create a cause, which in time will bear its corresponding effects. It is a personality of a human being or the *Jivatman* - with its positive and negative actions.

Karma could be both the activities of the body or the mind, irrespective of the consideration whether the performance brings fruition immediately or at a later stage. However, the involuntary or the reflex actions cannot be called *karma*. When we deal with *karma* our intention is not the cause – effect relationship of the physical world. Our concern is anthropological. The

problem of evil, which we call sin, should be understood within the frame work of *Karma*. If one suffers physical tragedy it is due to his past action. In the *Rig veda*, evil and sufferings are result of sin. This can be translated as ‘*enas*’ meaning offence, ‘*agas*’ which means fault, ‘*antra*’ meaning unrighteousness and ‘*drughda*’ meaning misdeed. Sin here is a ritual error rather than offence against gods and their friendship. Ritual and sacrificial impurity is very much stressed as sin in *Brahmanas*. Immoral acts make humans ritually impure. Therefore one can be purified by means of sacrifices. In the *Upanishadic* period the understanding of sin was given a different turn. It was not considered an offence against gods but a lack of knowledge or ignorance (*Avidhya*).

Ignorance (*Avidhya*), desire (*Kama*) and action (*Karma*) are sins because they prevent the attainment of right knowledge by human. When one attains the right knowledge the distinctions between *Atman* and *Brahman* disappears. One is beyond good and bad. It is the highest level of truth that one attains. *Gita* stresses on the attachment to fruits. So if one expects some reward for one’s action it is an action desired, attached and even self aggrandized action. These actions are sinful. *Bhagavatgita* promotes ‘*Niskama karma*’ which is the action without fruit.

Samsara

The Sanskrit word Samsara means “the repeated passing of souls through different worlds-or subtle.” Thus, *Samsara* means going through the cycle of repeated births and deaths. Under the influence of *karma*, the soul moves upwards ad downwards on the wheel of rebirth, the round of birth, death and rebirth undergone by all living beings. It is a cycle of transmigration from one living form into another.

The concept of *Samsara* is mentioned in *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*. The belief in *Samsara* is connected with Hindu belief in *Karma* which we have dealt with already above.

“When a caterpillar has come to the end of a blade of grass, it reaches out to another blade, and draws itself over to it. In the same way the soul, having coming to the end of one life, reaches out to another body, and draws itself

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over to it. A goldsmith takes an old ornament and fashions it into a new and more beautiful one. In the same way the soul as it leaves one body, looks for a new body which is more beautiful.”

(*Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* 4:4.3-6a)

The atman is in bondage as long as one clings on to the subtle body (*Suksma sarira*) ‘*Suksma sarira*’ is called ‘*linga sarira*’ (*li*-to dissolve, *gam*-to go out). The subtle body accompanies the spirit after cremation. The *linga sarira* is an essential link in the continuity of life because it is not destroyed by life as it continues to activate it throughout ‘*Samsara*’ until it becomes one with the *Brahman*. Misfortunes in our present life are the result of acts that we have committed in the past. So it necessarily follows that if a person has committed evil in this life then as retribution he will have some other mode of existence in the next life. This results in the endless chain of births and deaths. In every new birth one is given a new body by means of which one can counterbalance the deeds of the disintegrated body of the previous existence. The new body is a better one or the worst depends on the *karma*. If one has done good deeds he would get a better body and a worst body for bad deeds. The cycle of rebirths can either generate a progressive spiritual evolution or of deterioration of material enslavement. The *Atman* can never attain salvation when it is enslaved in the matter. It has to reach the succession of life into a superior body which helps leaving the impressions of *karma* and be integrated in the ideal equilibrium with the *Atman*. In this way the very subtle body becomes an expression of the perfect harmony that exists between God and the world. The goal of human life is to be free or liberated from repeated births. Such liberation is called *Moksha* or *Mukti*. *Moksha* can be attained only through the God realization.

Check Your Progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. How is Atman Identified with Brahman?

.....

 1. Write a short note on Karma

9.11 BUDDHISTS UNDERSTANDING OF A HUMAN PERSON

Buddhism offers a wide range of explanation for human person more than any other religion and philosophy. Buddha was very much interested in the human predicament. He begins with a supposition that our individual existence is root of the human malady. Buddha remained silent about the reality of world and God. He was convinced that the metaphysical theories would not provide consolation for a sick human. Does a soldier shot by a gun in battle enquire about the nature and origin of that gun? He would desire to be relieved from pain here and now. As for Buddha human life is a long series of miseries: “*Sarvam Dukkam*” in the first of the four noble truths of Buddhism. Can this suffering be treated with strong drugs to provide someone happiness? So what causes this ‘*Dukkam*’ (suffering) in human? Desires and thoughts pursue unattainable goals that cause self misery and suffering. There is the origin for suffering. This is the second noble truth of Buddhism. The self feels that these desires and thoughts are stable. In fact nothing is permanent and stable. It is just the ego which gives this false consciousness. Buddha says everything is becoming, flux (“*Sarvam Anityam Bhava*”). So a human is not a permanent ego, not a self, not a soul. If so what is a human? Humans are ever changing Psycho – Physical states: (*Nama – Rupa*). A human therefore is a succession of states. Human person is an ever changing component with the permanence of his or

her soul or self. Salvation is achieved when one detaches oneself from the false permanence of the self. In so doing one begins to experience “*Nirvana*” which is happiness in its purest state without being attached to thoughts and desires. Buddha discouraged metaphysical discussions. As for him *Nirvana* is not immortality. *Nirvana* means a ‘blowing out’. It is a state reached here and now above the worldly miseries through the ‘blowing off’ of the fire of all passions.

9.12 JAINISM AND SAMKYA

These two schools hold an identical dualistic vision of reality. While Samkya holds the dualism of *Prakriti* and *Purusha* (matter and spirit), Jainism holds the dualism of *Jiva* and *Ajiva* (life and non life). Within this dualistic context how do these systems understand Human person? Samkya According to Samkya, *Prakriti* is the cosmic reality in constant movement. *Prakriti* includes all that changes whether physical or psychical (sensations, feelings, desires, thoughts). *Purusha* is purely spiritual and stable. It is perfect. Where do humans stand between these basic constituents of reality? Samkya advocates that the true human is the individual perfect *Purusha*. It is wrong to conceive that one is the mixture of *Purusha* and *Prakriti*. If one perceives this mixture as true then that becomes the cause of one’s misery. The pure essence of a human, the perfect *Purusha* is revealed through the practice of yoga. Jainism

According to Jainism reality comprises of the duality of *Jivas* (Many living souls) and *Ajiva* (One cosmic lifeless reality). Life is the highest value. If one kills a life, he is doing a greater crime. All living beings have soul which indicates the sacred character of that being. These souls are pure and perfect as though divine. But the *Ajiva* which is impure and material by its very nature can contaminate the pure soul. *Jiva* can thus be entangled by the *Ajiva*. Through the practice of rigorous asceticism and purification process of successive reincarnations one can liberate oneself from the bondage of material reality.

Check Your Progress III

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

- Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit
- Describe the Buddhist concept of human person?

.....

- Explain the dual nature of life found in Jainism

.....

9.13 LET US SUM UP

Indian approach to human person is more ‘religious’ than properly philosophical. It tells us very little of what human ‘is’ and deals more with what human ‘should be’. The concerns of Indian philosophy of human person are how one attains salvation or enlightenment. It is concerned with ‘here and now’. While suffering holds the central place in Buddhism, One has to renounce one’s individuality and lose oneself with the divine Being. On the other hand more or less all the systems in Indian Philosophy believe that human reality is a condemned state of existence. A true human has to liberate himself or herself from this condemnation. *Upanishad* suggest s that the individual self has to become Universal self (*Atman-Brahman*) and lose in it. Samkya-Jainism Suggest that the empirical self must be purified from *Prakriti – Ajiva*. Buddhists propagate that the empirical self must be given up to reach the state of *Nirvana*.

9.14 KEY WORDS

Karma: Karma is the concept of “action” or “deed,” understood as that

which causes the entire cycle of cause and effect originating in ancient India and treated in Hindu, Jain, Sikh and Buddhist philosophies.

Samsara: Samsara is the cycle of birth, death and rebirth within Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism, Vaishnavism and other Indian religions. Colloquially, “Samsara” can also refer to a general state of subtle sufferings that occur in day to day life.

9.15 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Describe the vedic concept of Human.
2. Explain the concept of human in bhagvadgita.
3. Difference between atman or Brahman.
4. Explain the dual nature of life found in Jainism
5. Explain jiva and different perspectives.

9.16 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

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9.17 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. Vedas explore human's living in the universe. Among the Vedas the Rig and the Atharvan only explore human's concrete and spontaneous experience in the universe. The Sama and the Yajur emphasize sacrificial rituals. The entire universe is seen as an extension of one's life. The initial approach to human life is his or her very breath. The Rig Veda terms human soul or self as Atman. The word Atman is derived from 'an' means to breath, 'at' means to move and 'va' means to blow. Hence it is the breath of life, the vital force. Hence the soul is the principle of breathing and controller of all activities. This spiritual principle is not opposed to body. Soon the human is identified with whole existence.

2. Katha Upanishad explains human-on-earth: The creator of humans pierced the holes of his senses outward so that human person naturally looks without. Some sages the so called wise men wishing immortality looked within and found the self. Self-realization begins with the awareness of the earthbound body-self (Annamayakosa) dependent on and ultimately composed of food, a self which has shape and size and extension in space like other material objects, but is also alive, penetrated and vivified by breath. Pranamayakosha – the self of breath, which takes its shape from the Annamayakosha. Pranamayakosha gives Annamayakosha the power of transforming nourishment, growth, movement, sensation, sense perception in all its forms. Humans have another sheath called Manomayakosha or the emotion body, which spreads throughout the body enlivened by the Prana. This is the body of feelings which may react or respond to any stimulus offered to any part of the body not only by physical yielding or resistance, but also by movements inspired by imagination, emotion, reflective reasoning as well as instinct. The feelings have made the life forms mobile and evolved into animals. There is a further depth of interiority, the dimension of intelligence and intuition. The development of intellect with

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the vijnamayakosa made animal forms human. The last of all is the Anandanayakosa, the interior, non-dual self. This sheath makes humans divine, the Antaryamin.

Answers to Check Your Progress II

Atman is the individual self. It is the highest and the most valuable type of being that we experience. But the self that we experience is not the absolute self. The individual self is the mixture of real and unreal, a product of knowledge and ignorance. Our investigation in this section about the true self will give access to the essence of Brahman, the absolute reality. Upanishads identify Atman as Brahman. Brahman, which is the objective principle underlying the world, the mysterious power and the first cause of all that exists and Atman, that forms the essence of the human self are ultimately the same. The identification of Brahman with Atman reveals the spiritual nature of the absolute reality. This accounts for the existence of the selves and the physical world. Brahman is called “Saccidananda” where Sat is being, Cit is spirit and Ananda is peace, bliss. Upanishads identifies Brahman with Atman and these are termed as identity statements (Mahavakyani). For instance: “Prajnanam Brahma” – Brahman is consciousness. “Ayam Atman Brahma” – this Atman is Brahman; this Brahman is Atman. By discovering the identification of Atman and Brahman the individual discovers in the depths of his or her being the cosmic abundance of God. The oft quoted Mahavakya is “Tad Tvam asi” (Thou art that). This means that the divine reality (Tad) is in the heart of the disciple (Tvam). Tad and Tvam are Identical. The real self (Tvam) is no other than Brahman (Tad). Another phrase is “So aham asmi” (I am he or I am Brahman), “Aham Brahma asmi” (I am Brahman).

As it goes in Ramayana, the entire universe is governed by the Law of Karma and the most important section and the fundamental principle of this law is ‘Jo jas karai so tas fal chakaha’ As you sow, so shall you reap. Thus the law of karma is the law of action and reaction, cause and effect and effort and destiny. The law of cause and effect forms an integral part of Hindu philosophy. This law is termed as ‘Karma’ which is derived from the

root 'kr' which means 'to make, to do, to act'. Karma literally means to deed, action or cause. The concise oxford Dictionary of current English defines it as the "sum of person's actions in one of his successive states of existence, viewed as deciding his fate for the next". In Sanskrit karma means "volitional action that is undertaken deliberately or knowingly". So this details self-determination and a strong will power to abstain from inactivity. The law of karma is valid in physical, psychical and moral spheres. Every time we think or do something, we create a cause, which in time will bear its corresponding effects. It is a personality of a human being or the Jivatman – with its positive and negative actions.

Answers to Check Your Progress III

Humans are ever changing Psycho – Physical states: (Nama – Rupa). Human therefore is a succession of states. Human person is an ever changing component with the permanence of his or her soul or self. Salvation is achieved when one detaches oneself from the false permanence of the self. In so doing one begins to experience "Nirvana" which is the happiness in its purest state without being attached to thoughts and desires. Buddha discouraged metaphysical discussions. As for him Nirvana is not immortality. Nirvana means a 'blowing out'. It is a state reached here and now above the worldly miseries through the 'blowing off' of the fire of all passions.

According to Jainism reality comprises of the duality of Jivas (Many living souls) and Ajiva (One cosmic lifeless reality). Life is the highest value. If one kills a life, he is doing a greater crime. All living beings have soul which indicates the sacred character of that being. These souls are pure and perfect as though divine. But the Ajiva which is impure and material by its very nature can contaminate the pure soul. Jiva can thus be entangled by the Ajiva. Through the practice of rigorous asceticism and purification process of successive reincarnations one can liberate oneself from the bondage of material reality.

UNIT 10 NYAYA THEORY OF PHYSICAL WORLD.

STRUCTURE

- 10.0 Objectives
- 10.1 Introduction
- 10.2 Nyaya and Vaisesika
- 10.3 Nyaya theory of knowledge
- 10.4 Nyaya theory of causation
- 10.5 Nyaya theory of the Physical world
- 10.6 Nyaya concept of God
- 10.7 Vaisesika concept of *padartha* or Category
- 10.8 Vaisesika on Atoms and Creation
- 10.9 Bondage and Liberation
- 10.10 PANCHABHUTA Or Five Elements
- 10.11 Three Planes of Existence
- 10.12 Epistemology
- 10.13 Let Us Sum Up
- 10.14 Key Words
- 10.15 Questions for Review
- 10.16 Suggested readings and refernces
- 10.17 Answer to check your progress

10.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, the student should be able to:

- Understand the orthodox systems of the Nyaya and Vaisesika.
- Elucidate the Nyaya theory of knowledge.
- Discuss the Nyaya theory of causation.
- Recognize Nyaya conception of God and proofs for the existence of God.
- Be aware of the categories of Vaisesika.
- Appreciate the Vaisesika theory of Atomism.

- Comprehend the Vaisesika concept of Bondage and Liberation.

10.1 INTRODUCTION

The Nyaya is the work of the great philosopher and sage Gautama. It is a realistic philosophy based mainly on logical grounds. It admits four separate sources of true knowledge. Perception (*pratyaksa*), inference (*anumana*), comparison (*upamana*) and testimony (*shabda*) are the sources of true knowledge. Perception is the direct knowledge of objects produced by their relation to our senses. Inference is the knowledge of objects not through perception but through the apprehension of some mark. Comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a name and things so named on the basis of a given description of their similarity to some familiar object. Testimony is the knowledge about anything derived from the statements of authoritative persons.

The objects of knowledge, according to the Nyaya, are the self, the body, the senses and their objects, cognition (*buddhi*), mind (*manas*), activity (*pravritti*), mental defects (*dosa*) rebirth (*pretyabhava*), the feeling of pleasure and pain (*phala*), suffering (*dukkha*), and freedom from suffering (*apavarga*). The Nyaya seeks to deliver the self from its bondage to the body, the senses and their objects. It says that the self is distinct from the body and the mind. The body is only a composite substance made of matter. The mind is a subtle, indivisible and eternal substance. It serves the soul as an instrument for the perception of psychic qualities like pleasure, pain, etc; it is, therefore, called an internal sense. The self (*atman*) is another substance which is quite distinct from the mind and the body. Liberation (*apavarga*) means the absolute cessation of all pain and suffering brought about by the right knowledge of reality (*tattva jnana*). Liberation is only release from pain. The existence of God is proved by the Nyaya by several arguments. God is the ultimate cause of the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world. Nyaya did not create the world out of nothing, but out of eternal atoms, space, time, ether, minds and souls.

The Vaisesika system was founded by the philosopher and the sage Kanada. The Vaisesika is allied to the Nyaya system and has the same end view, namely, the liberation of the individual self. It brings all objects of knowledge, the whole world, under the seven categories of substance (*dravya*), quality (*guna*), action (*karma*), generality (*samanya*), particularity (*visesa*), the relation of inherence (*samavaya*), and non-existence (*abhava*). A substance is the substratum of qualities and activities, but is different from both. A quality is that which exists in a substance and has itself no quality or activity. An action is a movement. Particularity is the ground of the ultimate differences of things. Inherence is the permanent or eternal relation by which a whole is in its parts; a quality or an action is in a substance; the universal is in the particulars. Non-existence stands for all negative facts. With regard to God and liberation of the individual soul the Vaisesika theory is substantially the same as that of the Nyaya.

10.2 NYAYA AND VAISESIKA

Nyaya is a system of atomic pluralism and logical realism. It is allied to the Vaisesika system which is regarded as ‘*Samanatantra*’ or similar philosophy. Vaisesika develops metaphysics and ontology. Nyaya develops logic and epistemology. Both agree in viewing the earthly life as full of suffering, as bondage of the soul; liberation is absolute cessation of suffering as the supreme end of life. Both agree that bondage is due to ignorance of reality and that liberation is due to right knowledge of reality. Vaisesika takes up the exposition of reality and Nyaya mostly accepts the Vaisesika metaphysics. But there are some important points of difference between them which may be noted. Firstly, while the Vaisesika recognizes seven categories and classifies all real under them, the Nyaya recognizes sixteen categories and includes all the seven categories of the Vaisesikas in one of them called *prameya* or the knowable, the second in the sixteen. The first category is *pramana* or the valid means of knowledge. This clearly brings out the predominantly logical and epistemological character of the Nyaya

system. Secondly, while the Vaisesika recognizes only two *pramanas*, perception and inference and reduces comparison and verbal authority to inference, the Nyaya recognizes all the four as separate – perception, inference, comparison and verbal authority.

10.3 NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge or Cognition is defined as apprehension or consciousness. Nyaya believes that knowledge reveals both the subject and the object; they are quite distinct from knowledge. All knowledge is a revelation or manifestation of objects. Just as a lamp manifests physical things placed before it, so knowledge reveals all objects which come before it. Knowledge may be valid or invalid. Valid knowledge is defined as the right apprehension of an object. It is the manifestation of an object as it is. Nyaya maintains the theory of correspondence (*paratah pramanya*). Knowledge in order to be valid, must correspond to reality. Valid knowledge is produced by the four valid means of knowledge-perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Invalid knowledge includes memory (*smrti*), doubt (*samshaya*), error (*viparyaya*) and hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*). Memory is not valid because it is not present cognition but a represented one. The object remembered is not directly presented to the soul, but only indirectly recalled. Doubt is uncertainty in cognition. Error is misapprehension as it does not correspond to the real object. Hypothetical reasoning is no real knowledge.

Perception, inference, comparison or analogy and verbal testimony are the four kinds of valid knowledge. Let us consider them one by one. Sage Gotama defines perception as non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects; it is not associated with a name and which is well-defined. Inference is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. Inference is mediate and indirect. Comparison defined as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. It is produced by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity. Verbal testimony is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person and

consists in understanding its meaning.

10.4 NYAYA THEORY OF CAUSATION

Let us now consider the Nyaya theory of Causation. A cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect. The same cause produces the same effect and the same effect is produced by the same cause. Plurality of cause is ruled out. The first essential characteristic of a cause is its antecedence; the fact that it should precede the effect. The second is its invariability; it must invariably precede the effect. The third is its unconditionality or necessity; it must unconditionally precede the effect. Nyaya recognizes five kinds of accidental antecedents which are not real causes. Firstly, the qualities of a cause are mere accidental antecedents. The color of a potter's staff is not the cause of a pot. Secondly, the cause of a cause or a remote cause is not unconditional. The potter's father is not the cause of a pot. Thirdly, the co-effects of a cause are themselves not causally related. The sound produced by the potter's staff is not the cause of a pot, though it may invariably precede the pot. Night and day are not causally related. Fourthly, eternal substances like space are not unconditional antecedents. Fifthly, unnecessary things like the potter's ass are not unconditional antecedents; though the potter's ass may be invariably present when the potter is making a pot, yet it is not the cause of the pot. A cause must be an unconditional and necessary antecedent. Nyaya emphasizes the sequence view of causality. Cause and effect are never simultaneous. Plurality of causes is also wrong because causal relation is reciprocal. The same effect cannot be produced by another cause. Each effect has its distinctive features and has only one specific cause. An effect is defined as the counter-entity of its own prior non-existence. It is the negation of its own prior negation. It comes into being and destroys its prior non-existence. It was non-existent before its production. It did not pre-exist in its cause. It is a fresh beginning, a new creation.

10.5 NYAYA THEORY OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD

Now we come to the topic of the objects of knowledge. The physical world is constituted by the four physical substances of earth, water, fire and air. The ultimate constituents of these four substances are the eternal and unchanging atoms of earth, water, fire and air. *Akasa* or ether, *kala* or time, and *dik* or space is eternal and infinite substances, each being one single whole. Thus the physical world is the product of the four kinds of atoms of earth, water, fire and air. It contains all the composite products of these atoms, and their qualities and relations, including organic bodies, the senses, and the sensible qualities of things. According to Gautama the objects of knowledge are the self, the body, the senses and their objects, knowledge, mind, activity, the mental imperfections, rebirth, the feelings of pleasure and pain, suffering, absolute freedom from all suffering. All of these knowable are not to be found in the physical world, because it includes only those objects that either physical or somehow belong to the world of physical nature. Thus the self, its attribute of knowledge and *manas* are not at all physical. Time and space are two substances which although different from the physical substances, yet somehow belong to the physical world. *Akasa* is a physical substance which is not a productive cause of anything.

10.6 NYAYA CONCEPT OF GOD

God is the ultimate cause of creation, maintenance and destruction of the world. God is the eternal infinite self who creates, maintains and destroys the world. He does not create the world out of nothing, but out of eternal atoms, space, time, ether, minds and souls. The creation of the world means the ordering of the eternal entities, which are co-existent with God, into a moral world, in which individual selves enjoy and suffer according to the merit and demerit of their actions, and all physical objects serve as means to the moral and spiritual ends of our life. God is thus the creator of the world in the sense of being the first efficient cause of the world and not its material

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cause. He is also the preserver of the world in so far as the world is kept in existence by the will of God. So also He is the destroyer who lets loose the forces of destruction when the exigencies of the moral world require it. Then, God is one, infinite and eternal, since the world of space and time, minds and souls does not limit him, but is related to Him as a body to the self which resides in it. He is omnipotent, although He is guided in His activities by moral considerations of the merit and demerit of human actions. He is omniscient in so far as He possesses right knowledge of all things and events. He has eternal consciousness as a power of direct and steadfast cognition of all objects. Eternal consciousness is only an inseparable attribute of God, not His very essence, as maintained in the Advaita Vedanta. He possesses to the full all the six perfections and is majestic, almighty, all glorious, infinitely beautiful and possessed of infinite knowledge and perfect freedom from attachment.

Just as God is the efficient cause of the world, so He is the directive cause of the actions of all living beings. Nyaya gives the following arguments to prove the existence of God:

1. The world is an effect and hence it must have an efficient cause. This intelligent agent is God. The order, design, co-ordination between different phenomena comes from God.
1. The atoms being essentially inactive cannot form the different combinations unless God gives motion to them. The Unseen Power, the Adrsta, requires the intelligence of God.
Without God it cannot supply motion to the atoms.
1. The world is sustained by God's will. Unintelligent Adrsta cannot do this. And the world is destroyed by God's will.
1. A word has a meaning and signifies an object. The power of words to signify their objects comes from God.
1. God is the author of the infallible Veda.
1. The Veda testifies to the existence of God.
1. The Vedic sentences deal with moral injunctions and prohibitions. The Vedic commands are the Divine commands. God is the creator

and promulgator of the moral laws.

1. According to Nyaya the magnitude of a dyad is not produced by the infinitesimal magnitude of the two atoms each, but by the number of the two atoms. Number 'one' is directly perceived, but other numbers are conceptual creations. Numerical conception is related to the mind of the perceiver. At the time of creation, the souls are unconscious. And the atoms and the unseen Power and space, time, mind are all unconscious. Hence the numerical conception depends upon the Divine Consciousness. So God must exist.

1. We reap the fruits of our own actions. Merit and demerit accrue from our actions and the stock of merit and demerit is called *Adrsta*, the unseen power. But this Unseen Power, being unintelligent, needs the guidance of a supremely intelligent God.

10.7 VAISESIKA CONCEPT OF PADARTHA OR CATEGORY

The Vaisesika system is regarded as conducive to the study of all systems. Its main purpose is to deal with the categories and to unfold its atomistic pluralism. A category is called *padartha* and the entire universe is reduced to six or seven *padarthas*. *Padartha* literally means the meaning of a word or the object signified by a word. All objects of knowledge or all reals come under *padartha*. *Padartha* means an object which can be thought and named.

Originally the Vaisesika believed in the six categories and the seventh, that of *abhava* or negation was added later on. Though Kanada himself speaks of *abhava*, yet he does not give it the status of a category to which it was raised only by the later *Vaisesikas*. The Vaisesika divides all existent reals which are all objects of knowledge into two classes; *bhava* or being and *abhava* or non-being. Six categories come under *bhava* and the seventh is *abhava*. All knowledge necessarily points to an object of knowledge and is called a *padartha*. The seven *padarthas* are:

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1. substance (*dravya*), 2 quality (*guna*), 3 Activity (*karma*), 4 generality (*samanya*), 5 particularity (*visesa*), 6 inherence (*samavaya*), and 7. non-being (*abhava*).

1. Dravya Or Substance

Dravya or substance is defined as the substratum where actions and qualities in here and which is the coexistent material cause of the composite things produce from it. Substance signifies the self-subsistence, the absolute and independent nature of things. The category of substance is the substratum of qualities and actions. The *dravyas* are nine and include material as well as spiritual substances. The Vaisesika philosophy is pluralistic and realistic but not materialistic since it admits spiritual substances. The nine substances are: 1) earth (*prthivi*), 2) Water (*Ap*), 3) Fire (*tejas*), 4) Air (*vayu*), 5) ether (*akasa*), 6) time (*kala*), 7) space (*dik*), 8) spirit (*atman*) and 9) mind (*manas*). Earth, water, fire and air really signify not compound transient objects made out of them, but the ultimate elements, the supersensible eternal partless unique atoms which are individual and infinitesimal. Earth, water, fire, air and ether are the five gross elements. These and *manas* are physical. Soul is spiritual. Time and space are objective and not subjective forms of experience. Ether, space, time and soul are all-pervading and eternal. Atoms, minds and souls are infinite in number. Ether, space and time are one each.

2. Guna or Quality

The second category is *guna* or quality. Unlike substance, it cannot exist independently by itself and possesses no quality or action. It inheres in a substance and depends for its existence on the substance and is not a constitutive cause of anything. It is called an independent reality because it can be conceived, thought and named independent of a substance where it inheres. The qualities are therefore called objective entities. They are not necessarily eternal. They include both material and mental qualities. They are a static and permanent feature of a substance, whole action of a dynamic and transient feature of a substance. A quality, therefore, is different from both substance and action. Qualities include material and spiritual

properties. Smell is the quality of earth; taste of water; color of fire; touch of air; and sound of ether. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition are the mental qualities which inhere in the self.

3. Karma or Action

The third category is *karma* or action. Like quality, it belongs to and inheres in a substance and cannot exist separately from it. But while a quality is a static and permanent feature of a substance, an action is a dynamic and transient feature of it. Unlike a quality, an action is the cause of conjunction and disjunction. Action is said to be of five kinds: 1) upward movement, 2) downward movement, 3) contraction, 4) expansion, and 5) locomotion.

4. Samanya or Generality

The fourth category is *samanya* or generality. *Samanya* is generality. Generality is class-concept, class-essence or universal. It is the common character of the things which fall under the same class. The universals reside in substances, qualities and actions. They are of two kinds, higher and lower. The higher generality is that of 'being'. It includes everything and itself is not included in anything. Every other generality is lower because it covers a limited number of things and cannot cover all things. A universal cannot subsist in another universal; otherwise an individual may be a man, a cow, and a horse at the same time.

5. Visesa or Particularity

The fifth category is *Visesa* or particularity. It enables us to perceive things as different from one another. Every individual is a particular, a single and a unique thing different from all others. It has got a unique of its own which constitutes its particularity. It is opposed to generality. Generality is inclusive; particularly is exclusive. Generality forms the basis of assimilation; particularity forms the basis of discrimination. It is very important to remember that the composite objects of this world which we generally call 'particular' objects are not real particular.

6. *Samavaya* or Inherence

The sixth category is *Samavaya* or inseparable relation called 'inherence.' It is different conjunction or *samyoga* which is separable and transient relation and is a quality. *Samavaya* is an independent category. Kanada calls it the relation between cause and effect. *Samvaya* is one and eternal relationship subsisting between two things inseparably connected.

1. *Abhava*

The seventh category is *Abhava* or non-existence. Kanada does not mention it as a separate category. Absence of an object and knowledge of its absence are different. The first six categories are positive. This is negative. The other categories are regarded as absolute, but this category is relative in its conception. Non-existence is of four kinds: 1) antecedent non-existence, 2) subsequent non-existence, 3) mutual non-existence and 4) absolute non-existence.

10.8 VAISESIKA ON ATOMS AND CREATION

According to Vaisesika diversity and not unity is at the root of the universe. Vaisesika says that atom is the minutest particle of matter which may not be further divisible. The indivisible, partless and eternal particle of matter is called an atom (*paramanu*). All physical things are produced by the combination of atoms. Therefore creation means the combination of atoms in different proportions and destruction means the dissolution of such combination. The material cause of the universe is neither produced nor destroyed. It is the eternal atoms.

The atoms are said to be of four kinds; of earth, water, fire and air. Ether or *akasha* is not atomic. It is one and all-pervading and affords the medium for the combinations of the atoms. The atoms differ from one another both in quantity and in quality. Each has a particularity of its own and exists as a separate reality. During dissolution, they remain inactive. Motion is imparted to them by the unseen power (*adrsta*) of merit (*dharma*) and

demerit (*adharmā*) which resides in the individual souls and wants to fructify in the form of enjoyment or suffering. Atoms are supra-sensible. Atoms increase by multiplication and not by mere addition. When motion is imparted to them by the unseen power, they begin to vibrate and immediately change into dyads. A *dyad* is produced by the combination of two atoms. The atoms are its inherent cause; conjunction is its non-inherent cause; and the Unseen power is its efficient cause. An atom is indivisible, spherical and imperceptible. A *dyad* (*dvyanuka*) is minute (*anu*), short (*hrasva*) and imperceptible.

From the standpoint of ancient Indian philosophy the world including physical nature is a moral stage for the education and emancipation of individual souls. The Vaisesika atomic theory of the world is guided by spiritual outlook of ancient Indian philosophy.

The atomic theory of the Vaisesika explains that part of the world which is non-eternal subject to origin and destruction in time. The eternal constituents of the universe, namely, the four kinds of atoms, and the five substances of *akasa*, space, time, mind, and soul, do not come within the purview of their atomic theory, because these can neither be created nor destroyed. On the other hand, all composite objects, beginning with a dyad or the first compound of only two atoms (*dvyanuka*) are non-eternal. So the atomic theory explains the order of creation and destruction of these non-eternal objects. All composite objects are constituted by the combination of atoms and destroyed through their separation. The first combination of two atoms is called a *dvyanuka* or dyad, and a combination of three dyads (*dvyanukas*) is called a *tryanuka* or triad. The *Tryanuka* is also called the *trasarenu* and it is the minimum perceptible object according to the Vaisesika. The paramanu or atom and the *dvyanuka* or dyad, being smaller than the *tryanuka* or triad, cannot be perceived, but are known through inference.

All the finite objects of the physical world and the physical world itself are composed of the four kinds of atoms in the form of dyads, triads and other larger compounds arise out of these. The world or the universe is a system of physical things and living beings having bodies with senses and possessing

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mind, intellect and egoism. All these exist and interact with one another, in time, space and *akasa*. Living beings are souls who enjoy or suffer in this world according to their character; wise or ignorant, good or bad, virtuous or vicious. The order of the world is, on the whole, a moral order in which the life and destiny of all individual selves are governed, not only by the physical laws of time and space, but also by the universal moral law of *karma*. In the simplest form this law means 'as you sow, so you reap,' just as the physical law of causation, in its most abstract form, means that there can be no effect without a cause.

Vaisesika admits the reality of the spiritual substances, souls and God, and also admits the law of *karma*. The atoms are the material cause of the world of which God, assisted by the Unseen power, is the efficient cause. The physical world presupposes the moral order. Evolution is due to the Unseen Power consisting of merits and demerits of the individual souls which want to bear fruits as enjoyments or sufferings to be experienced by the souls. Keeping in view this moral

order of the universe, the Vaisesika explains the process of creation and destruction of the world as follows: The starting -point of the process of creation or destruction is the will of the supreme Lord (*Mahesvara*) who is the ruler of the whole universe. The Lord conceives the will to create a universe in which individual beings may get their proper share of the experience of pleasure and pain according to their deserts. The world being beginningless (*anadi*), we cannot speak of a first creation of the world. In truth, every creation is preceded by some order of creation. To create is to destroy an existing order of things and usher in a new order. Hence it is that God's creative will has reference to the stock of merit and demerit act with souls, endowed with the creative function of *adrsta* that first sets in motion the atoms acquired by individual souls in a previous life lived in some other world. When God thus wills to create a world, the unseen forces of moral deserts in the eternal individual souls begin to function in the direction of creation and the active life of experiences. And it is the content of air. Out of the combination of air- atoms, in the form of dyads and triads, arises the gross physical element of air, and it exists as an incessantly vibrating

medium in the eternal *akasa*. Then, in a similar way, there is motion in the atoms of water and the creation of the gross element of water which exists in the air and is moved by it. Next, the atoms of earth are set in motion in a similar way and compose the gross element of earth which exists in the vast expanse of the gross elemental water. Then from the atoms of light arises in a similar way, the gross element of light and exists with its luminosity in the gross water. After this and by the mere thought of God, there appears the embryo of a world out of the atoms of light and earth. God animates that great embryo with Brahma, the world-soul, who is endowed with supreme wisdom, detachment and excellence. To Brahma God entrusts the work of creation in its concrete details and with proper adjustment between merit and demerit on the one hand, and happiness and misery on the other.

The created world runs its course for many years. But it cannot continue to exist and endure for all time to come. Just as after the stress and strain of the day's work God allows us rest at night, so after the trials and tribulations of many lives in one created world. God provides a way of escape from suffering for all living beings for some time. This is done by him through the destruction of the world. So the period of creation is followed by a state of destruction. The process of the world's dissolution is as follows: When in the course of time Brahma, the world-soul, gives up his body like other souls, there appears in *Mahesvara* or the supreme Lord a desire to destroy the world. With this, the creative *adrsta* or unseen moral agency in living beings is counteracted by the corresponding destructive *adrsta* and ceases to function for the active life of experience. It is in contact with such souls, in which the destructive *adrsta* begins to operate, that there is motion in the constituent atoms of their body and senses. On account of this motion there is disjunction of the atoms and consequent disintegration of the body and the senses. The body with the senses being thus destroyed, what remain are only the atoms in their isolation. So also, there is motion in the constituent atoms of the elemental earth, and its consequent destruction through the cessation of their conjunction. In this way there is the destruction of the physical elements of earth, water, light and air, one after the other. Thus these four physical elements and all bodies and sense organs are disintegrated and

destroyed. What remain are the four kinds of atoms of earth, water, light and air in their isolation, and the eternal substances of akasa, time, apace, minds and souls with their stock of merit, demerit and past impressions. It will be observed here that while in the order of destruction, earth compounds come first, then those of water, light and air in succession, in the order of creation, air compounds come first, water compounds next, and then those of the great earth and light appear in succession.

10.9 VAISESIKA CONCEPT OF BONDAGE AND LIBERATION

The Vaisesika regards bondage as due to ignorance and liberation as due to knowledge. The soul, due to ignorance, performs actions. Actions lead to merits or demerits. They are due to attachment or aversion and aim at obtaining pleasure or avoiding pain. The merits and demerits of the individual souls make up the unseen moral power, the *adrsta*. According to the law of *Karma*, one has to reap the fruits of actions one has performed whether they are good or bad according to the *karmas* one performed. This *adrsta*, guided by God, imparts motion to the atoms and leads to creation for the sake of enjoyment or suffering of the individual souls. Liberation is cessation of all life, all consciousness, all bliss, together with all pain and all qualities. It is qualityless, indeterminate, pure nature of the individual soul as pure substance devoid of all qualities.

What does Karma Bhumi mean?

Karma bhumi is a Sanskrit term that translates as “land of action.” Bhumi means “earth,” “country” or “land,” while karma is typically defined as “action” or “activity.” In Jainism and Hinduism, what constitutes karma bhumi varies depending on the tradition, but always refers to some sort of earthly plane.

The law of karma refers to the concept of one's actions -- both good and bad -- affecting one's destiny or fate in the future and in subsequent lives.

Because karma is rooted in the belief systems of India, karma bhumi is sometimes used as a synonym for India or the Indian subcontinent.

Yogapedia explains Karma Bhumi

In Indian philosophy, the universe is divided into realms or regions, which vary in number but include some sort of heavenly world, earthly world and underworld. The earthly world, called martya or bhu-loka, is sometimes referred to in its entirety as karma bhumi, or the place where good and bad actions reap karma. The other worlds, or lokas, are collectively referred to as bhoga bhumi.

In Jainism, the world inhabited by humans is divided into zones, three of which – bharat kshetra, mahavideh kshetra and airavat kshetra – comprise karma bhumi. In karma bhumi, Jain doctrine is preached and the faithful live an austere life in order to obtain liberation. In the other zones, people live a life of pleasure with no sin and, therefore, no need for religion.

10.10 PANCHABHUTA OR FIVE ELEMENTS.

Our whole cosmic quest of the world and beyond starts from the point of panchabhuta (five elements) which then manifests in an enjoining manner to form the life force and then, later, those five elements disintegrates to ensue a celestial traverse at the Paramanu (atom) level.

However, we will first try to understand these five elements which are Earth or Prithvi; Water or Jal ; Fire or Agni; Air or Vayu and then Ether or Akasha. Each of these Five elements has its own character and celestial elements which we will gauge in the following lines.

Earth (Prithvi): One can touch earth and smell it too ! However, there are two types of earth one is Eternal or (nitya) which are in the form of atom (Paramanu).The other type is perishable (anitya) which exists in the form of

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Karya or Work at animate and inanimate levels. Symbolically speaking our body, sense organs are the earth which as a whole get the shape of Jiva or life but those are perishable. But elements or atoms are eternal as after death may we bury, or burn the body, all the atoms get disintegrated to come back to its original eternal form. So our body and its Karya or Work are perishable as the mountain or rock forms but the atom remains which are eternal.

Water or Jal is the second element which again has two characters as in the Earth i.e. eternal in the shape of atom and Karya (Work) be it as river, pond or sea are perishable. As from sea or river water evaporates to be in the sky as cloud then again in the shape of rain it comes down on earth. So the eternal atom is only changing its karya or shape of work and what we see is the perishable form. From the sense organ perspective we can touch it to feel and taste it as well.

The third element is Air or Vayu. Again it has two levels as earth and water i.e. eternal atom and perishable Karya. One can feel air, as we breathe in or out. We feel the storm or strong breeze which are temporary but air at atomic level remains around us eternally. In the Purana there is a mention of 49 types of Maruts or winds. Seven are important namely 1. Pravaha 2. Avaha; 3. Udvaha 4. Samvaha; 5. Vivaha; 6. Parvaha and 7. Paravaha. The wind which takes the water from the ocean is called Udvaha.

Fire or Agni is the fourth element of Indian Panchabhuta. Again it has eternal and perishable elements as we have seen above. The essential character of Fire is to generate heat. According to Hindu Mythology, Agni is one of the Eight guardians who guard our universe and is known as Asta-dik-palakas (Asta-eight, dik--Zone, Palaka-Guardian). The Fire is positioned in the South East of the Universe.

However, in Indian mythology there are mentions of various types of fires. The four important ones are fire of the earth, fire of the sky, fire of the stomach (can mean hunger and digestive power as well) and the fire we commonly use.

Then comes the last of the Panchabhuta or five elements which is sound or ether. Ether is unique as it has only one character i.e. eternal. Ether is the carrier of sound be it man made or otherwise. One can hear it. As ether is the only eternal element of the five elements it attracted the attention of various sages. The concept of Akashvani or Devine sound which is heard by sages of higher order is related to this Ether or Akasha. The primordial mantra AUM then in modern times Raam or Shyaam are to work as linkages between Jivatma (life force--atman or soul) to Paramatman or (Omnipotent of supreme soul). The concept of sound and Mantra will be discussed in the next issue. Now we should concentrate on elements, other than five mentioned above which are very important to Hindu theological perspective. Those are Time (Kala) and Space (Sthan or Dik i.e. place and direction); Soul and Mind.

Like ether Time and Space are eternal. Time or kala is common cause of all actions of all the elements and is eternal link of predetermined actions and happenings. Thus in Hindu astrology the whole world and its course are equated with "time". The Direction or Dik are part of Space and North, South, West and East are eternal no matter the Universe undergoes whatever changes.

Then the other element is Soul which is related with the knowledge system of man as jivatman and the eternal Knowledge of God or Paramatman (omnipotent). The last of the nine main elements is the manas or Mind. Its the sense-organ or path to experience the world eternally and otherwise. These sense organs are in the shape of eternal paramanu or atom and works is combinations to derive pleasure at worldly levels. These are the brief out line of main five elements and other four primary elements. It is said that our universe was created out of the manifestation of five elements. This was described in the Devigita very elaborately.

Devigita proclaims that Shakti went about creating the world with 24 tattvas or elements. The five elements were born out of the primordial principle of unmanifested Sakti. The ether through which sound traverse was first element, which is also known as Sabda-rupa (form of sound). Second was

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Air or Vayu (Sparsharupa or a form which is felt) The Air or Vayu give rise to Agni so it called Vayoranih. Then sense of taste or 'rasrupa' the water element came. The the gandharupa or the source of smell came--the earth.

Pauranic Expert Vettam Mani said that the universe remained in embryo form or in the bijarupa. "These Panchabhutas{five elements} were first divided into two (each was divided into two). Then by a process of the combination of these ten parts different substances were born....Each half of each of these five bhutas{elements} is again subdivided into four parts. These 1/8 parts are joined to the other halves and by combining them in other fractions of the material bodies(sthularariras of all beings are made." wrote Vettam Mani.

The cosmic body is the grand total of those material bodies discussed above. The first and pure manifestation of those five elements are the inner conscience and bodily organs like ear etc. However, the inner conscience or Antarkaranas assumes four state or forms. Once conception and doubt arise it is called Mind. But when there is no doubt arises is called Buddhi. The process of examination and re-examination of a subjects belongs to the state of intellect called citta. But with the feeling of "I" the ego or ahamkar bursts out. So we find the pure five elements gave rise to the inner conscience or Antarkarnana and then there are four states within it namely mind, buddhi, citta and ego.

Vettam Mani explained "From the coarse (rajasic) aspect of the five sense organs originate the five organs of action like word, foot, hand, excretory and the genital organ, and also the five pranas (breaths) called prana, apana, samana, udhana and vyana.

...Prana is located in the heart, apana in the anus, samana in the nabhi (navel)udana in the throat and Vyana all over the body.....(Organs of knowldege 5, of action 5, and pranas 5,and buddhi 1,mind 1, the bodily is composes of these 17 factors".

The sukshmasaria or the subtle body has two nature or Prakrati namely maya wherein the god is reflected. The other is Avidya seen by Jiva or living

being who is receptive of sorrows. Through Vidya (Eternal Knowledge) and Avidya (ignorance) three forms of body emerge. Mani explained 'He who is attached and is proud about the material body is called visva; he who attaches importance to the subtle body is called Taijiswa, and who is aware of casual body is called Prajna.' Likewise we see how the five elements manifested itself into 22 tattva (materials) which all go towards creation of a body. In the Devigita it is said that eighty-four lakh species of living beings have manifested from these five elements. In the next article we would take up the ether or sound elements in mantra perspective which has only single and eternal entity and dwells in Hindu theology vibrantly.

Check Your Progress I

1. Describe briefly panchbhuta.

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History of Advaita Vedānta

It is possible that an Advaita tradition existed in the early part of the first millennium C.E., as indicated by Śaṅkara himself with his reference to tradition (sampradāya). But the only two names that could have some historical certainty are Gaudapāda and Govinda Bhagavadpāda, mentioned as Śaṅkara's teacher's teacher and the latter Śaṅkara's teacher. The first complete Advaitic work is considered to be the Mandukya Kārikā, a commentary on the Mandukya Upanṣad, authored by Gaudapāda. Śaṅkara, as many scholars believe, lived in the eight century. His life, travel, and works, as we understand from the digvijaya texts are almost of a superhuman quality. Though he lived only for 32 years, Śaṅkara's accomplishments included traveling from the south to the north of India, writing commentaries for the ten Upaniṣads, the cryptic Brahma Sūtra, the Bhagavad Gītā, and authoring many other texts (though his authorship of only some is

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established), and founding four pīṭhas, or centers of (Advaitic) excellence, with his pupils in charge. Śaṅkara is supposed to have had four (prominent) pupils: Padmapāda, Sureśvara, Hastamalaka and Toṭaka. Padmapāda is said to be his earliest student. Panchapadika, by Padmapāda, is a lucid commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary on the first verses of the Brahma Sūtra. Sureśvara is supposed to have written Naiṣkarmya Siddhi, an independent treatise on Advaita. Mandana Miśra (eight century), an earlier adherent of the rival school of Bhatta Mīmāṃsā, is responsible for a version of Advaita which focuses on the doctrine of sphota, a semantic theory held by the Indian philosopher of language Bhartṛhari. He also accepts to a greater extent the joint importance of knowledge and works as a means to liberation, when for Śaṅkara knowledge is the one and only means. Mandana Miśra's Brahmasiddhi is a significant work, which also marks a distinct form of Advaita. Two major sub-schools of Advaita Vedānta arose after Śaṅkara: Bhamati and Vivarana. The Bhamati School owes its name to Vacaspati Miśra's (ninth century) commentary on Śaṅkara's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, while the Vivarana School is named after Prakāśatman's (tenth century) commentary on Padmapāda's Panchapadika, which itself is a commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. The prominent names in the later Advaita tradition are Prakāśātman (tenth century), Vimuktātman (tenth century), Sarvajñātman (tenth century), Śrī Harṣa (twelfth century), Citsukha (twelfth century), ānandagiri (thirteenth century), Amalānandā (thirteenth century), Vidyāraṇya (fourteenth century), Śaṅkarānandā (fourteenth century), Sadānandā (fifteenth century), Prakāśānanda (sixteenth century), Nṛsimhāśrama (sixteenth century), Madhusūdhana Sarasvatī (seventeenth century), Dharmarāja Advarindra (seventeenth century), Appaya Dīkṣita (seventeenth century), Sadaśiva Brahmendra (eighteenth century), Candrasekhara Bhārati (twentieth century), and Sacchidānandendra Sarasvatī (twentieth century). Vivarana, which is a commentary on Padmapāda's Panchapadika, written by Vacaspati Mshra is a landmark work in the tradition. The Khandanakhandakhadya of Śrī Harṣa, Tattvapradīpika of Citsukha, Pañcadasi of Vidyāraṇya, Vedāntasāra of Sadānandā, Advaitasiddhi of Madhusadana Sarasvatī, and

Vedāntapariḥsa of Dharmarāja Advarindra are some of the landmark works representing later Advaita tradition. Throughout the eighteenth century and until the twenty-first century, there are many saints and philosophers whose tradition is rooted primarily or largely in Advaita philosophy. Prominent among the saints are Bhagavan Ramana Maharṣi, Swami Vivekananda, Swami Tapovanam, Swami Chinmayānandā, and Swami Bodhānandā. Among the philosophers, KC Bhattacharya and TMP Mahadevan have contributed a great deal to the tradition.

Metaphysics and Philosophy

The classical Advaita philosophy of Śāṅkara recognizes a unity in multiplicity, identity between individual and pure consciousness, and the experienced world as having no existence apart from Brahman. The major metaphysical concepts in Advaita Vedānta tradition, such as māyā, mithya (error in judgment), vivarta (illusion/whirlpool), have been subjected to a variety of interpretations. On some interpretations, Advaita Vedānta appears as a nihilistic philosophy that denounces the matters of the lived-world

a. Brahman, Jīva, īśvara, and Māyā

For classical Advaita Vedānta, Brahman is the fundamental reality underlying all objects and experiences. Brahman is explained as pure existence, pure consciousness and pure bliss. All forms of existence presuppose a knowing self. Brahman or pure consciousness underlies the knowing self. Consciousness according to the Advaita School, unlike the positions held by other Vedānta schools, is not a property of Brahman but its very nature. Brahman is also one without a second, all-pervading and the immediate awareness. This absolute Brahman is known as nirguṇa Brahman, or Brahman “without qualities,” but is usually simply called “Brahman.” This Brahman is ever known to Itself and constitutes the reality in all individuals selves, while the appearance of our empirical individuality is credited to avidya (ignorance) and māyā (illusion). Brahman thus cannot be known as an individual object distinct from the individual self. However, it

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can be experienced indirectly in the natural world of experience as a personal God, known as saṅuṅa Brahman, or Brahman with qualities. It is usually referred to as īśvara (the Lord). The appearance of plurality arises from a natural state of confusion or ignorance (avidya), inherent in most biological entities. Given this natural state of ignorance, Advaita provisionally accepts the empirical reality of individual selves, mental ideas and physical objects as a cognitive construction of this natural state of ignorance. But from the absolute standpoint, none of these have independent existence but are founded on Brahman. From the standpoint of this fundamental reality, individual minds as well as physical objects are appearances and do not have abiding reality. Brahman appears as the manifold objects of experience because of its creative power, māyā. Māyā is that which appears to be real at the time of experience but which does not have ultimate existence. It is dependent on pure consciousness. Brahman appears as the manifold world without undergoing an intrinsic change or modification. At no point of time does Brahman change into the world. The world is but avivarta, a superimposition on Brahman. The world is neither totally real nor totally unreal. It is not totally unreal since it is experienced. It is not totally real since it is sublated by knowledge of Brahman. There are many examples given to illustrate the relation between the existence of the world and Brahman. The two famous examples are that of the space in a pot versus the space in the whole cosmos (undifferentiated in reality, though arbitrarily separated by the contingencies of the pot just as the world is in relation to Brahman), and the self versus the reflection of the self (the reflection having no substantial existence apart from the self just as the objects of the world rely upon Brahman for substantiality). The existence of an individuated jīva and the world are without a beginning. We cannot say when they began, or what the first cause is. But both are with an end, which is knowledge of Brahman. According to classical Advaita Vedānta, the existence of the empirical world cannot be conceived without a creator who is all-knowing and all-powerful. The creation, sustenance, and dissolution of the world are overseen by īśvara. īśvara is the purest manifestation of Brahman. Brahman with the creative power of māyā is īśvara. Māyā has both

individual (vyaṣṭi) and cosmic (samaṣṭi) aspects. The cosmic aspect belongs to one īśvara, and the individual aspect, avidya, belongs to many jīvas. But the difference is that īśvara is not controlled by māyā, whereas the jīva is overpowered by avidya. Māyā is responsible for the creation of the world. Avidya is responsible for confounding the distinct existence between self and the not-self. With this confounding, avidya conceals Brahman and constructs the world. As a result the jīva functions as a doer (karta) and enjoyer (bhokta) of a limited world. The classical picture may be contrasted with two sub-schools of Advaita Vedānta that arose after Śaṅkara: Bhamati and Vivarana. The primary difference between these two sub-schools is based on the different interpretations for avidya and māyā. Śaṅkara described avidya as beginningless. He considered that to search the origin of avidya itself is a process founded on avidya and hence will be fruitless. But Śaṅkara's disciples gave greater attention to this concept, and thus originated the two sub-schools. The Bhamati School owes its name to Vacaspati Miśra's (ninth century) commentary on Śaṅkara's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, while the Vivarana School is named after Prakāśātman's (tenth century) commentary on Padmapāda's Pañcapadika, which itself is a commentary on Śaṅkara's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya. The major issue that distinguishes Bhamati and Vivarana schools is their position on the nature and locus of avidya. According to the Bhamati School, the jīva is the locus and object of avidya. According to the Vivarana School, Brahman is the locus of avidya. The Bhamati School holds that Brahman can never be the locus of avidya but is the controller of it as īśvara. Belonging to jīva, tula-avidya, or individual ignorance performs two functions – veils Brahman, and projects (vikṣepa) a separate world. Mula-avidya (“root ignorance”) is the universal ignorance that is equivalent to Māyā, and is controlled by īśvara. The Vivarana School holds that since Brahman alone exists, Brahman is the locus and object of avidya. With the help of epistemological discussions, the non-reality of the duality between Brahman and world is established. The Vivarana School responds to the question regarding Brahman's existence as both “pure consciousness” and “universal ignorance” by claiming that valid cognition (prama) presumes avidya, in the everyday world, whereas pure

consciousness is the essential nature of Brahman.

10.11 THREE PLANES OF EXISTENCE (PARAMARTHIKA SATTA) (VYAVAHARIKA SATTA)(PRATIBHĀSIKA EXISTENCE)

There are three planes of existence according to classical Advaita Vedānta: the plane of absolute existence (paramarthika satta), the plane of worldly existence (vyavaharika satta) which includes this world and the heavenly world, and the plane of illusory existence (pratibhāsika existence). The two latter planes of existence are a function of māyā and are thus illusory to some extent. A pratibhāsikaexistence, such as objects presented in a mirage, is less real than a worldly existence. Its corresponding unreality is, however, different from that which characterizes the absolutely nonexistent or the impossible, such as a sky-lotus (a lotus that grows in the sky) or the son of a barren woman. The independent existence of a mirage and the world, both of which are due to a certain causal condition, ceases once the causal condition change. The causal condition is avidya, or ignorance. The independent existence and experience of the world ceases to be with the gain of knowledge of Brahman. The nature of knowledge of Brahman is that “I am pure consciousness.” The self-ignorance of the jīva (individuated self) that “I am limited” is replaced by the Brahman-knowledge that “I am everything,” accompanied by a re-identification of the self with the transcendental Brahman. The knower of Brahman sees the one non-plural reality in everything. He or she no longer gives an absolute reality to independent and limited existence of the world, but experiences the world as a creative expression of pure consciousness. The states of waking (jāgrat), dreaming (svapna) and deep sleep (susupti) all point to the fourth nameless state turiya, pure consciousness, which is to be realized as the true self. Pure consciousness is not only pure existence but also the ultimate bliss which is experienced partially during deep sleep. Hence we wake up refreshed.

In Vedanta literature there are some discussions related to the three notions of reality: prAtibhAsika satya, vyAvahArika satya and pAramArthika satya. Before the discussions, let us make sure that we understand that Truth is only one and it is never threefold. These narrations are just reflections of our own perceptions at different situations.

prAtibhAsika satya has neither basis, nor any existence. It is our illusion and a good example is the reality during dream. When there is twilight, a little light and a little darkness, we come by a rope and mistake it to be a snake. Really speaking, there is no snake there. The snake is only in our mind and the thing that is really there is only the rope. This is also referred as prAtibhAsika satya.

When we stand in front of a mirror, we see our reflection in it. When we move away, the reflection vanishes. Therefore, the reflection depends on the original object and only when it is there, will we see the reflection. Here, there is one basis, namely, the original thing. Without the original, there is no reflection. This is an illustration of vyAvahArika satya.

On the other hand, pAramArthika satya is an entity which is present everywhere and at all times. This is the true and eternal reality. A number of examples can be provided to illustrate the pAramArthika satya:

Gold and golden ornaments - here the form and names such as bangle, ring, necklace have changed but the gold remains without any change.

Clay and pots of different shapes and sizes.

There are many bulbs with many different voltages and different colors.

Even though we see many forms, many names, many races, many creeds and many castes in this world, we must know that the God that is present in all of them, the inner being, is in reality only one. Those with sama dRRiShTi and sama bhAva [unbiased, impartial perception and interpretation] will be able to see "Only God" with different names and forms.

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Everything that we do is at the vyAvahArika level only and even the description and explanation of pAramArthika are also at the vyAvahArika level. No one except Brahman knows what the pAramArthika level is and even this assertion is only at the vyAvahArika level. The sages and saints are always careful and they have avoided making any false claims. Our problem is the lack of understanding of what they say and, most of the time, we attribute our mistakes to them.

They employ a `reference point' to illustrate the Truth at the vyAvahArika level and they are aware of our limitations. It seems that we overextend their assertions and try to go beyond! In the rope and snake example - the reference point (rope) is the Truth at the vyAvahArika level. Due to darkness (ignorance) the rope appears as the non-existent snake. But with the correct understanding (torch light) the truth is revealed.

Now reasoning is employed to illustrate the Truth at the pAramArthika level - the rope of vyAvahArika became the Brahman of pAramArthika and the non-existent snake of vyAvahArika became the non-existent World of pAramArthika. We do need to recognize that that this illustration with additional explanation is only at the vyAvahArika level! This example or analogy does not provide any clue about pAramArthika or Brahman to those who determine not to accept any analogy. The `dream' analogy is another example that is used to point to pAramArthika reality using a vyAvahArika framework.

The Truth at the pAramArthika level does require us to extend our understanding beyond the vyAvahArika level. Any of our claims about the TRUTH at the pAramArthika level are just further speculation. TRUTH can't be understood analytically by any `brilliant mind (intellect)' and that is the bottom line. This may explain why scripture becomes relevant for us to accept or reject a `speculated truth.'

For Hindus, the `Vedas or shruti - the revealed truth' became the authority for resolving issues related to the establishment of the Truth. The `shruti' is the experience of the `SELF' by the jIvanmukta. Any documentation of

Vedas will not qualify for the term - `shruti.' All documented versions of Vedas become `smRRiti - a diluted form of Truth.' Consequently TRUTH (Self-Realization) can never be described in words. Everything that is written, spoken or remembered will fall into the vyAvahArika level.

10.12. EPISTEMOLOGY

The Advaita tradition puts forward three lesser tests of truth: correspondence, coherence, and practical efficacy. These are followed by a fourth test of truth: epistemic-nonsublatability (abādhyatvam orbādhaṛāhityam). According to the Vedānta Paribhāṣa (a classical text of Advaita Vedānta) “that knowledge is valid which has for its object something that is nonsublated.” Nonsublatability is considered as the ultimate criterion for valid knowledge. The master test of epistemic-nonsublatability inspires a further constraint: foundationality (anadhigatatvam, lit. “of not known earlier”). This last criterion of truth is the highest standard that virtually all knowledge claims fail, and thus it is the standard for absolute, or unqualified, knowledge, while the former criteria are amenable to mundane, worldly knowledge claims. According to Advaita Vedānta, a judgment is true if it remains unsublated. The commonly used example that illustrates epistemic-nonsublatability is the rope that appears as a snake from a distance (a stock example in Indian philosophy). The belief that one sees a snake in this circumstance is erroneous according to Advaita Vedānta because the snake belief (and the visual presentation of a snake) is sublated into the judgment that what one is really seeing is a rope. Only wrong cognitions can be sublated. The condition of foundationality disqualifies memory as a means of knowledge. Memory is the recollection of something already known and is thus derivable and not foundational. Only genuine knowledge of the Self, according to Advaita Vedānta, passes the test of foundationality: it is born of immediate knowledge (aparokṣa jñāna) and not memory (smṛti). Six natural ways of knowing are accepted as valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) by Advaita Vedānta: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), verbal testimony (śabda), comparison (upamāna), postulation

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(arthapatti) and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). The pramāṇas do not contradict each other and each of them presents a distinct kind of knowledge. Nonfoundational knowledge of Brahman cannot be had by any means but through Śruti, which is the supernaturally revealed text in the form of the Vedas (of which the Upaniṣads form the most philosophical portion). Inference and the other means of knowledge cannot determinately reveal the truth of Brahman on their own. However, Advaitins recognize that in addition to Śruti, one requires yukti (reason) and anubhava (personal experience) to actualize knowledge of Brahman. Mokṣa (liberation), which consists in the cessation of the cycle of life and death, governed by the karma of the individual self, is the result of knowledge of Brahman. As Brahman is identical with the universal Self, and this Self is always self-conscious, it would seem that knowledge of Brahman is Self-knowledge, and that this Self-knowledge is ever present. If so, it seems that ignorance is impossible. Moreover, in the adhyāsa bhāṣya (his preamble to the commentary on the Brahma Sūtra) Śaṅkara says that the pure subjectivity—the Self or Brahman—can never become the object of knowledge, just as the object can never be the subject. This would suggest that Self-knowledge that one gains in order to achieve liberation is impossible. Śaṅkara's response to this problem is to regard knowledge of Brahman that is necessary for liberation, derived from scripture, to be distinct from the Self-consciousness of Brahman, and rather a practical knowledge that removes ignorance, which is an obstacle to the luminance of the ever-present self-consciousness of Brahman that does pass the test of foundationality. Ignorance, in turn, is not a feature of the ultimate Self on his account, but a feature of the individual self that is ultimately unreal. Four factors are involved in an external perception: the physical object, the sense organ, the mind (antaḥkarana) and the cognizing self (pramata). The cognizing self alone is self-luminous and the rest of the three factors are not self-luminous being devoid of consciousness. It is the mind and the sense organ which relates the cognizing self to the object. The self alone is the knower and the rest are knowable as objects of knowledge. At the same time the existence of mind is indubitable. It is the mind that helps to distinguish between various perceptions. It is

because of the self-luminous (svata-prakāṣa) nature of pure consciousness that the subject knows and the object is known. In his commentary to Taittirīya Upaniṣad, Śaṅkara says that “consciousness is the very nature of the Self and inseparable from It.” The cognizing self, the known object, the object-knowledge, and the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) are essentially the manifestations of one pure consciousness.

a. Error, True Knowledge and Practical Teachings

Śaṅkara uses adhyāsa to indicate illusion – illusory objects of perception as well as illusory perception. Two other words which are used to denote the same are adhyāropa (superimposition) and avabhāsa (appearance). According to Śaṅkara the case of illusion involves both superimposition and appearance. Adhyāsa, as he says in his preamble to the Brahma Sūtra, is the apprehension of something as something else with two kinds of confounding such as the object and its properties. The concept of illusion, in Advaita Vedānta, is significant because it leads to the theory of a “real substratum.” The illusory object, like the real object, has a definite locus. According to Śaṅkara, adhyāsa is not possible without a substratum. Padmapāda says in Pañcapadika that adhyāsa without a substratum has never been experienced and is inconceivable. Vacaspati affirms that there cannot be a case of illusion where the substratum is fully apprehended or not apprehended at all. The Advaita theory of error (known as anirvacanīya khyāti, or the apprehension of the indefinable) holds that the perception of the illusory object is a product of the ignorance about the substratum. Śaṅkara characterizes illusion in two ways in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. The first is an appearance of something previously experienced—like memory—in something else (smṛtirupaḥ paratra pūrva dṛṣṭaḥ avabhāsaḥ). The second is a minimalist characterization—the appearance of one thing with the properties of another (anyasya anyadharma avabhāsatam. Śaṅkara devotes his introduction to his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, to the idea of adhyāsa to account for illusory perception relating to both everyday experience and also transcendent entities. This introduction, called the adhyāsa bhāṣya (commentary on illusion) presents a realistic position and a

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seemingly dualistic metaphysics: “Since it is an established fact that the object and subject which are presented as *yusmad*—‘you’ /the other, and *asmad*—‘me’ are by very nature contradictory, and their qualities also contradictory, as light and darkness they cannot be identical.” Plurality and illusion, on this account, are constructed out of the cognitive superimposition of the category of objects on pure subjectivity. While two conceptual categories are superimposed to create objects of illusion, the Advaita Vedānta view is that the only possible way of metaphysically describing the object of illusion is with the help of a characteristic, other than those of non-existence and existence, which is termed as the “indeterminate” (*anirvacaniya*) which also somehow connects the two usual possibilities of existence and non-existence. The object of illusion cannot be logically defined as real or unreal. Error is the apprehension of the indefinable. It is due to the “illegitimate transference” of the qualities of one order to another. Perceptual illusion forms the bridge between Advaita’s soteriology, on the one hand, and its theory of experience, on the other. The relationship between the experience of liberation in this life (*mukti*) and everyday experience is viewed as analogous to the relation between veridical and delusive sense perception. Śaṅkara formulates a theory of knowledge in accordance with his soteriological views. Śaṅkara’s interest is thus not to build a theory of error and leave it by itself but to connect it to his theory of the ultimate reality of Self-Consciousness which is the only state which can be true according to his twin criteria for truth (non-sublatability and foundationality). The characteristic of indeterminacy that qualifies objects of illusion is that which is truly neither real nor unreal but appears as a real locus. It serves as a stark contrast to the soteriological goal of the Self, which is truly real and determinate. On the basis of his theory of knowledge, Śaṅkara elucidates the fourfold (mental and physical) practices or qualifications—*sādana catuṣṭaya*—to aid in the achievement of liberation: (i) the discrimination (*viveka*) between the permanent (*nitya*) and the impermanent (*anitya*) objects of experience; (ii) dispassion towards the enjoyment of fruits of action here and in heaven; (iii) accomplishment of means of discipline such as calmness, mental control etc.; (iv) a longing for

liberation. In his commentary to the Brahma Sūtra, Śaṅkara says that the inquiry into Brahman could start only after acquiring these fourfold qualifications. The concept of liberation (mokṣa) in Advaita is cashed out in terms of Brahman. The pathways to liberations are defined by the removal of self-ignorance that is brought about by the removal of mithyajñāna (erroneous knowledge claims). This is captured in the formula of one Advaitin: “[He] is never born again who knows that he is the only one in all beings like the ether and that all beings are in him” (Upadesa Sahasri XVII.69). Many thinkers in the history of Indian philosophy have held that there is an important connection between action and liberation. In contrast, Śaṅkara rejects the theory of jñāna-karma-samuccaya, the combination of karma (Vedic duties) with knowledge of Brahman leading to liberation. Knowledge of Brahman alone is the route to liberation for Śaṅkara. The role of action (karma) is to purify the mind (antaḥkaranasuddhi) and make it free from likes and dislikes (raga dveṣa vimuktaḥ). Such a mind will be instrumental to knowledge of Brahman.

10.13 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have tried to give central concepts of Nyaya and Vaisesika. Nyaya is a system of logical realism and atomistic pluralism. Nyaya develops logic and epistemology; Vaisesika develops metaphysics and ontology. In this unit we have explained Nyaya theory of knowledge, causation, physical world, God and the proofs for the existence of God. In this unit relating to the orthodox system of Vaisesika, we have discussed Vaisesika categories, atoms, creation, destruction, bondage and liberation. We conclude this unit with the Vaisesika conception that liberation is the real state of the soul free from all qualities and it reduces the soul to a mere nothing.

10.14 KEY WORDS

Perception: Perception is a definite cognition which is produced by sense-object contact and is true and unerring.

Inference: Inference is the cognition which presupposes some other cognition.

Comparison: Comparison is called *upamana*. Comparison is knowledge derived from comparison and roughly corresponds to analogy.

Verbal Testimony: Verbal testimony is defined as the statement of trustworthy person and consists in understanding its meaning.

Cause: Cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause.

Padartha: *Padartha* means an object which can be thought and named.

Dravya: *Dravya* is the substance. Substance signifies the self-subsistence, the absolute and independent nature of things. Substance is the basis of qualities and actions, actual or potential, present or future.

10.15 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What do you Understand by the orthodox systems of the Nyaya and Vaisesika.
2. Elucidate the Nyaya theory of knowledge.
3. Discuss the Nyaya theory of causation.
4. Explain Nyaya conception of God and proofs for the existence of God.
5. Describe the categories of Vaisesika.

10.16 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

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10.17 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

CHECK YOUR PROGRESS I

1. Refer to the topic five elements

UNIT 11 HUMAN MIND

STRUCTURE

- 11.0 Objectives
- 11.1 Introduction
- 11.2 Uniqueness of Human Being
- 11.3 Ontological Dimension of Human Person
- 11.4 Psychological Dimension of Human Person
- 11.5 An Integral Concept of Person
- 11.6 Let Us Sum Up
- 11.7 Key Words
- 11.8 Questions for review
- 11.9 Suggested Reading and References
- 11.10 Answers to Check Your Progress

11.0 OBJECTIVES

We, in our day to day communication as well as understanding, use terms such as “Human” and “Person.” But, for centuries, a number of eminent thinkers have differed in their views and theories. The objectives of this unit are:

- To scan through the various theories
- Broaden our mental horizon
- And finally lead us into a better understanding of ourselves.

11.1 INTRODUCTION

We live in an anthropocentric world where human person is considered as the centre, summit and measure of everything. The term ‘person’ is not used for plants and animals but it is exclusively reserved to human. Human is called a person because one is a subject and the term brings out the grandeur, dignity and nobility of person.

The word 'person' comes from the Greek word '*prosopon*' meaning mask, to personify in a role, which became the Latin '*persona*'. Neither in common usage nor in philosophy has there been a univocal concept of person. In common usage 'person' refers to any human being in a general way. The person is distinct from a thing or material object. The term 'person' generally stands for a living conscious human being.

11.2 UNIQUENESS OF HUMAN BEING

All people in the world, believers or non-believers, recognize something unique in man/woman. Philosophers, psychologists and scientists have explained this unique-ness of human differently. For philosophers, it is the reason that makes human different from other beings. For scientists, it is consciousness that makes human unique among other creatures. It is precisely because of this unique status that we owe respect to every human person. The human being alone is a person. Human has the dignity of a subject and is of value in oneself.

Human is a unique creation of the forces of nature. As a unique creation, a human being reveals this originality and uniqueness in one's development as well as in one's acts. An individual is a being who is one in itself and distinct from all other beings. Many philosophers have stressed the element of uniqueness, singularity and individuality of the human person. Even though human shares with other sub-human beings a number of qualities, one enjoys a life that is qualitatively different from other forms of life. The life of human is specifically different from that of animals and plants, because one has the unique dignity of an individual, rational and immortal being.

Individuality of Human Person

As human begins to go deeper into oneself, one becomes aware of oneself as a subject and that one is different from the rest of the universe and thus discovers one's individuality. Being an individual, one is unique, dynamic,

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rational, free and creative. An individual should never be considered or treated as an object or commodity. We can make use of a thing at our will because it has no will and freedom. Since it has no will, we don't require the consent of the object to use it. But a human person is quite different from an anonymous entity because one is an intelligent and free individual.

Rationality of Human Person

Human beings are different from other animals because they have the power of reason. Rationality is human's capacity to ask the 'why' of things. It is the capacity to think rationally. To think rationally implies the capacity to distinguish between what is reasonable and not reasonable in the matters we come across in our life. Reason is the natural capacity of human beings to arrive at truth in a holistic way.

Human, being rational is capable of relating oneself with other beings making them participate in one's life and promote one's true good. In order to become authentic human person, proper reasoning in our thinking and action is needed. Everything human does when executing human acts must be a manifestation of one's rationality. The power of reason helps human form concepts, pass judgements, organize them in systems and give meaning to reality. Because of one's reasoning power human emerges superior to other beings on earth. Therefore, we can rightly describe human as a rational animal as Aristotle puts it.

Immortality of Human Person

Human beings seem to be unique among other creatures of the earth because they not only are fully aware of the inevitable death but also coupled with this awareness they seem to refuse that death is the end. Human, being a unity of body and soul or matter and spirit, death cannot be the end of everything. If I was not spirit, death would not exist for me; there would only the corruption of my body. Therefore, death is understood as a separation of the soul from the body. For philosophers like Plato and Aquinas, human is a unity, one substance composed of body and soul. But human soul being spiritual can subsist without matter. Therefore, the soul,

for Plato continues to exist even after the death of the body because soul alone is the true reality of human. Etymologically speaking *im* is non and *mortality* is death. So immortality is non-death. It is the continued and perennial existence of the human, the soul. This is a unique nature and feature of human alone.

Freedom and Responsibility

Freedom is the property of will. The object of will is the good. The will is the tendency towards or love of total good. To desire good is a value. To be free means to be able to decide freely for a specific good. It is equally openness to good or that it is implicitly oriented towards an unlimited good, which corresponds to a fundamental openness towards truth. Freedom is the power of decision of a moral object. Freedom of the individual manifests the way in which a person is made manifest, the way one acts and expresses emotions, the manner in which one is present to others and to the world.

Freedom in the hands of human is a weapon of dual stature. It can be adopted either for good, or for evil. It can serve human for the cultivation, the promotion, the elevation and the realization of one's own being. But it can also serve to obtain the opposite effect; to degrade, humiliate and annihilate one's own being. With good use of freedom human can become a hero, a saint, a benefactor of humanity. Meanwhile with its evil use one can become an addict, a terrorist, a nemesis of humanity.

Therefore, freedom in its true sense implies freedom with responsibility. Human persons are called to live in freedom and responsibility. A human of mature personality takes full responsibility for one's life- thoughts and actions. Human being a moral agent is responsible and answerable for all what one thinks, speaks and acts. One is responsible for one's life mixed with triumphs and successes, mistakes and failures. We ourselves are responsible for all our actions.

Self Transcendence

Etymologically 'transcendence' means to go over and beyond a threshold or a boundary (*transscendere*). Self transcendence has its basis in human's

power of never being satisfied with finite, the limited or the imperfect. Human is spirit and lives one's life in continuous opening toward the Absolute.

Different Interpretations of 'Transcendence'.

Transcendence is the movement with which man continually "overtakes" himself. This movement has a direction and points towards a goal, the Absolute. In the history of philosophy there have been philosophers who give *egocentric*, *philanthropic* and *theocentric* meanings to transcendence.

Egocentric Transcendence: Human is currently in a precarious, alienated and inauthentic state. The emphasis is on human rising above what one is now and reaching a superior state of happiness. Human is in a tension to free oneself from one's misery and needs to find oneself again through a more complete actualisation of one's possibilities. Philosophers in this group include Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and Heidegger etc.

Philanthropic Transcendence: Human is currently confined in one's individualism. The emphasis is on the social dimension and advocates the perfection of the human community and an attempt to originate a new humanity freed from social inequality. Philosophers in this group include Marx, Comte, Bloch, Garaudy etc.

Theocentric Transcendence: Human is constitutionally open towards the Absolute and escapes incessantly from the confines of one's own reality. Human is the absolute opening to being in general, or human is "spirit". The transcendence toward the Absolute Being (*theocentric*) is the only fundamental structure of human. Philosophers in their group include Thomas Aquinas, Blondel, Rahner, Marcel, Lonergan etc.

The Opening of Human to the Absolute is the Fundamental Constitution of Human

Human is basically spiritual, that is, one lives one's life in a continuous tension towards the Absolute, in an opening towards it. This is revealed even in the banal actions of everyday life. One is *human* only because one

is in the way towards God, whether one knows and expresses it or not, whether one wants it or not. One's opening to God is *intrinsic*. One is the finite being totally open towards the Absolute. One can accept or refute it but not destroy it.

This transcendence attests that the being of human is spiritual and cannot, therefore, be reduced to the material. The spirituality of human is, first of all, positive. One is an "I", a person that exists as a unique subject and opens to a "You", that is a pure person.

However, it is important not to define human as a negation of material. Human's spirituality does not indicate, in the first place, different properties from those materials. Intelligence and will do not exist of their own account. They are abstractions. What exists is a concrete person who thinks and wills. To think and to will are modes of being (accidental entities) of the personal being. The problem of spirituality is not regarding the immateriality of the intellectual faculties but the subsistence and unity of the person.

Check Your Progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

- Check your answer with those provided at the end of the unit.

- How does reason differentiate human person?
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- How is immortality a unique nature of human?
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11.3 ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN PERSON

The ontological concept of person gives emphasis to human as an individual endowed with the faculty of will, freedom and autonomy. The uniqueness of ‘human person’ lies in the fact that human person is first of all an individual, unique, original, irrepeatable, irrepresentable being as every human has a unique combination of qualities and talents that no one else has. For Augustine, person means, the single, the individual. To be an individual is to be one, namely being undivided in itself and distinct from all other beings. The uniqueness of person is implied in the concept of individual.

Definition of Person as given by Boethius and Aquinas

The merit of giving an adequate first definition of person in the ontological perspective goes to Severin Boethius. He defined person as *rationalis naturae individua substantia* (individual substance of rational nature). This definition of Boethius was revised by Aquinas. Aquinas defines person as *subsistens in rationali nature* (a singular subsistent of a rational nature).

Substance

This is the first category of Aristotle, that which is in itself. The person is a being that exists in oneself because one is complete substance. Person is a substantial and individual unity.

Individual Substance

The substance, in the fullest sense of the word is the individual. The universal concept does not exist in reality but only in the individual. In the philosophy of Aquinas these two terms individual and substance are united in the term ‘subsistent’, which means a total autonomy of existence and

action. The 'subsistents' is an individual substance that forms a complete whole.

Rational Nature

While there are individual substances that are not persons, there are no persons that are not individual substances. Every person is an individual and a human person has a rational nature. The element that distinguishes human from animals and things of this world is one's rationality. To be a person one has to be capable of exercising reason. It is this rational faculty that helps the human person to distinguish between real and unreal, right and wrong and knowledge and opinion. The ontological concept of person gives emphasis to the faculty of will and the autonomy of the person. Human as a willing being is an autonomous subject who tries to transcend time and space. This means that human is an end in oneself. A person is therefore capable of deciding for oneself and of acting in accordance with one's own decisions in order to arrive at one's ultimate end. A human becomes an authentic person when one acts in a morally upright way taking responsibility for one's actions. One must creatively respond to the challenges with a spirit to change and grow, by relating oneself to God, fellow-beings and nature as free persons.

11.4 PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN PERSON

Persons are individual human beings capable of mental activities. It was Descartes who proposed a theory of mind and for him, person is not just a material body but person for Descartes is a self, a self-conscious mind which thinks, feels, desires etc. Descartes no longer defines person in relation to the autonomy of being, but in relation to self-consciousness. In his psychological sense of person, Descartes admits firstly intellectual knowledge and reason as the essential requisite of the person and secondly, self-consciousness as a distinctive mark of human.

The Psychological Person

From the psychological point of view human can be viewed as a being that has self awareness. The person is the 'I'. The discovery of the 'I' means 'becoming aware of my individual existence, separated from that of other beings'. In the psychological understanding of person, human intellect, thinking, reasoning, knowledge and self consciousness are emphasised.

Self Consciousness

Human differs from animals as a self-conscious being in the cognitive level. Self-consciousness and objectivity are the two elements which distinguish human from animals. In fact, animals know objects and know themselves but reach neither self-consciousness nor objectivity, because they do not succeed in separating themselves either from the knowing subject or from the known object. Human has the awareness of the 'I' (subject) and 'non I' (object).

The inter related actions of reason, volition and emotion together constitute the human mind (consciousness). By the existence of these mental functions we become self conscious that we are subjects and not objects. The person not only acts consciously, but is also aware both of the fact that one acts and of the fact that it is one who acts. Self-consciousness is the awareness by the self of itself. Self knowledge is the basis of self consciousness.

Human Person as a Subject

A subject is a willing, feeling and thinking entity. Human as a subject is a unique being endowed with intellect, will and heart. Since human is a subject, no human being should be treated as an object, a thing or as a function. As a subject one is a knowing, conscious, free and self transcending being in the world.

As a thinking being I hold on to my reasonably legitimate ideas and views. As a feeling subject I seek and desire for the emotional satisfaction of my life. And as a willing being I desire to be an autonomous subject and I make myself a free person by responsible exercise of choices.

The human person is a subject and refuses to be an object. In order to become authentic human beings, we need to discover our true self, deepening and widening our consciousness, forming an integral vision, creating open attitudes and having right convictions.

Check Your Progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

- Check your answer with those provided at the end of the unit.
- What is person according to Boethius and Thomas Aquinas?

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- Human differs from animals as a self-conscious being. Explain.

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Substantial Unity of Human: The Absolute Value and Dignity of the Person

Human is a substance. In fact, one has all the properties of a substance; constancy, stability, identity, autonomy in being etc. Thus we can say that human or more exactly every single individual of the human species is a substance. The complete substance of the human being is neither the body, nor the soul, but the body and the soul in their profound unity.

Person is Open to the Absolute

In contrast to the purely material, the structure of human as a spiritual being, given intelligence and will, means that one is open to the infinite, tending to supersede every limit. The object of intelligence is being as being. It chooses the finite within the horizon of infinite and has an infinite desire to know, as well as unbounded potential. Similarly, the will is never content with the attained good, but tends towards the greater. Since only God is infinite and unlimited Truth and Good, only God can satisfy the quest of the human person.

The Person Open to the Absolute is an End in Oneself

The human person is not a means to an end but one is an end in oneself in the sense that one is ordained by the Transcendent. In one sense the person is relative as one is dependent on the Absolute and in another sense, one is an absolute form because one is willed by the Absolute. This is the authentic dignity of human person because one has been caused in such a way as to be able to direct oneself to the absolute.

Dialogical concept of person

Philosophers like Max Scheler (1874-1928), Martin Buber (1878-1965), Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) describe human as a being-in-relationship, a being-with-others. According to them humans are embodied self-conscious beings who stand in relationality with others and it is to be realized through dialogue. Human is not only an individual, but also a communion being. In order to lead a meaningful and authentic existence one must establish a loving and mutually reciprocal relationship with other human beings. According to Max Scheler, the human being lives first of all, and principally in others and not in oneself. One lives more in the community than in one's own individual. Therefore, dialogue attaches directly to the persons. In dialogue I enter into relationship with others and is conceivable

only between persons. For dialogue, I must first recognize in the other persons as independent subject of existence, interiority, a capacity for response, and freedom- in short- subjectivity.

Martin Buber's Concept of Person

According to Buber human existence is essentially related and relational. Human life with all its complexity finds its meaning, richness and happiness in being related to others. For Buber life is relationship with others from birth to death. According to Buber a genuine relationship can take place only in the '*sphere of between*'. The '*sphere of between*' is not something permanent, rather it is ever created whenever two human beings meet. One turns to the other and in order to communicate with each other, must reach out to a sphere beyond one's own namely the '*sphere of the between*'.

The Three-fold Relation

Human has a threefold relationship by virtue of one's very nature and situation. First one is related to the world and to things; second one is related to humans –both to individuals and to many; third one is related to the absolute. Thus we can say that human has got an I-It, I-Thou and I-Eternal Thou relationship. To be a genuine human person, one should relate oneself with the Absolute, fellow beings and nature in mutual selfless love, sharing and co-operation. Absolute is the indispensable foundation and basis for every genuine I-Thou relationship. Without the eternal Thou human's relationship will become sterile and useless. The Absolute is the Absolute Being who makes possible every I-Thou relationship.

Gabriel Marcel's Concept of Person

Marcel's philosophy has been called in the philosophy of communion. He insists that to be genuine in our interpersonal relationships we must be

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totally and unreservedly available to the other. Marcel identifies selfless love and mutual openness as inter-subjectivity in our relationship with others. One should place oneself at the disposal of others. Marcel calls this capacity ‘*availability*’.

To become an available person means to be a free person. Because the unavailable person is tangled within oneself, one is limited to one’s own self created world. When someone leads a ‘closed’ life and does not make oneself available to others, he/she leads an inauthentic life. A person leads an authentic existence only when one is making oneself ‘open’ to others in love and sharing. According to Marcel, “I can become myself only through the other, my friend”.

The available person gives oneself without the expectation of receiving back. One is actually at the disposal of others. When one opens up oneself for others, one is open to reality itself. This enables one to grow deeper and deeper in life, whereas the self-centred, unavailable person refuses the call of others and thereby one becomes uncommitted. One is not ready to go beyond the petty circles one craves. One forgets the fact that when one gives one grows and that through self sacrifice one reaches self-fulfilment. Only a liberated, free, available person can enter into a meaningful and authentic interpersonal communion.

The Intersubjective Communion

Intersubjectivity does not merely mean collective labour or it is not merely being together either. But it calls for an interaction in a deeper level. It means that I must be willing to put myself at the disposal of the other. Here ‘the other’ is considered and treated not like an object, but as the subject, as the magnetic centre of presence. At the root of presence there is a being who takes me into consideration, who is regarded by me as taking me into account. Now by definition an object does not take me into account. I do not exist for it.

Let us take the example of a bus conductor. I often travel in a particular bus.

Therefore, I have to deal with this particular conductor often. Now the conductor is an instrument for me. He /she gives me a ticket and I pay for it. Nothing more than that. Seeing him /her uneasy one day, I ask, “What is the matter?” Responding to my question he/she comes to me. Here originates the subject - subject relationship. In this way we really become present to each other. In this mutual presence starts the Marcelian inter-subjectivity.

This encounter or meeting or inter-subjectivity is not something accidental or happening by chance. Marcel writes: “To encounter some one is not merely to cross his path but to be, for the moment at least near to or with him. To use a term I have often used before, it means being a co-presence”. This meeting or encounter is “not mere interaction between two persons... but a reciprocal intercourse of ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ who get to know one another as persons.” My genuine individuality is found out only in relation with the other. There is no self without communion. By self-enclosure I am actually destroying myself. So, one should get out of one’s own egoistic way of being.

11.5 AN INTEGRAL CONCEPT OF PERSON

The ontological, the psychological and the dialogical concepts of person include some good elements. The ontological concept of person gives importance to the will and volitive dimension. It implies that human is an ‘individual substance’ who takes free decisions. Psychological concept of person gives emphasis to intellect and cognitive dimension. It implies that human is a self-conscious being in the world. The dialogical concept stresses the heart and the affective dimension and describes person as a loving and feeling being. All these concepts and dimensions put together we can speak of human as a person who thinks, wills and feels. Human person thus is a thinking, willing and feeling entity. Human is precisely a person because one is the master of oneself and one has self control. The dignity of human too reveals that one is a person with independence, freedom and responsibility.

Check Your Progress III

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

- Check your answer with those provided at the end of the unit.
- Human being as spiritual being is open to the Absolute, How?

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- What do you understand by the term “Inter-subjectivity”?

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11.6 LET US SUM UP

Human is a mystery. Millions of people have been speculating on the nature of human being for centuries. Various branches of science have attempted to explain the making of human beings. Still human beings remain a mystery. No one has ever succeeded in comprehending the nature of human beings completely. Human is an evolving being possessing the properties of autonomy, self-consciousness, selfless love and self-transcendence. One is a self-transcending being capable of never being satisfied by a given facticity, capable of transcending and projecting oneself beyond space and time. The worth of a human person lies not in what one does or what one knows, but in what one is. Human is an incarnate spirit and is made up of matter and spirit. Since one is an incarnate spirit one has a soul and is spiritual. A spiritual being is essentially intelligent. An intelligent being is essentially able to will. A being, able to will, is necessarily free. A free being is necessarily personal. Human, who is intelligent, free, spiritual and personal by nature, is able to communicate and enter into relationship with the

Absolute. Human is an unfinished product. In so far as human is a conscious and free being, one is aware of oneself as a being on the way, who in freedom directs one's ascent to the fullness of being. Thus, becoming human is a life long human process of learning to transcend our self with love, integrity, fidelity and care. Human being is a possible possibility tending towards the Infinite and one's ultimate destiny consists in being united with the Infinite.

11.7 KEY WORDS

Persone : The word 'person' comes from the Greek word '*prosopon*' meaning mask, to personify in a role, which became the Latin '*persona*'.

Transcendence : To go beyond a limit or range, e.g. of thought or belief or to

exist above and apart from the material world.

11.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain psychological dimension of human mind
2. Describe Uniqueness of Human Being and human mind.
3. Explain Ontological Dimension of Human mind
4. Human being as spiritual being is open to the Absolute, How?

5. Describe human mind according to indian metaphysics.

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11.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Answers to Check Your Progress I

1. Human beings are different from other animals because they have the

power of reason. Rationality is human's capacity to ask the 'why' of things. It is the capacity to think rationally. To think rationally implies the capacity to distinguish between what is reasonable and not reasonable in the matters we come across in our life. Reason is the natural capacity of human beings to arrive at truth in a holistic way.

Human, being rational, is capable of relating oneself with other beings making them participate in one's life and promote one's true good. In order to become authentic human person, proper reasoning in our thinking and action is needed. Everything human does when executing human acts must be a manifestation of one's rationality. The power of reason helps human form concepts, pass judgements, organize them in systems and give meaning to reality. Because of his reasoning power human emerges superior to other beings on earth. Therefore, we can rightly describe human as a rational animal as Aristotle puts it.

1. Human beings seem to be unique among other creatures of the earth because they not only are fully aware of the inevitable death but also coupled with this awareness they seem to refuse that death is the end. Human, being a unity of body and soul or matter and spirit, death cannot be the end of everything for human. If I was not spirit, death would not exist for me; there would only the corruption of my body. Therefore, death is understood as a separation of the soul from the body. For philosophers like Plato and Aquinas, human is a unity, one substance composed of body and soul. But human soul being spiritual can subsist without matter. Therefore, the soul, for Plato continues to exist even after the death of the body because soul alone is the true reality of human. Etymologically speaking *im* is non and *mortality* is death. So immortality is non-death. It is the continued and perennial existence of human, the soul. This is a unique nature and feature of human alone.

Answers to Check Your Progress II

Notes

1. The merit of giving an adequate first definition of person in the ontological perspective goes to Severin Boethius. He defined person as *rationalis naturae individua substantia* (individual substance of rational nature). This definition of Boethius was revised by Aquinas. Aquinas defines person as *subsistens in rationali nature* (a singular subsistent of a rational nature).
1. Human differs from animals as a self conscious being in the cognitive level. Self consciousness and objectivity are the two elements which distinguish human from animals. In fact, animals know objects and know themselves but reach neither self-consciousness nor objectivity, because they do not succeed in separating themselves either from the knowing subject or from the known object. Human has the awareness of the 'I' (subject) and 'non I' (object).

The inter related actions of reason, volition and emotion together constitute the human mind (consciousness). By the existence of these mental functions we become self conscious that we are subjects and not objects. The person not only acts consciously, but is also aware both of the fact that one acts and of the fact that it is oneself who acts. Self-consciousness is the awareness by the self of itself. Self knowledge is the basis of self consciousness.

Answers to Check your Progress III

1. In contrast to the purely material, the structure of human as a spiritual being, given intelligence and will, means that one is open to the infinite, tending to supercede every limit. The object of intelligence is being as being. It chooses the finite within the horizon of infinite and has an infinite desire to know, as well as unbounded potential. Similarly, the will is never content with the attained good, but tends towards the greater. Since only the Absolute is infinite and unlimited Truth and Good, only the Absolute can satisfy the quest of the human

person.

1. Inter-subjectivity does not merely mean collective labour or it is not merely being together either. But it calls for an interaction in a deeper level. It means that I must be willing to put myself at the disposal of the other. Here 'the other' is considered and treated not like an object, but as the subject, as the magnetic centre of presence. At the root of presence there is a being who takes me into consideration, who is regarded by me as taking me into account. Now by definition an object does not take me into account. I do not exist for it.

UNIT:12 UNIVERSALS: THE DEBATE AMONGST THE DIFFERENT SCHOOL

STRUCTURE

- 12.0 Carvaka
- 12.1 Inrodcution
- 12.2 Buddhism – 1
- 12.3 Buddhism – Ii
- 12.4 Jainism
- 12.5 Let Us Sum Up
- 12.6 Keywords
- 12.7 Questions For Review.
- 12.8 Suggested Readings And Refernces
- 12.9 Answer To Check Your Progress

12.0 CARVAKA

OBJECTIVES

One of the important counter-movements in India that challenged the authority of Vedas and questioned its teachings is Caravaka philosophy. It sought to unsettle most of the traditionally held views and beliefs such the existence of God, soul and life after death. That is why it was called heterodox school of philosophy. The aim of this unit is to introduce the students to the teachings, philosophy and arguments of this school which were diametrically opposed to those of orthodox schools of philosophy in India.

12.1 INTRODUCTION

Carvaka is a non-vedic Indian materialistic school of philosophy named after a sage called Carvaka, the founder of this system, according to a popular view. But some think that Carvaka was a prominent disciple of Brhaspati, the actual founder of the school. Carvaka etymologically means

‘sweet-tongued’ (*caru+vak*). Carvakas have sweet words. They are votaries of pleasing ideas if only you choose to follow their ways. Some hold that ‘carvaka’ has its etymology in ‘*carva*’ which means to chew or eat. It is an allusion to their doctrine of ‘eat, drink and make merry.’ According to Gunaratana of eight century C.E., ‘*carva*’ stands for chewing, grinding with the teeth, eating and swallowing virtues and vices. Carvakas are those who take no notice of virtues and vices. Carvaka was also called ‘Lokayatya’ which is the combination of the two words ‘*loka*’ (The world) and ‘*ayata*’ (basis). It accepts only the reality of the material world. In other words, Carvakas are the people who care only about the earth and not about the heaven.

ORIGIN OF THE SCHOOL

According to the scholars, the origin of the school can be traced back to post-*upanishadic* period. The school would have been born between 600-400 B.C.E. The Buddhist texts of this period mentions several heterodox teachers such as Sanjaya, the skeptic, Ajita, the materialist, Purana Kasyapa the indifferentist and Kosala, the fatalist and Katyayana whose ideas in some way or the other come closer to the views of Carvakas. It is probably in this ambience of skepticism, materialism and nihilism that Carvaka philosophy would have originated. It must be noted that it is around the same time that the Atomists and the Sophists became popular in Greece. Though it is a remote possibility that the Atomists, the Sophists and the Carvakas would have influenced one another, it is evident that all these shared certain common views.

But Chattopadhyaya who has written extensively on Lokayata and Carvaka schools holds that already in pre-Buddhist text of Chandogya Upanishad (vii 7-9) of seventh century BCE there is a reference to a view identifying body with the self, the philosophical position of Lokayata/Carvakas. But it must be noted that the text does not mention the word ‘Lokayatas’

or ‘Carvakas’ and attributes the view to the Asuras. According to T.M.P.

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Mahadevan, even in the earliest text of Rg-veda, there are references to heretics, non-conformists, skeptics, agnostics and critics of Vedas.

But Kautilya in the fourth century B.C. speaks of the Lokyatas though only once, but in the context in which he speaks of them seems to indicate that they had an established system already that time like that of the Samkhya and Yoga. In the second century B.C. Patanjali speaks of the Lokyatas and of the Bhaguri as their supporter. The texts of second century C.E., namely, the *Kamasutra* of Vatsayana and the *Nyayasutra* of Gautama—one of earliest texts of Nyaya system contain the views of Lokyata Sutras and have an extensive discussion mainly on two topics, very commonly attributed to Lokayatas/'Carvakas': i) the denial of inference as a source of knowledge and ii) the denial of self distinct from the body. Besides this, the Buddhist sources such as *Payasi Suttanta* and *Samanna-Phala-Sutta* written around 4th-5th Cent CE speak about the views of materialism and the later text speaks of 'heretics' of Buddha's time including Ajita Kesakambali who is a representative of extreme materialism and regarded as a follower of Carvaka school. Hiriyanna considers Carvaka philosophy as a form of accidentalism namely *yadrccha-vada* or *animitta-vada* because, for all of them, world is basically a chaos and whatever order is seen in this world is the outcome of mere chance.

THE LITERARY SOURCES OF CARVAKAS/LOKAYATAS

The original writings of Carvakas, if any, are no longer extant. Most of what we know about Carvakas and their philosophy is through the *Purvapaksha* (refutations) as provided by the opponents. The chief among them are Madvacharya's *Sarva-darsana-samgraha*, Samkara's *Sarva Siddhanta-samgraha* and Krishn Misra's *Prabodha-chandrodaya* (an eleventh century C.E. allegorical drama intended to popularize the Advaita view by ridiculing specifically the Carvaka view), Only exception to this is Jayasiri Bhatta's *Tattvo-paplava-simgha*, (which literally means 'the lion that throws overboard all categories), a treatise in defense of Carvaka philosophy. The work edited by Sanghvi and Parikh claim that the actual

text of the only original work of Carvakas roughly belong to the eight century CE. Since the text holds that no *pramana* whatsoever is possible, many scholars think that it represents extreme skepticism, and it defends neither materialism nor perception as the only source of valid knowledge.

Apart from these, one more text needs to be mentioned in connection with Carvakas and it is called Lokayata-sutra or Carvaka-sutra which was only referred to by many writers but never available as a text. It is generally attributed to Brihas*Pati*, who is traditionally regarded as the founder of this school. Yet the existence of another work known as Brhaspati-*sutra* (a work on political economy) attributed to the same author brings in more ambiguity. But Misra's *Prabodha-chandrodaya* says that the Lokayata Sutras were initially formulated by Brihas*Pati* and later handed over to Carvaka who popularised them through his pupils.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. What is the meaning of the term 'Carvaka'? What is the other name for this school?

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2. Who is believed to be the founder of the school? What is his major work (attributed to him) that forms of the basis of Carvaka philosophy?

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3. What are some of the non-carvaka literary sources that speak about the philosophy of Carvakas?

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EPISTEMOLOGY

According to Carvakas, perception (*Pratyaksa*) is the only source of valid knowledge and they hold that nothing exists except what is perceived by five senses. Accordingly, they refuted inference (*anumana*) and testimony (*sabdha*), which are accepted by almost all other schools of Indian philosophy as valid and reliable. For them, perception is of two kinds, namely, external and internal, the former kind involving the operation of the five senses while the latter involves the operation of the mind. Knowledge is the outcome of contact between an external object and one of the five senses, although further knowledge may be acquired through the process of the mind operating with the sense knowledge. Ultimately, then, all knowledge is derived from the senses.

For them inference is not a valid means of knowledge because universal relation which should serve as its ground is impossible. For instance let us take the following example:

“whatever has smoke has fire

The hill has smoke

therefore the hill has fire.”

Here a universal and necessary relation is assumed between the smoke and the fire. Carvakas questions this. They would ask ‘How did you get this knowledge? From the kitchen where you have seen fire and smoke? But it cannot give you necessary relation between fire and smoke? Have you observed all kitchens to affirm their (smoke and fire) co-presence. What about the past and the future instances. So no one can be certain about any relation. In inference we proceed from the known to the unknown and there is no certainty in this, though some inferences may turn out to be accidentally true.” Just because certain things are sometimes true in some instances, they need not be true at all times in all instances. Consider a causal relation between A and B in which A causes B. What you observe is A is followed by B. This induces a belief in you that this will be the case in

the future too. Therefore causation is a belief, nothing more. From the observed case, we cannot infer anything about the unobserved. Inference is impossible and it is utmost “a merer leap into the dark.” Thus inference is not a valid means of knowledge.

Carvakas brought several other objections against the possibility of a valid inference. They are

1. Impressions created by inferential knowledge are not as vivid (*aspastavat*) as those made by perception.
2. Inference always depends on other things for the determination of its objects.
3. Inference has to depend on perceptual statements.
4. Inferential knowledge is not directly produced by the objects.
5. Inference is not concrete (*avastu–vishayatvat*)
6. Inference is often contradicted (*badhyamanatvat*) and
7. there is no proof which may establish that every case of the presence of the reason (*hetu*) should also be a case of the presence of probandum (*sadhya*) i.e. there is no proof establishing the invariable and unconditional concomitance between the middle and the major terms.

Carvaka’s views on inference has been criticised by many thinkers and philosophical schools. According to them, first of all, inference is inescapable for Carvaka himself. To refuse the validity of inference is to refuse to think and discuss. All thoughts, all discussions, all doctrines, all affirmations and denials, all proofs and disproofs are made possible by inference. It is through inference, not through sense-perception that the Carvaka knows what the other doctrines are, and it is through inference that the Carvaka hopes to convince others of the soundness of his argument. Secondly, the rejection of inference itself is self-contradictory. That all inferences are invalid is itself an inference, which the Carvaka must admit. Some historians of philosophy think that Carvakas did not reject inference altogether. They did not favour the use of inference only for metaphysical categories, i.e as regards things that have never been perceived.

They also do not accept testimony (*sabda*). Madvacharya in his *Sarva-darsana-samgraha* quotes their position as follows: “Nor can

testimony be the means thereof, since we may either allege in reply....that this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that this fresh

proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on the recognition of a sign in the form of the language used in the child's presence by the old man; and, moreover, there is no more reason for our believing another's word that smoke and fire are invariably connected than for our receiving the ipse dixit of Manu (which, of course, we Carvakas reject)."

Thus it is clear that testimony does not have any value for the Carvakas and accordingly Vedas are not authoritative and they are meaningless and misleading. Those who composed them aimed to confound and confuse the common people in order to achieve their own selfish purpose.

METAPHYSICS OF CARVAKAS

Carvaka Metaphysics, which is directly and logically derived from their epistemology, is "an unqualified materialistic monism." They hold a philosophy of the matter which means 'Matter is all.' Since perception is the only reliable source of knowledge, whatever is known through it alone is real and matter becomes the only reality. Sense-perception does not reveal any metaphysical entity. What it can perceive is only matter in its fourfold form; earth, water, fire and air. Carvakas do not accept ether (*akash*), because it is not an object of perception. The four elements are real not as subtle forms but in their gross particle forms. There is no reality other than these four elements and their combinations.

If so, what is consciousness? How do you account for it? How do you explain the capacity of human beings for reasoning, reflecting and imagining? Carvakas do not deny consciousness but deny only that it can be independent of the body. They regard consciousness as a mere product of matter. It does not 'inhere in particles of matter' but when the latter come to be organized in a specific form, they are found to show signs of life. It is always found associated with the body and is destroyed with the body's

disintegration. When the four elements of matter come together in a particular mode to form the living organisms, the animal and human consciousness appear in it. It is the result of an “emergent and dialectical evolution, an epiphenomenon, a by-product of matter.” Consciousness is an after-glow of matter. They

would say “Matter secretes mind as liver secretes bile”. If none of the elements of physical body possesses consciousness, is it not that consciousness is independent of physical body? Their answer would be no. When physical elements come together to form an organic pattern, consciousness emerges. It does not inhere in any particular part of the body. It is just like certain tastes and intoxicating qualities are got out of certain combinations of ingredients, though none, taken separately, possesses it. Red is got out the betel leaf and lime, but none of it apparently seems to possess red.

The soul therefore is nothing other than the conscious living body. They say that there is no soul or no consciousness apart from body which is evidenced by the fact that consciousness perishes with the body. Therefore body is the self and the body is the product of material elements. Sankara in his *Sarva Siddhanta-samgraha* describes their understanding of the soul as follows: “The soul is but the body characterized by the attributes signified in the expressions, “I am stout,” “I am youthful,” “I am grown up,” “I am old” etc. It is not something other than that body. The consciousness that is found in the modifications of non-intelligent elements (ie in organisms formed out of matter) is produced in the manner of the red colour out of the combination of betel, areca-nut and lime. There is no world other than this; there is no heaven and no hell; the realm of Siva and like regions are invented by stupid imposters of other schools of thought.”

The Carvaka thus denies soul or Atman as a surviving or transmitting entity, but it does not mean, according to Hiriyanna, that the Carvaka denies a conscious or spiritual principle but refuses to regard it as ultimate and independent.

CARVAKAS VIEWS ON GOD AND RELIGION

Since Carvakas do not believe in any metaphysical reality beyond matter, it logically follows that they out rightly consider that traditional concepts of God, religion and life-after death are “pure fictions, sheer imaginations of fevered brains”. There is nothing existent beyond this material world. Hence there is no survival of anything, no other world, and no God as unmoved mover, the first cause and the creator of the universe. Since all that exists is only matter, God who is supposed to be a supernatural and transcendental being does not exist as it cannot be the object of perception, the only valid means of knowledge. Thus Carvakas summarily deny the existence of God and dethrone God who is supposed to indwell in the human beings as *antaryamin*. They also de-recognise conscience, the voice of God, which guides man. Subsequently, they rule out the possibility of religion as the realm of faith and

belief systems that assume human beings’ innate consciousness towards a destiny beyond this world (i.e.materialistic) according to their scheme of things thirst for spirituality and structure their has no basis in the true nature of reality

ETHICS OF CARVAKAS

The Carvaka ethics is based on the assumption that the human beings get annihilated at the point of death. She or he begins life with birth and ends it with death. Carvakas do not believe in the theory of *karma* and accordingly they reject the notion of re-birth after death. Since this is the only life for the individual, their exhortation is: “make the best use of it.” To get the best out of this only life, one has to enjoy this life and to seek the utmost pleasure. The basic desire of every being/creature is to gain pleasure and avoid pain. Pleasure in this life is the sole end of man. Pleasure goes with pain. But on account of this, you should not run away from pleasure. The fact that there is pain in life should not deter the human beings from pursuing pleasure. Some

of the sayings of Carvakas encourage us not to be bogged down by the presence of pain in the process of seeking pleasure: “The wise man does not reject the kernel because of the husk;” “None gives up eating fish because there are bones and scales;” “Roses are not discarded because they have thorns;” “we do not cease to grow crops because the animals destroy them; we do not stop cooking our food, because beggars ask for it;” In all of these sayings the Carvakas call upon the people to enjoy pleasure at all times. Thus pleasure is the natural ethical principle. One should take efforts to minimize pain and maximize pleasure. Whatever action minimizes pain and maximizes pleasure is a good action.” A Carvaka lives in the moment for the moment. They exhort the human beings not to ignore a present pleasure in the hope of gaining some greater pleasure later. They invoke the following proverbs in support of their position: “Make hay while the sun shines;” “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush;” “A pigeon today is worth more than a peacock of tomorrow.” They debunk all religious practices and rituals. One of the reasons for their rejection is that they falsely promise people a good future life but in reality the religious rituals are mechanisms of priests to exploit others and make a living out of it. Vatsayana in his *kamasutra* quotes some of the *Lokyata Sutras*. In this connection let us see one of their aphorisms:

1. Religious rites should not be practiced,
 2. because their fruition depends upon the future,
-
1. And is doubtful.
-
1. Who, unless he is a fool, gives away to others what belongs to him?
-
1. A pigeon to-day is better than a peacock tomorrow.
-
1. A sure *kaudi* is better than a doubtful gold coin.

These Lokyata Sutras thus appeal to people not to ignore the present at the cost of the future. In a spirit of cynicism, one Carvaka asks a priest why he

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sacrifices a poor animal. The priest replies that the animal sacrificed goes direct to heaven. Then the Carvaka tells the priest “If so, you can jolly well put yourself in that inevitable position.”

The Carvakas do not believe in heaven or hell and for them paradise could only be on this earth. Sankara’s *Sarva-siddhanta-samgraha* speaks of what has been repeatedly called the Carvaka philosophy of hedonism:

The enjoyment of heaven lies in eating delicious food, keeping company of young women, using fine clothes, perfumes, garlands, sandal paste, etc.

The pain of hell lies in the troubles that arise from enemies, weapons, diseases; while liberation (moksha) is death which is the cessation of life-breath.

The wise therefore ought not to take pains on account of that (liberation); it is only the fool who wears himself out by penances, fasts, etc.

Chastity and other such ordinances are laid down by clever weaklings. Gifts of gold and land, the pleasure of invitations to dinner are devised by indigent people with stomachs lean with hunger.

The construction of temples, houses for water-supply, tanks, wells, resting places, and the like, is praised only by travelers, not by others.

The Agnihotra ritual, the three Vedas, the triple staff carried by the priests, the ash-smearing, are the ways of gaining a livelihood for those who are lacking in intellect and energy

The wise should enjoy the pleasures of this world through the proper visible means of agriculture, keeping cattle, trade, political administration, etc.

From the above passage it is clear that the Carvaka’s emphasis is on the individual, rather than any collective, good; accordingly, the Carvakas accept only two of the four *purusarthas* or traditional human values, namely, attainment of worldly pleasure (*kama*) and the means of securing it (*artha* = wealth), thus rejecting religious merit (*dharma*) and liberation (*moksha*). The Carvakas do not make any qualitative distinction among pleasures, nor do they try to distinguish the pleasures of the body from the pleasures of the

mind. Except in the case of activities like trade and agriculture they accept immediately available pleasures rather than any promised ones of the future as they would say “A pigeon today is better than a peacock tomorrow,” and “a certain copper is better than a doubtful gold.”

12.2 BUDDHISM – 1

In the history of the world, 8th century B.C. to 1st century A.D is known as ‘Axial Era’, a period of great ‘Spiritual Quest’ where we get almost all lasting answers to life’s perennial questions. India gave her contribution to the genuine thoughts of Axial Era in the form of Upanishadic enquiry, religions of Jainism and Buddhism and all other systems of thought. We generally divide them as orthodox and heterodox contributions. Buddha is one fine product of this era as a new pathfinder. From him comes a religio-philosophical system which is a whole in itself with its diverse developments and spread in course of time.

Every person will be influenced by his age, but what will influence him and how, depends on his sensitivities too. Buddha was a very sensitive man. The story of four sights that made him a wanderer (old man, disease, dead body and recluse) bears witness to this. We also see these sights, but they are like speck of dust fallen on hand. In the case of Buddha they were like speck of dust fallen on eye which is very sensitive and could not rest at ease until a solution was reached. They worked like immediate catalysts that caused an awareness of the basic realities of life. What do these four sights symbolise? The first three; old man, diseased man and dead body speak about the common plight of human beings. This brings Buddha to the first noble truth ‘*Sarvam Dukkam.*’ Recluse or state of being a renouncer was the way of that age for dedicating oneself for full time enquiry. Thus he leaves his palace and throne and begins his search for the reasons and remedies for the plight of man.

Buddha due to his sensitivity looked into solutions that were available at his time. After taking the life of a wanderer he visited many learned and

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rigorous practising ascetics. But he was not satisfied fully with any of them. After six years of search he came to his own discipline which he calls middle way and dharma. Middle way for him is rejection of extremes, be it rejection of extreme austerity or extreme indulgence in worldly pleasures (in his practical life) or rejection of 'eternalism' of Upanishads (there is one unchanging, permanent principle) or nihilism of Carvaka (there is no permanent, unchanging principle, life ends with physical death). Thus for his teachings the philosophical foundation becomes a new position that he reached through his enlightenment. This middle way is the theory of dependent origination, that everything is conditional, momentary and without essence. When one forgets this and considers something as unconditional, eternal and with essence, then suffering begins. This was a radical finding which begins with basic position which is opposite to the one that was accepted at that time.

Let us be aware of the complications in understanding what Buddha actually taught. Historically he is so remote and he did not write down anything. He taught orally for 45 years and his teaching fell on the ears of people from various cultures and traditions. So from his part he must have adapted himself to their culture (*paryaya*), and from the hearer's part they got only according to their capacity of reception (*adhikari bheda*). He taught in the language of the ordinary people and there were many, and the philosophical language was Sanskrit. In all these languages the disciples of Buddha later recorded his words. Buddha was a teacher who taught 'be light unto thyself' (*atta dipo bhava*). It means do not take anything true without your rational scrutiny. He also repudiated human authority as the final word in his society of monks (*Sangha*) and taught, "let the dharma be your guide, no human authority". All these caused lot of practical disciplinary problems as so many teachings came up as Buddha's teachings. Thus the need for a canon came up and 30 years after Buddha's *parinirvana* (death), the first council was conducted. Within a century in the next council strong disagreement between traditionalists (*Teravadins*) and progressivists (*Mahasangikas*) came up. Human emotional imbalance in the form of putting down and

condemning the other as low and vile (*hina*) happened in the course of time. These all contributed to the growth of sects and sub-sects and many schools and many canons.

Today we have Pali Canon, Chinese Canon, Tibetan Canon and Sanskrit Canon with their own special emphasis. To the question 'which among this is really Buddha's teaching (*buddha vachana*), nobody dared to negate the other canon, rather emphasised their own among others: "all these are '*buddha vachanas*', but 'this is His, 'the teaching,' is the trend of Buddhist sects. So each one will present Buddha's teaching from his angle. This doesn't mean that they all disagree in everything. In some basic teachings they all agree. They are the practical teachings of Buddha (the four noble truths), No-soul theory, conditioned origination, and the law of impermanence. To these basics each sect adds its own special emphasis as *Buddha vachana*. We don't go into special emphasis of sects in this unit. But we only expose those teachings that normally all agree as real Buddha teaching. In unit 'Buddhism – II' we will discuss some distinguishing marks of some schools.

This unit is divided into two parts. First is the most known teaching of Buddha, (four noble truths) which is very much practical though deep understanding of it exposes metaphysical pre-suppositions. In the second part we will expose metaphysical pre-suppositions. But water tight compartmentalisation is not possible, for they go together always. Thus student will see repetitions in both parts. This is unavoidable as they always go together. This separation is for clarity sake only.

FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS

Everyone who accepts Buddha agrees on one thing that his basic teaching is four noble truths (*chatvari arya satyani*). They are '*sarvam dukkam*', '*dukkha samudaya*', '*dukkha nirodha*', '*dukkha nirodha marga*'. This is actually ethico-religious teaching. This is exposed in the first discourse the '*Dhammacakkapavattana-sutta*'. All agree that Buddha was against hair

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splitting metaphysical speculations that are useless from the perspective of life's goal. He has a classical simile to explain it. He says if a man is struck by a poisonous arrow and is in immediate need of medication but says, 'I will not allow you to remove this arrow and put medication until I know who shot, this arrow, what it is made of, how far away he was standing, what type of bow he used etc, then, by the time you collect all answers the man will die. Thus, these answers are useless at the moment. The fact is in front of us and the means for saving his life too. Let us do that.

Buddha was taken up by the plight of humans. He named it '*dukkham*' (suffering), searched the cause of it and presented remedies like a doctor who diagnoses disease and prescribes medicine for cure. The goal is religious as life without 'suffering,' is a stage beyond 'this present life situation'. And the means are purely ethical and meditational. Only difference in this matter between him and the other religious thinkers was rejection of metaphysical speculations, be it on God or soul or the beginning and end of life, etc. Buddha saw it as not only useless but also detrimental to remove suffering. According to Buddha, suffering is caused by ignorance and this ignorance is ignorance about real nature of reality which is *anatma*, *anitya* and *dukkha*. This ignorance causes attachment, craving and all its evil effects. The goal for us is removal of this ignorance by removing attachment and craving. That is termed as '*Nirvana*' and the means for this is *prajna*, *sila* and *samadhi* (awareness, moral precepts and meditation). They are elaborated into 'noble eightfold path'.

Sarvam Dukkham: (everything is suffering)

Indian Philosophy in general begins at a realization of this human predicament; the unfortunate existential situation in which one finds oneself, that his life is 'brutish and short'. It begets frustration, unhappiness and pain. Some scriptures say "life is a vale of tears"; "vanity of vanities, everything is vanity". This is a pessimistic way of looking at life. Buddha also shares in it. According to him, "Birth is suffering, old age is suffering, sickness is

suffering, death is suffering, to be united with what is unpleasant is suffering, if one wants something and does not get it, that also is suffering; in brief, the life as we see it is suffering (it is the aggregate of five *skandhas* with thirst for existence and clinging)”. If we ask the question why it is suffering we must say it is suffering because it is impermanent. Though this initial pessimism is there in Buddha, it does not make him inactive; rather, it energises him to search for answers. One general answer was already there in the form of law of karma, i.e., the source of this unfortunate situation is of our own making. It is our own deeds that breed the *karmic* residue which is stored up and activated later and makes our life like this. And the future will be conditioned by the present deeds. This situation is called *karmic* circle, *samskara*. Buddha shared in this worldview and within this context arrived at his enlightenment; having been dissatisfied of the already given explanation and he proposes his own.

If we ask the question ‘What was Buddha’s enlightenment?’ we must say it was the realization, ‘*sarvam dukkham*’. Ordinary man, at one time speaks of life as vale of tears, in the next moment, strives for pleasure and clings to some soul. Even when he fails to attain pleasure he is under the impulse, the thirst for pleasure and appeasing of soul. For the ordinary man things are not consistently impermanent. The distinction of Buddha is that for him even those strivings for pleasure are painful and the attainment of the so-called pleasures too. Clinging to a permanent

soul is the root delusion. Thus everything is pain, and this realisation is the first criteria for enlightenment. Thus this is the first noble truth, and this realization is the first criteria for following Buddha way.

One who realizes consistently that everything is suffering, he will strive with the whole heart to end it. In order to end it, first he must know how it originates and how it can be removed. An expert doctor will not only consider the symptoms of disease but also will find out the root cause of it, in order to root it out. Buddha did the same. If every action leads to

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suffering, can we escape from suffering by desisting from action? Here comes Buddha's moral consciousness, that it is not action that is important, but the attitude behind it. Action before being done externally, happens internally or in the mind. As every action has its cause and brings out its fruits, every mental action too has its cause and effect. This cause-effect examination of all actions within the person through a psychological analysis is his second noble truth.

Dukkha Samudaya (cause of suffering)

Second noble truth says, our suffering has a cause. That which is caused can come to an end if the causal condition is removed. Something that is uncaused cannot be removed. (this is the foundation for Buddha's rejection of Upanishadic uncaused and permanent soul). Thus the second noble truth is the message of hope that comes from Buddha. Since bondage is caused, there is possibility of removing it by controlling causes and eventually eliminating them.

What is it that causes suffering? In the first sermon at Benaras (*Dhammacakkapavattana-sutta*) Buddha said, it is the thirst (*trishna*) that leads to rebirth, which is accompanied by delight and passion. Later this thirst is further elaborated as aroused by sense-objects (*kamatrishna*) and it is directed towards one's worldly existence (*bhavatrishna*). When senses come in contact with their objects, sensations arise and these awaken desire. In this way the so-called thirst for objects of desire (*kamatrishna*) arises. The second type of *trishna* arises when one takes worldly personality (five *skandhas*) as the self (*atma*) and clings to it. This is the ignorance that entangles one in the cycle of existence. When all these joined together in cause effect chain (dependent origination – *pratitya samutpada*), the famous theory of 12 spokes of *bhavachakra* of Buddhism originated. They explain it both in forward order and reverse order.

Let us see the twelve-membered chain of causes and effects:

Ignorance (*avidya*)

Impression (*samskara*)

Initial Consciousness in the embryo (*viñāna*)

Mind-body embryonic organism (*nāma rūpa*)

The six fields viz., the five senses and the mind together with their objects (*sadāyatana*)

Contact between the senses and the objects (*sparsa*)

Sense experience (*vedana*)

Strong Desire (*trishna*)

Clinging to existence (*upādāna*)

Will to be born (*bhava*)

Re-birth (*jāti*)

Pain, old age and death (*jara–marāna*)

In the general presentation of cause of suffering in the twelve-membered chain of causes and effects, the root cause of entanglement in causal chain is ignorance which is the absence of liberating cognition, the four noble truths. In such a person craving for worldly objects and worldly personality come into being (*kāma trishna* and *bhavatrishna*). The impressions that are like a subtle body is the bearer of rebirth; it enters into a new womb after death, driven by these impressions. This necessitates formation of body-mind organism and in turn the formation of senses and mind as six organs of cognition. Due to that, contact with objects occurs. And that causes sensations of various kinds leading to the passions (*raga, dvesa* and *moha*), foremost being the thirst that clings to sense-pleasure and to the supposed self that grasps them, thereby leading to renewed bondage and new existence. Once again, birth and entanglement in the suffering of existence come about, and so it goes, in the endless chain, till the liberating cognition and annihilation of thirst put an end to the cycle of existence. When one strikes at the root of this endless chain by removing the basic ignorance which is the wrong view of *atma*, permanence and pleasure, one prepares the way for third noble truth.

Dukka Nirodha (cessation of suffering)

It is the third noble truth about cessation of suffering, *nirvana*. Negatively if

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we speak of *nirvana* it is cessation of all suffering; annihilation of all that binds; complete vanishing of thirst, abandoning of all afflictions (*upadhi*). Positively it is attainment of freedom. The question is freedom from what and freedom to what. *Nirvana* is a freedom from all the three types of acts that bind mental, vocal and physical. This can happen only when one's actions do not create craving (*raga*), aversion (*dvesa*) and delusion (*moha*). Again *Nirvana* is a freedom to a life with full of good will (*metta*), compassion (*karuna*), sympathetic appreciation (*mudita*) and equanimity (*upekkha*). Its outward expressions include politeness, good manners, cleanliness of habits and the like. Buddha himself stands as a beacon with his personality.

Buddha when he started teaching was a man of harmonious, self-contained personality with great magnetism. This comes from self-confidence resulting from his enlightenment, the attainment of the right view. This is liberation. He had a contemplative temperament and kind-heartedness towards all mankind, even towards one who came to kill him. The majesty of his appearance and his courtesy towards people even of lower status and his noble manners converted many even Angulimala and impressed even those who rejected his teaching.

What is the nature of *Nirvana*, if we take it as the permanent state after death? It is a controversial issue. For Buddhism teaches *anatma* and *anitya*. If no permanent agent to experience freedom, then who attains liberation? Or what will be that after right view dawned and aggregate of *skandhas* are no more which we normally call death? Rightly Buddha kept these questions in the inexpressible (*avyakrtas*), for they are beyond our categories of linguistic expression. Later schools explained it in their own way.

Dukkha Nirodha Marga (path for cessation of suffering)

The fourth noble truth is about the path to liberation. This is the path that Buddha followed and attained enlightenment. So anyone who wishes to

follow Buddha and attain enlightenment can follow this and attain enlightenment. In fact, it is path to moral perfection, through practice of morality or virtues. Morality in Buddhism has a deeper understanding than popular understanding. Normally we judge rightness or wrongness on the basis of actions externally seen, but in Buddhism emphasis is on what is going on in the mind. Again popularly morality means following moral precepts i.e., emphasis on actions performed. In Buddhism emphasis is on 'being moral' than following precepts. Being moral emphasises total personality. It is not one action that decides morality but the moral culture of the person.

Fourth noble truth is generally described as the noble eightfold path. Some books divide them into three groups. They are wisdom (*prajna*), morality (*sila*) and meditation (*samadhi*). Among the eight first two are classified in the group of wisdom, next three are in the group of morality and last three are in the group of meditation. They are

- i) Right View (*samyak drsti*)
- i) Right Conception (*samyak samkalpa*)
- i) Right Speech (*samyak vak*)
- i) Right Conduct (*samyak karmanta*)
- i) Right Livelihood (*samyak ajiva*)
- i) Right Effort (*samyak vyayama*)
- i) Right Mindfulness (*samyak smriti*)
- i) Right Concentration (*samyak samadhi*)

i) Right View (*samyak drsti*)

‘Right view’ here refers to comprehensive understanding. Its opposite wrong view then refers to one sided or excessively bent to one extreme, be it about self or about world, and that is the root cause of suffering. Thus if we want to be free from suffering we must come out of our one sidedness. Buddha came out of both extremes of ‘it is’ (*sasvatavada*) and ‘it is not’ (*uchedavada*). He gave the truth as middle way, which is the right view, claim his disciples. This truth is exposed in the form of four noble truths and their pre-suppositions, which are dependent origination as becoming (*pratitya samutpada*), no permanent soul (*anatma*) and law of impermanence (*anitya*).

ii) Right Conception (*samyak samkalpa*)

Right conception is the decision in the mind of what is to be practically followed. As far as practice is concerned, the right view remains impractical, for it doesn’t become part of the active mind. It is duty of right conception to make mind active in that way. If that is not there, wrong conception may carry the mind away. Wrong conceptions are associated with lust (*kama-samkalpa*), conception of ill-will (*byapada-samkalpa*) and conception of harm

(*vihimsa-samkalpa*). The right conceptions are conceptions of renunciation (*nishkama-samkalpa*), conceptions of good will (*abyapada-samkalpa*), and conceptions of compassion (*ahimsa-samkalpa*).

iii) Right Speech (*samyak vak*)

When right view and right conception start to regulate life, they bring qualitative change in the way of speaking, behaviour and life style. Right speech is that speech which does not consist of lies, gossip, abuse and idle talk. This rule asks for restraint of speech and practice of virtues with one’s speech.

iv) Right Conduct (*samyak karmanta*)

This noble truth asks the practitioner (*sadhaka*) to abstain from wrong actions. This contains famous “*Pancha-Sila*” – the five vows for desisting from killing, stealing, sensuality, lying and intoxication. Killing refers to destruction of the life of any being. He who takes away life or instigates another to do so is guilty of this crime. Stealing is taking away of that which is not given. Sensuality or adultery is the holding of carnal intercourse with the female that belongs to another. Lying is one among the four sins of the speech. Others are slander, abuse and unprofitable conversation. Intoxication refers to intentional drinking of any liquor. This is forbidden because it is the root cause of all other sins. For liquor takes away the rationality and morality of the one who is under the grip of liquor, and he commits all types of sins.

v) Right Livelihood (*samyak ajiva*)

Right Livelihood refers to earning one’s everyday living by honest means. This rule tells the practitioner (*sadhaka*) that even for the sake of maintaining one’s life one should not take to forbidden means, but work in consistency with good determination.

vi) Right Effort (*samyak vyayama*)

Right effort refers to mind control. Mind is the root where all types of tendencies reside, whether they are good or wicked passions. Sometimes undesirable ideas may haunt the mind, and hence mind control is needed. Sins of the mind are covetousness, malice and scepticism. They need to be controlled. One cannot progress steadily unless he maintains a constant effort to root out old evil thoughts and prevent new evil thoughts from arising. Again since mind cannot be kept empty, he should constantly endeavour to fill the mind with good ideas and retain such ideas in the mind. These four are the right efforts.

vii) Right Mindfulness (*samyak smrti*)

This rule further stress constant vigilance, constantly keeping in mind the

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good things he has already learned. He should constantly remember and contemplate the body as body, sensations as sensations, mind as mind, mental states as mental states and contemplate on the frail, loathsome and perishable nature of things. These help us remain free from attachment and grief.

viii) Right Concentration (*samyak samadhi*)

Buddhism speaks of four stages of concentration. The first stage is dhyana or meditation on four noble truths. Here mind makes its reasoning and investigation about truths. At the second stage of concentration there is no reasoning and investigation, but an unaffected contemplation. Here still the practitioner enjoys an experience of joy, peace and internal tranquillity. At the third stage one detaches himself even from joy of concentration, attitude of indifference increases, still conscious of the ease and equanimity he experiences. At the last stage one puts away even the ease and equanimity and all senses of joy and happiness he earlier had. This is a stage of perfect equanimity, indifference and self-possession. Here he attains the desired goal of nirvana, the right view in its perfection.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. What are the noble truths of Buddha? Explain.

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.....
.....

1. Elaborate the ways of cessation of suffering.

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PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF BUDDHA'S TEACHING

We know Buddha as an ethical teacher and founder of religion who gave the eightfold path. Can one be a founder of a religion without being a philosopher or without having philosophical ideas as the foundation for these teachings? It is not possible. For religion is moulding of life in the light of reality as one sees it and knowledge of the nature of that reality shapes ideals of life. Thus philosophy is pre-supposition of religion. Sometimes religious teachers will grow from the existing philosophy of the time, without questioning it. But Buddha was not satisfied with the philosophy of the times. He questioned theory and practice of Vedic sacrifice, theory and practice of 'soul-realization' and theory and practice of 'this-life-alone' holders. He comes to a new vision, accepting the spiritual, accepting morality, but rejecting 'permanence' and 'soul' or 'substantiality'. That which is 'not-permanent' breeds suffering. Everything is not-permanent. Hence, '*sarvam dukkam*'. His vision springs from awareness of the causal genesis of things and ideas (*pratitya samutpada*), their impermanence and insubstantiality.

Theory of dependent origination (*pratitya samutpada*)

This is the central conception of the system of Buddha. This is the Buddhist theory of causation. This explains the nature of existence. He said "leave aside the questions of the beginning and end. I will instruct you in the Law (*dharma* of Buddhism). If 'that' is, 'this' comes to be; on the springing up of 'that', 'this' springs up. If 'that' is not, 'this' does not come to be; on the cessation of 'that', 'this' ceases". This is the common description of dependent origination. This exposes most salient features of Buddha's conception of the principle of dependent origination.

There is a temporal relation between the 'that' and 'this'. 'This' is an experiential component. For 'this' refers to the effect that is experienced rather than inferred. And 'that' refers to the cause that has already been

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experienced. Formulating the principle of dependent origination in this manner, the Buddha attempts to avoid the search for any mysterious entity or substance in the explanation of phenomena. Avoiding mysterious entity or substance does not mean abandoning all enquiry and go to absolute scepticism. Rather it represents the acceptance of a middle standpoint and he calls it right view. In *Kaccayanagotta-sutta*, when question asked about 'right view' Buddha said; "this world, is generally inclined toward two views:

existence and non-existence. To him who perceives with right wisdom the uprising of the world as it has come to be, the notion of non-existence in the world does not occur. To him who perceives with right wisdom the ceasing of the world as it has come to be, the notion of existence in the world does not occur.

The world for the most part, is bound by approach, grasping and inclination. And he who does not follow that approach and grasping, that determination of the mind, that inclination and disposition, who does not cling to or adhere to a view, "this is my self", who thinks "suffering that is subject to arising arises; suffering that is subject to ceasing, ceases" such a person does not doubt, is not perplexed there is "right view" (that leads to liberation). "Everything exists" is one extreme. "Everything does not exist" is the other extreme. Without approaching either extreme, the *Tathagata* teaches you a doctrine of the middle...(then follows exposition of 12 factors of *bhava chakra* as causes of suffering). This we already saw in the second noble truth, where he applied this theory of causation (*pratitya samutpada*) in the origin of suffering. Like that in other fields too his disciples apply it. In the field of Logic it is law of identity. Something is, is; is not, is and is not. When it is applied in metaphysics it becomes theory of momentariness (everything in constant flux, changing from cause to effect). And when applied in ethics it becomes law of karma as every action leaves its effect. This principle of dependent arising is an alternative to the Brahminical notion of eternal self (*atman*) as well as to the Carvaka rejection of spirituality. As an alternative Buddha explains phenomena as a state of being

in constant arising and ceasing. What is it that arises and ceases, they say 'dharma's'. It does justice to the need of both permanence and change to explain our experience and ethics.

Doctrine of Universal change or impermanence (*Sarvam anitya*)

The metaphysical application of law of dependent arising arrived by investigation and analysis of the empirical, is the doctrine of universal change. All things are combination of 'dharma's' and subject to change and decay. Since they all originate from some condition, it disappears when the condition ceases to be. Whatever has a beginning has an end. Buddha therefore says "know that whatever exists arises from causes and conditions and is in every respect impermanent. That which seems everlasting perishes, that which is high will be laid low; where meeting is, parting will be; where birth is, death will come". This is doctrine of impermanence. When this is brought to its logical conclusion, by asking the question, how one thing can become another if it is not continuously changing. If not changing it will remain as it is, if it remains as it is, it will never change combination of *dharma's* too become impossible. If there is no change, we cannot explain our experience, morality cannot be explained, for morality in order to be meaningful actions should bear fruit, no fruit without change. If change, change must be at all moments. If at one moment it is permanent, then it will go on like that for ever. For Buddhism does not accept of an external mover.

No-soul theory (*anatma*)

From the beginning of human reflection up to now, one prominent theme is 'soul'. But it is known by different names. To the primitive man inside him or in any animal that lives and moves there is a living principle, a man inside a man or an animal inside an animal that we call 'soul'. This is animism. As religion becomes refined soul concept also becomes refined. But in one form or another we see it in living religions of Hinduism, Jainism, Christianity and Islam. They teach a man's personality or self is his soul, known by different names like '*atman*', *pudgala*, *pneuma*, or *psyche* which enters body at birth and quits at death. The common element is, it is the invisible,

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immaterial ego, the 'I' that is unchangeable amidst everything that is changing, the 'Lord' of the body and mind. Those who hold that, there is a soul that exists say, without a soul there could be no immortality, without immortality life would not be worth living. The existence of a soul alone could ensure to each individual the fruit of his actions; without soul there could be no reward in heaven or punishment in hell and without it transmigration could not be explained, and so also we cannot explain differences between man and man in character, position, peculiarities and fate.

For Buddha such a permanent soul, a permanent self is the most deceitful of illusions, the basic wrong view that leads man into the pit of sorrow and suffering. In order to be a Buddhist practitioner first thing that is to be rejected is such a belief in permanent self. The reason given is – self naturally produces attachment, and attachment to it leads to egoism, craving for pleasure and aversion to pain on earth and then beyond in heaven. So search for soul is a wrong start, and wrong start will lead in false direction. "Some say that the 'I' endures after death, others say it perishes, both have fallen into a grievous error. For if the 'I' is perishable the fruit people strive for will perish too, and then deliverance will be without merit. If, as the others say, the 'I' does not perish, it must be always identical and unchanging, then moral aims and salvation would be unnecessary". Because of this logical difficulty, Buddha kept that matter in the 'inexplicable'. This silence of Buddha was explained differently by different schools, though all agree 'soul' does not exist. First systematic exposition of that we have in the book "*The Questions of King Menandros*" (*Milindapancha*). Here Nagasena the monk convinces the king with the example of chariot, there is no permanent personality, but only name and form, i.e. the five groups (*skandas*), which continuously cease and arise anew.

12.3 BUDDHISM – II

The philosophy of *Staviras* or Elders we can call as *Abhidharma*. *Abhidharma* is actually philosophical reflections by realistic and pluralistic

philosophers of Buddhism (Theravada or Hinayana) on the basic teachings of Buddha. The literal meaning of the term ‘*Abhi*’ is ‘further’ or ‘about’. Thus *Abhidharma* means the higher, further or special *Dharma*, or ‘the discourse on *Dharma*’. *Dharma* here refers to all the elements with which everything is made of. If we analyse everything we can reduce the whole of subject and object (whole reality) into 75 *dharma*s. These realistic philosophers were known as Sarvastivadins. ‘*Sarvam asti*’ means ‘everything is’ (these are realistic pluralistic philosophers) but only as elements not having a *pudgal* or soul. This is in fact the first philosophical development in Buddhism.

VAIBHASIKA SCHOOL

The word Vaibhasika has come from the main text *Mahavibhasasastra*, which was compiled around 2nd century C.E; its main object was to expose *Abhidharma* philosophy. Another classical text of this school is Vasabandhu’s (420-500 C.E.) *Abhidharma-kosa*. Actually Vaibhasika is the later form of Sarvastivada.

These Sarvastivadin philosophers transformed Buddha’s ‘no soul’ into a consistent philosophy of ‘*pudgal nairatmaya*’ (non-substantiality of everything). Non-substantiality is not only in the case of human beings, but is applied to the whole material world. ‘Things are without essence’. If we say they are unsubstantial, then what are they? This group answers that they are collection of *dharma*s. In the case of material things, there are four material atoms, and in the case of living beings five *skandas*. We see exposition of this in both *Milinda pancho*, a second century C.E. text and *Abhidharmakosa* of Vasabandhu of 4th century C.E.

Another view that is closely connected with this insubstantiality is the idea of momentariness of all entities. Buddha’s ‘*anityam*’ (impermanence) had a limited application, in the case of morality, but they applied it consistently on everything. Unlike Samkhya, who thought of a permanent thing behind all change, exposed by the image of lump of clay that turns into pot still doesn’t lose its ‘clayness’, Vaibhasika clung to Buddhist insubstantiality and

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impermanence and exposed it with the example of wood being consumed. When wood is consumed by fire, only ashes remain and it is completely different from wood. Still they accepted three moments in this change; past, present and future; that which causes that which is destroyed and that which endures.

They explained the whole of universe with 75 *dharmas* and enumerated them in detail. We see it in *Abhidhammakosa*. First they divide *dharmas* into conditioned (*samskrta*) and unconditioned (*asamskrta*). 72 are conditioned and 3 are unconditioned. The conditioned are again divided into four classes:

- Form (11 *dharmas*) consisting of the five sense organs, five sense-objects, and form with no manifestations. These are also known as *rupa* and they form all that we call matter.

II Consciousness (1 *Dharma*) sometimes divided into five *dharmas* corresponding to the sense-organs. This is also known as *citta*.

III The concomitant mental functions (46 *dharmas*). They are also known as *caitasika*. They are subdivided into four groups.

i) The general mental elements are 10 universals (*sarva-Dharma-sadharana*). They are contact, attention, sensation, ideation, will, desire to do, conviction, recollection, concentration and insight.

i) The general good functions are 10 moral universals (*kusala-mahabhumika*). They are faith, shame, the root of good, absence of greed, absence of hatred, absence of delusion, diligence, harmoniousness, attentiveness, equanimity and non-violence.

i) The general foul functions are 6 defilements of mind that hinders one from following the path. They are passion, hate, pride, ignorance, erroneous view and doubt.

i) Minor foul functions are altogether 20 mental functions that are minor defilements for the practice of eight fold path. They are anger, resentment, hypocrisy, spitefulness, envy, miserliness, deceitfulness, dissimulation, wantonness, malevolence, unrestraint, shamelessness, rigidity, agitation, lack of faith, laziness, negligence, forgetfulness, distractedness and thoughtlessness.

IV 14 *dharmas* that have no connection with form or mind (*citta-viprayukta-sanskara*) They are like acquisition, non-acquisition, communion, effects of meditation, power of longevity (vital power), the waves of becoming, words and sentences related to speech.

The remaining three are unconditioned elements. They are Space (*akasa*), extinction (*nirvana*) caused by absence of productive cause (*apratisamkhyanirodha*) and extinction caused by knowledge (*pratisamkhyanirodha*). That which provides ground to matter is space. In itself it has no defilement and it is not caused. Again *apratisamkhyanirodha* is that *Dharma*, where no type of defilement is present. In *pratisamkhyanirodha Dharma* there is right view that occasions *nirvana*. If we look into the above list, we see the importance they give to mental activities. In fact they make a psychological analysis of everything. Their naive realism forced them to dogmatically emphasise everything that are exposed above as existing independent of the subject. The next school that we are going to speak of comes up in the context of logical and rational questioning of above enumeration of *dharmas* as independently existing.

SAUTRANTIKA SCHOOL

The word *sautrantika* comes from '*sutranta*' (scripture). They base themselves on '*Sukta pitaka*' of the canon. This group came up against the naive realism and pluralism of Vaibhasikas. Main teachers of this school are Kumaralat, a contemporary of Nagarjuna. Srilabha or Srilata was his

disciple. Then comes Yasomitra and Harivarman who wrote the book

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Tattvasiddhi (Proof of the Truth). Another name notable is Vasubandhu (some say this is the same Vasubandhu who wrote *Abhidharmakosa* and some others say it is another one by the same name). It is a logico-epistemological school. (there is a later logico-epistemological school having characteristics of both Sautrantika and Yogacara. The main personalities are Dignaga and Dharmakirti (5th & 7th century C.E.). The reason for this is universities like Nalanda and Takshashila where issues are followed, not the sectarianism of schools, one becomes acharya, when he is proficient in teachings of all schools, and it was very easy for them to form their own philosophy by taking the logically fitting teachings). They said *Abhidharma* scholasticism is a deviation from the actual intent of the Master. They rejected independent existence of some of the *dharmas* and reduced their number into 45 (43 Conditioned and 2 unconditioned). If we ask the question what is it that forced them to reduce the number of *dharmas*, we must say it has both metaphysical and epistemological reasons.

The realism of Vaibhasika forced them to treat Nirvana too as some 'thing'. Sautrantika said this is against the mind of the master. So they clung to 'Sukta Pitaka' and based their interpretation on that and reason (for Buddha said '*atta dipo bhava*'). Logically, they said, the Vaibhasika clinging to three moments is not possible, for if anything changing, it must happen at all moments and one thing will last only a moment, where birth and death happens; so no past, present and future, only present is existing. Past and future are imagination (*sankalpas*).

Epistemology (Pramanas) and Acceptance of external objects and mind
Sautrantika developed logic and defended itself against both Buddhistic and non-Buddhistic criticisms. This logic was later developed and crystallized by the Yogacara (*vijnanavada*) teachers. Dignaga and Dharmakirti are the two towering personalities. First they were Sautrantika (both mind and external objects exist), later they were lenient to Yogacara (mind only exists). Dignaga in his famous work *Pramana Samuchaya* speak of two valid means of knowledge. They are Perception (*pratyaksa*) and Inference (*anumana*).

Perception deals with *svalaksanas*, (that which characterises itself, a unique particular singular and momentary). This is ultimately real (*paramarta sat*) and inexpressible. To experience them means to experience reality as it is. Inference, the other *pramana* consists of conceptualizations, verbalizations, reflections and other products of mental constructions. (*kalpana, vikalpa*) Dignaga calls it *Samanyalaksana* (a general characteristic applicable to many objects or distributed over many instances). They are enduring and not subject to change, thus they are true only in relational level (*asamvrti sat*).

Epistemologically Sautrantika goes a step further from Vaibhasika to answer the question, what we really know. They say it is not objects that come into our consciousness (naive realism) but an after-image of an object. Thus our knowledge is not through perception, but through inference. Therefore there will be always some mental construction. Thus we call them representative realists or critical realists.

Theory of Momentariness

Vaibhasika developed Buddha's notion of '*anitya*' into universal law of impermanence of everything, but they accepted three moments as "a thing arises, remains constant and ceases to exist". But being logically minded, Sautrantika raised the question, if changing, how can there be three moments, there can be only one moment. As it arises it must vanish. Thus things never

remain constant. What is there is an uninterrupted flow of causally connected momentary entities of the same kind. The cessation takes place without cause. They call it *Santana*. If it were not so, then the *dharmas* would remain constant and changeless. They define moment

(*ksana*) as the smallest indivisible unit of time. This is 1/75th of a second. All aggregates of being are repeatedly produced and destroyed in every moment. Since these elements succeed upon each other so fast, as in cinematography

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were distinct pictures in a rapid projection, evokes illusion of continuous action on the screen, we see them as continuous. Again earlier and later ones within one Santana are almost alike we normally fail to discern the arising and destruction and perceive them like flowing river or flame of a lamp. According to this doctrine, all objects of the world – our bodies, ideas, emotions and all the external objects around us – are destroyed every moment and are replaced by similar things generated at the succeeding moment, which again are replaced by other similar things at the next moment and so on.

One important logical consequence of this theory is the rejection of past and future. Everything is happening at the present time, past has ceased and future hasn't arisen. Past is memory and future is imagination. There is only just origination and cessation. This is the real truth (*paramarta sat*). The other two are relative truths (*samvrti sat*). One question that naturally arises is, how we explain 'the knowing process' then? They explain it with the theory of *svasamvedana* (self-apperception). This theory says consciousness is able to be conscious of itself and of other phenomena, just like a lamp is able to illumine clearly both itself as well as other external objects.

Sautrantika classification of *Dharma*

They have a different classification of *Dharma* from that of Vaibhasika. While Vaibhasika accepts 75 *dharma*s, Sautrantika reduces that number into 45. This includes 43 *samskrtas* and 2 *asmskrtas*. 43 *samskrtas* they divide into five *skandas*.

i) Form (*rupa*): consists of matter in its 4 primary forms (*upadana*) and 4 derived (*upadaya*) forms. 4 primary forms are earth, water, fire and air. 4 derived forms are solidity, humidity, heat and motion.

ii) Feeling (*vedana*): consists of 3 types of emotions- pleasure, pain and neutral.

iii) Perception (*samjna*): consists of grasping by 6 senses – five senses and mind. It consists of colours etc by eyes, agreeable, disagreeable, friend, enemy, male female etc.

iv) Consciousness (*vijnana*): consists of 6 sense consciousness. It is “row grasping of visual, auditory, olfactory, taste, touch and mental consciousness.

iv) Mental formation (*samskara*): consists of volitional factors that create and determine the five *skandas* of future existence. Sautrantika speaks of 10 virtuous and 10 non-virtuous *dharmas*.

iv) Unconditioned (*asamskrta*): consists of 2 uncaused *dharmas* – Nirvana and space.

Sautrantika is a transition thought on the way to full-fledged Mahayana. Later schools of Madhyamaka and Yogacara develop in their own way the ‘*Sautrantika germs*’. Madhyamika continues the logical pruning of *dharmas* that was started by Sautrantika and reduces them all

into *samvrti satya*. Yogacara cling to *Svasamvedana* and give reason for it with their *Vijnaptimatratata*.

MAIN SCHOOLS IN MAHAYANA TRADITION

Mahayana literally means ‘great vehicle’. This is a term coined by those members of the Buddhism who believed in things that the early school considered as not the real teaching of Buddha. But this group got so many adherents and they formed their own scriptures as taught by Buddha. This group called the other group as old style conservative Buddhists, who were not able to grasp the higher teaching, so Buddha did not reveal it to them. Now time is ripe for that teaching of Buddha to make public.

MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL

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Madhyamaka is the name of the school and one who follows the teaching of that school is known as a Madhyamika. This is also known as *Sunyavada* and it is systematised by Nagarjuna (2nd century A.D), whom they consider as the founder of this school. His famous work is *MulaMadhyamikaKarika*. His disciple was Aryadeva who wrote *Catush Shataka*. The name of this school comes from Buddha's famous 'middle position' (*madhyama pratipad*). Hinayana schools mostly took its ethical implication i.e., not going to the extremes of indulgence or practice. But this school takes it in a metaphysical sense. Middle position is the rejection of the extreme metaphysical positions of 'is' and 'is not' (*Sasvatavada* and *Uchedavada*). Thus it becomes the no-position (transcendental and inexpressible) and they used the word '*Sunyata*' to explain it. In the later development of this school we see division into two: Svatantrika Madhyamaka and

Prasangika Madhyamaka. A famous name connected with *Svatantrika* is Bhavaviveka (6th Century A.D) who proposes independent argument for substantiating their position. Prasangika School claims that Madhyamaka is a 'no-position' school, thus it does not have any independent argument. What it has is its dialectics. It uses '*prasanga*' (*reducio ad absurdum*), in the argument of the opponent only to show the inconsistency within them. Main champions of this trend are Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti (6th and 7th Century C.E.).

Use of '*sunya*' and '*sunyata*':

Sunyata is the most perplexing word in Buddhist philosophy. Non-Buddhists have interpreted it only as nihilism. In Madhamaka philosophy this term becomes so important that the whole system is known as *Sunyavada*. It has both ontological and soteriological implications.

a) Ontological implication

Here '*sunya*' is used to characterize the whole reality. Reality they divide into two – *samvrti sat* (relative reality) and *paramarta sat* (absolute reality).

It was a common understanding that everything has a 'svabhava' (own being, essential property – in orthodox systems, belief in permanent soul). Madhyamaka rejects this as having any independent existence. Thus they speak of both *pudgal nairatmya* and *Dharma nairatmya*. Earlier *Abhidharma* rejected whole (*pudgal*) as construction, a name given without real existence. Now the same reason is applied by Mahayanists to show *dharmas* too are construction (main argument is denial of atomism). They understand *pratityasamutpada* as conditioned existence. They say 'svabhava' must be that which is not produced by causes, which was not dependent upon anything else. There is nothing like that in our experience, for everything is conditionally originated. Since they are interdependent they are 'sunya' of 'svabhava', thus for them all *dharmas* are 'svabhava sunya'. Secondly they call the absolute reality too 'sunya' but here *Prapancha-sunya* or devoid of *prapancha* or verbalization, thought-construction and plurality. (The meaning is – Reality that which is not conditionally originated is beyond thought-construction, beyond any expression in words.)

b) Soteriological implication (that which is concerned with salvation)

This comes from the practical aim of attaining '*prajna paramita*'. Here we understand sunyata as means for attaining an end. (the state of Bodhisattva, the realization of *tathata*, tathagata or *tathagata-garbha*, *Dharma-kaya*, bodhicitta, realization of *sunyata*, *Nirvana* – all these refer to one or other aspect of *prajna paramita* in Madhyamaka which is also the Absolute). This comes through meditation on '*sunyata*'. *Sunyata* tells us that all empirical things are devoid of substantial reality, so they are worthless and because of our *avidya* we cling to insubstantial as substantial and crave for it. Here happens the germination of all passions and desires. Once *sunyata* of *dharmas* are realized, this mad rush after worldly things will go and detachment will come. Meditation on *sunyata* will lead to '*prajna*' (transcendental wisdom) which brings emancipation of the practitioner from spiritual darkness. This is the attainment of status of bodhisattva which consists in bodhicitta with its twofold aspects of *Sunyata* or *pranja* and *Karuna*. *Karuna* here refers to compassion or universal love.

i) *Samvrti satya* (*vyvaharika*) and *Paramartha satya* (phenomena and absolute; *samsara* and *nirvana*; appearance and reality). Like every rational, idealistic systems Madhyamaka too accepts two levels of reality. The empirically cognisable, that which is conditioned, that which can be known through categories of thought, that which is causally connected they call as *samvrti satya* or phenomena or *samsara*. That which is beyond the categories of thought, that which is unconditioned, that which is inexpressible, they call *paramarta satya* or absolute or *nirvana* (*paramarto aryanam thusnibhava* = to the saints, the Absolute is just silence i.e. it is inexpressible says Chandrakirti). Now it is the question of their relationship. Here Madyamaka brings out its ingenuity. They say actually there are no two. But only one and when you look at it through relativity (thought-forms, categories of reason), then it became empirical reality which is *nissvabhavata*, a covering over reality. But the same when you look through the eye of *sunyata* i.e. by removing the veil of primal ignorance that makes it relative to *samvrti*, then it is *paramarta* or absolute reality. Thus *samvrti* is like means (*upaya*) for reaching Reality that is the goal (*upeya*). Thus there is no *paramarta* without *samvrti* and no *samvrti* without *paramarta*.

i) Madhayamaka Dialectic

In fact this is the original contribution of Nagarjuna to Buddhism and Indian Philosophy in general. Buddha was silent about many questions. Now Nagarjuna asks the question, why he kept silence at the so called '*avyakrtas*.' Not because he did not know the answer, but because he knew well that such speculations will lead only to dogmatism. All metaphysical positions are one-sided. For reality is transcendent to thought constructions. To prove this he invents the dialectic with four alternatives (*catuskoti* or *tetralemma*). They are i) a positive thesis, ii) a negative counter-thesis; iii) they are conjunctively affirmed to form the third alternative and iv) disjunctively denied to form the fourth. He reduced all metaphysical systems (*drstis*) into one of these categories and applied rigorous logic to it and showed the inner inconsistencies within the system. Yes-or-No answer to

fundamental questions could not do justice to the truth and if we do so, it becomes dogmatism is the basic line of thought of Nagarjuna.

Madhyamaka is not a '*drsti*' (metaphysical system) but a critique of all philosophies – a meta-philosophy, which helps one be aware of what he is doing, while philosophizing – checking of pre-suppositions and assumptions unnoticed. In one sense Madhyamaka may seem the most intolerant of systems, as it negates all possible views without exception. In another sense it can accommodate and give significance to all systems and shades of views. For, he realizes *sunyata* and it gives him inner harmony and peace.

YOGACARA (VIJNANAVADA) SCHOOL

Yogacara is the other Mahayana school that we study in this unit. Yogacara is also known as *Vijnanavada*. It is the only idealistic school in Buddhism and Indian philosophy in the strict sense. It is not only idealism, but also absolutism. As a metaphysical system it comes up against the extreme nihilism of Madhyamika. If you say everything is *sunya* (illusory) having no '*svabhava*', then that is against common-sense. So they said something that projects illusion is real. What is it that projects illusion? It is '*alaya-vijnana*' (the ground, the power that creates material world and projects outside) says Yogacara. Madhyamaka claimed, it has no metaphysical position, it is only dialectics, but we cannot go far without metaphysics (some ground). Yogacara says Pure Consciousness (*Vijnaptimatratā*) provides the ground and this alone is real, and everything else is its self-bifurcation. Thus Yogacara is an absolutistic system. Epistemologically Yogacara idealism is the logical culmination of Buddhist 'momentariness'. Sautrantika analysis of knowledge exposed the contradiction inherent in perception, when we explain it in the context of momentariness. The only way out is falling back to subjective and idealism of Yogacara solves it. According to Yogacara its idealism is the 'middle way' (*madhyama pratipad*). The two extremes are realism and nihilism. The object is real and exists like the subject is one extreme and it is represented in realistic Sarvastivada. The subject is unreal and non-existent like object is the other extreme represented by

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Madhyamaka. The middle position between the two is that the object is unreal and is a fiction of the subjective; the subject is the real and the sole reality. The appearances are unreal; but that which appears is real.

Yogacara philosophy has two phases. The first phase is strictly idealistic. This is mainly 4th and 5th century A.D. Important persons and works related with this phase are Maitreya, his famous work is *Abhisamayalankara*. His disciple Asanga, wrote *Madhyanta Vibhaga Sutra* and *Mahayana Sutralankara*. Asanga's younger brother Vasabandhu (who was first Sarvastivadin and later converted into Mahayana by his elder brother) is one of the most prominent figures in the history of Buddhism. He wrote the most complete and definitive text on the Yogacara idealism known as *Vijnaptimatratasiddhi*. Stiramati was his disciple who wrote commentaries on his works. With him the first phase of Yogacara idealism is over.

Most important persons in the second phase are Dignaga and Dharmakirti. They were not interested in the constructive details of the idealistic metaphysics. The interest shifted from metaphysics to logic and epistemology. Idealism was maintained from the standpoint of ultimate reality; but, in order to supply a stable basis for the logic of empirical reality, the Sautrantika conception of a thing-in-itself (*svalaksana*) was revived. This resulted in the formation of the hybrid school of the Sautrantika-Yogacara, for which the name Vijnanavada can be reserved. Famous work of Dignaga is *Alambhanapariksa* and Dharmakirti's work is *Pramanavarttika*.

i) Idealism of Yogacara

Realism and Idealism are the two opposing epistemological positions. Realist will say the content known and the cognition (consciousness of the object) are two independent realities. The duty of consciousness is only to reveal the object not to create it. If it creates, then each time when we perceive, object will be altered but this is not the case. But for Yogacara, consciousness is the only reality. The so-called empirical world is only a system of ideas. The objective content is only apparent, and is really

identical with its cognition. These content and cognition are invariably perceived together (*sahopalambhaniyama*) and are therefore identical. If the content were different from cognition it should exist separately and must be perceived apart from the latter but this is not the case. Yogacara concludes that knowledge is not a mere discovery of something that is already there as realist says, but consciousness creates and projects its own content when it knows.

Yogacara proves its conclusion both by disproving the claim of realism and by giving independent arguments. If, as the realist says, consciousness only reveals the object then it must be able to reveal at all times and each time it must be similar. But actually, how and under what circumstances we look at it, the colour, shape, size etc changes. Then how we decide whether they exist in the object or in the consciousness? Positively they give the example of dreams where consciousness creates and projects as objects. The theory that all our experiential world is like a dream, without real content, and are creation and projection of consciousness, is rejection of all objectivity. It goes against all our subject-object co-operation world experience. So they must show that idealism does not do any violence to our everyday world of experience. They do it with their theory of evolution of consciousness

ii) Theory of evolution of Consciousness

Here we expose Yogacara metaphysics proper. For according to them *Vijnana* only exists (*vinjaptimatrata*). But they have to explain the whole panorama of empirical existence. They explain it with diversification of *vijnana*, which is by nature creative. They speak of different stages of this process. They are mainly three. This is caused by illusory idea of objectivity and once it is eradicated, they revert to the pristine purity of *Vijnaptimatrata*. The main stages of evolution are: a) storehouse consciousness (*alaya-vijnana*) – the place or receptor in which are contained the seeds or impressions (*vasanas*) of all karmas, good, bad or indifferent. All *dharmas* come out of it as effects or evolutes. So it is known as *sarva-bijaka*. *Alaya* serves two functions.

1) Receptor of the impressions of past *vijnanas* 2) gives rise to further *vijnanas* by maturing those impressions. This always goes on in *alaya-vijnana*, till true knowledge dawns. The second stage in evolution of consciousness is known as *Klista-manas* (psyche governed by *klesas*). It is in fact the mediator between first (*alaya*) and third (*pravrti*). In the *alaya* 'bija' is indeterminate and in *pravrti* it is fully determinate, and the transition is done by the *Klista-manas*, in the form categorisation. In Yogacara 'manas' is referred to as 'klista' (defiled). For ignorance is without a beginning (*anadi*), but can be removed with practice (Yogacara). *Klistas* in *manas* are four. They are a) the false notion of an ego (*atmadrsti*), b) ignorance about ego (*atmamoha*), c) elation over it (*atmamana*), d) attachment to it (*atmaprema*). In fact what are to be removed are these intellections and all practices are for that. The third stage of evolution of consciousness is determinate awareness of the object. In the empirical discourse these only matter. They are of six forms. The five external senses and one internal sense of mind (this mind is different from *klista-manas*. *Klista-manas* is transcendental but this mind is internal sense organ through which knowledge of the empirical ideas or *dharmas* happens). Thus altogether there are eight *vijnanas*. Here comes up all other *dharmas* that other schools of Buddhism speak of. This school speaks of 100 *dharmas*. These are the last bifurcation of *vijnana*.

iii) Doctrine of Three truths

Yogacara is not only idealism, but also absolutism, for; the logical culmination of idealism is absolutism. Idealism says object does not exist; only subject exists. But the question is – can the subject exist without object? If there is no object what will you call subject? For both of them relatively exist. When object is negated, then the next logical step will be the receding of subject. Thus we reach the *sunyata* of Madhyamaka. But as far as the relative existence of subject and object are concerned, that is real for all practical purposes, as long as our ignorance (*avidya*) does its work of objectification and falsification. Unlike Madhyamaka who makes a twofold

division of reality, Yogacara makes threefold. First is *Parikalpita*. That which has no authentic existence is *parikalpita*. It is totally imagined to exist (*kalpanamatra*). It is an object projected by the creative consciousness. Its existence is like barren woman's son. Second is *Paratantra*. This too is appearance, but it is caused by causes and conditions. That which causes it is eight types of consciousness. When the idea of the other goes, this appearance too will go, till then it will remain. Thus it is a mid-way between *Parikalpita* and *Parinispanna*. When this will go what remains is the third division of reality, known as *Parinispanna*. Thus it is the inner essence of all reality (*dharmanam dharmata*). We can speak of it only in the negative, as what it is not. Positively we can speak of it only as the consciousness freed from subject-object duality.

iv) Yogacara ideal and the way to attain it

The very name 'Yogacara' refers to 'practice of yoga'. Yogacara contains a systematised path of Buddhist practice. Buddhist goal is *nirvana*. This *nirvana* is understood in different ways in different schools. In Yogacara *nirvana* is freedom of consciousness from duality of the subject and the object which is the false idea or *avidya*. Though duality is *avidya*, the effect it generates is real and we need strict discipline and practice for removing the false idea. They speak of six *paramita* discipline. They are *Dana*, *Sila*, *Ksanti*, *Virya*, *Dhyana* and *Prajna*. Though the first ones are ethical practices, the final one is purely intellectual. It consists in the understanding of the real nature (*Prajna*). This is realization of *Tathata* (the essence of everything), the reality as it is.

Idealism we understand here in an epistemological sense. Not in a metaphysical sense where we speak of reality as spiritual. According to A.K. Chatterjee, epistemologically this term connotes three things. a) Knowledge is creative, b) there is nothing given in knowledge, and c) the creative knowledge itself is real. Soteriological means that which is concerned with salvation.

12.4 JAINISM

EPISTEMOLOGY OF JAINISM

Consciousness is the inseparable essence of every soul. It is like the sun's light capable of manifesting itself and also every other thing, unless it is obstructive. The reason is that omniscience is a natural property of the soul. In an unobstructed state, the soul is in a position to know things but when it is imprisoned in the body its nature of omniscience is obstructed. In other words it can know things only through the apparatus of the senses. The obstacles are created by the different *karmas* of the soul. These *karmas* obstruct the natural consciousness of the soul in different degrees and that determines the type of knowledge that the soul can get.

The Jainas admit twofold classification of knowledge – namely mediate and immediate knowledge. Under mediate knowledge they categorize inference and other such knowledge which are derived through the medium of some other knowledge. On the other hand immediate knowledge refers to perception. Perceptual knowledge is said to be immediate because we get knowledge of both external and internal objects through the senses and mind. In some cases the soul is also in a position to apprehend. In other words immediate knowledge is direct and mediate knowledge is indirect. Under immediate knowledge we have again two kinds namely ordinary immediate knowledge, extraordinary immediate knowledge; ordinary immediate knowledge, is that type of knowledge which the soul gets when bound by the *karma* obstacles. Under this type of knowledge we can classify *mati jnana* and *sruta jnana*. *Mati Jnana* includes any kind of knowledge obtained through the senses and mind. It even includes memory, recognition etc. On the other hand *sruta jnana* involves knowledge derived from an authoritative person or text. One may argue that listening to a person or reading a text is also a part of perceptual knowledge. Even *sruta jnana* can be brought under *mati jnana* but the Jainas reply that *sruta jnana* is different from *mati jnana* because it involves the text of an authoritative person, that is why it needs special mention.

Immediate knowledge is also classified as absolute or *paramartika* immediate knowledge or extraordinary immediate knowledge. This knowledge is possible after the soul is purged of the impurities namely the karma obstacles. In such a state the soul's consciousness becomes immediately related to objects without the medium of the senses. In the case of ordinary immediate knowledge the soul is caged in the body and as a result, it can be related to objects and thereby know them only through the senses. In that stage the soul's knowledge is not only obtained through the sense organs but is also guided by the *karma* obstacles. On the other hand, the soul is said to obtain extraordinary knowledge directly. We can explain this with an example. When a person is standing inside a room he can know the outside world only through the openings in that room such as windows, and doorways. Once the four walls that surround him are removed he can know much more about the world than what he knew earlier. In other words, man is able to see everything around him provided he is free. Similarly soul's consciousness is capable of knowing everything directly but when it is inside the body it is limited, it is not in a position to exercise its full power. When ones *karma* obstacles are removed he is in the path towards extraordinary knowledge which of course is immediate par excellence. The Jainas talk about this in stages because this immediate extraordinary knowledge is not to be got overnight. It needs the gradual destruction of the *karma* obstacles. The Jainas mention three such stages as

(i) *Avadhi*

(i) *Manah Paryaya*

(iii) *Kevala – Jnana*

After the partial destruction of karmas one acquires the power of knowing objects which are too far away and obscure for the normal sense organs. This stage of extraordinary knowledge is *avadhi*. The second stage is *manah paryaya* wherein one has direct access to others mind. This can happen only

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after that person overcomes hatred and jealousy. In other words, in the first stage, we are able to know some distant gross objects with a form. In the second stage we are able to know or probe deeper into subtle level. Finally when all karmas are destroyed completely, then absolute knowledge or omniscience arises. That stage is *kevala jnana*. Only the liberated souls possess this kind of extraordinary knowledge.

The Jainas accept three *pramanas* or sources of knowledge namely perception, inference, and testimony. Perceptual knowledge is direct which involves the sense organs and therefore acceptance of perception as an independent source of knowledge need not be elaborated. But definitely we must examine the refutation of Carvaka's position by the Jainas regarding inference and testimony. The Jainas ask whether perception is a valid source of knowledge. Definitely according to Carvaka, perception is a valid source of knowledge because it is uncontradicted and at the same time not misleading. Now the Jainas point out that the reasons for the validity of perception itself shows that the Carvaka resorts to inferential knowledge. Furthermore even perceptual knowledge can at times be contradicted and misleading as in the case of the perception of a mirage. So the Jainas point out that if perception can be contradicted and misleading but still held as a source of knowledge why not inference and testimony be regarded as independent sources of knowledge.

Therefore according to Jainism the only reasonable conclusion that we can draw is that any source of knowledge, be it perception, inference or testimony, should be regarded as valid in so far as it yields knowledge that does not prove misleading. Therefore the criterion of validity should be the harmony of knowledge with the practical consequences to which that knowledge leads.

THE JAINA THEORY OF JUDGMENT OR SYADVADA

It is the conception of reality as extremely indeterminate which is the basis of *syadvada*. According to this theory every judgment is only partial or

relative. The term “*syat*” is derived from the Sanskrit root “*as*” which means “to be”. The present tense form of this verb ‘*as*’ is ‘*asti*’ which can be translated as “is”. The potential mood of this verb form is “*syat*” which means “may be”. The Jainas use this theory to signify that the universe can be looked at from many points of view and that each view yields a different conclusion. In other words they believe that there can be a variety of doctrines depending upon the points of view. This is known as *anekantavada*. This doctrine indicates an extreme caution and signifies an anxiety to avoid absolute affirmation and absolute negation. Here one must see the conditions under which this doctrine was passed in order to understand its significance. There were two important extreme views concerning reality. At one point of time namely the *Upanishadic* view and at another point the Buddhist view. The *Upanishadic* view of reality upholds the concept of “Being”. On the contrary the Buddhists deny such a “Being”. According to Jainism both these theories are only partially true. So the Jainas consider reality to be so complex that every one of these theories is true as far as it goes. But none is absolutely true. So the Jainas make out a series of partially true statements without committing to any of these exclusively. This series is explained in seven steps or sevenfold formula called *saptabhanginaya*. “*Naya*” means partial knowledge about some object while “*bhanga*” means different and “*sapta*” seven.

Judgment based on any partial knowledge is also called *naya*. When we consider every judgment to be unconditionally true then it leads on to quarrel. In this way the various schools of philosophy have come to quarrel with each other since they believe that their judgment of reality is final; when they realize that their knowledge is partial the conflict is no longer there. In view of this fact the Jainas insist that every judgment should be qualified by some words like “somehow” or “may be” so that the limitation of every judgment as also the possibility of other judgments is recognized. Thus *syadvada* is the theory which holds that every judgment is only partially true. Thus we have the judgment “the elephant is like a pillar” is changed into “may be or somehow the elephant is like a pillar”. On the basis

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of this theory the Jainas classify seven kinds of judgments though logic recognizes only two namely affirmative and negative. The seven types of judgments are as follows:

- a) *syat asti* – ‘somehow S is P’. A jar is red

- a) *syat nasti* – ‘somehow S may not be P’. A jar may not be red.

- a) *syat avaktavyam* – ‘somehow S may be indescribable’. The redness of jar cannot be described adequately.

- a) *syat asti ca nasti ca* – ‘somehow S may be or may not be P’. This argument does not involve contradiction. Normally logic considers a judgment to be contradictory only when it holds that ‘S’ is both ‘P’ and ‘not P’, because the same ‘S’ is ‘P’ from one angle and ‘not P’ from another angle. That is why this judgment is accepted by the Jainas.

- a) *syat asti ca avaktavyam ca* – somehow ‘S’ is ‘P’ and is indescribable.

- a) *syat nasti ca avaktavyan ca*– somehow ‘S’ is ‘not P’ and is indescribable.

- a) *syat asti ca nasti ca avaktavyam ca*– somehow ‘S’ is ‘P’ ‘not P’ and indescribable. These seven steps form a part of what is known as *saptabhanginaya* or the seven fold judgments. According to this theory every judgment is only partial or relative.

THE JAINA METAPHYSICS OR THE THEORY OF SUBSTANCE

Every substance has got innumerable characters of which some are positive and others are negative. As in common conversation so also in philosophy a distinction is made between the characters and that which possesses these characters. We call that which possesses characters as substance or *dravya*. The world consists of different substances. Each of these substances have qualities which are essential along with qualities that are accidental. The

essential quality is called *guna*. The accidental quality is called *paryaya*. The essential qualities are those that remain in the substance as long as the substance exists. In other words they are inseparable from the substance. On the other hand the accidental qualities are those which come and go. In so far as the essential characters of the ultimate substance are abiding, the world is permanent. In so far as the accidental qualities undergo modifications, the substance also changes. According to Jainas both change and permanence are real. When we apply *syadvada* the seeming contradiction between change and permanence vanishes. The Jainas reject both *kshanikavada* (theory of momentariness of Buddhists) and reject *nityavada* (theory of permanence of the vedantins).

Substances can be classified as both extended and non-extended. Among substances time alone is devoid of extension. All other substances are considered to be extended. Extended substances are innumerable and are referred to by the general name *astikaya* because every substance exists like a body. *Kaya* means that which possesses extension. The word *astikaya* means anything that occupies space or has some pervasiveness. Such objects which are extended are classified by the Jainas as animate (*jiva*) and inanimate (*ajiva*). We may call them as the living being or the non-living matter. The Jainas consider soul or *jiva* as an extended substance. This is not without reason. Normally we understand soul as being opposed to body; since body is extended we conclude that its opposite namely the soul is non-extended. But according to Jainism souls also expand and contract according to the dimensions of the body which they occupy. It is only in this sense that the Jainas regard souls to be extended. Even among such souls the Jainas differentiate between the emancipated and fettered souls. Once the souls are emancipated or liberated none of the impurities attach to them. That is the highest state of *jiva*. But the *jiva* has to transcend various levels before reaching this state. So the Jainas attribute such states to the souls in bondage. Fettered souls are either moving or immobile.

Among the non-moving fettered souls the Jainas consider those living in bodies made of earth, water, fire, and air or plants. All such non-moving

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substances (*sthavara*) have one-sensed, namely that of touch. On the contrary moving substances (*trasa*) are two-sensed namely worms, three-sensed like ants, four-sensed like bees and five sensed like man. This distinction among moving substances is based on the senses that are active. For instance in the case of worms the sense of touch and taste alone are at work. In the case of ants the senses of touch, taste and smell. That is why ants have been classified under three-sensed and similarly bees are four-sensed because they also have sight. The immobile living substances have the most imperfect kind of bodies when compared to the mobile living substances. The Jainas regard even the four elements as being animated by souls, that is the particles of earth etc have soul in the sense that there is consciousness present in them although this consciousness is not as differentiated as in the case of a higher being. We may call such substances as elementary. They just live and die. Their functions are not clearly demarcated, or well defined. These elementary lives are either gross or subtle. Gross objects are distinguished from subtle on the basis of their visibility and knowability. On the contrary the mobile living substances have bodies of different degrees of perfection.

Soul or *jiva* – Generally *jiva* is a conscious substance. It is also extendable in space because souls expand and contract according to the dimensions of the body. According to the Jainas the essence of soul is consciousness or in other words consciousness is present in the soul everywhere. The Jainas arrange the soul theoretically in a continuous series according to the degree of consciousness. At the highest end of the scale would be the perfect soul that has overcome all *karmas* and attained omniscience and at the lowest end would be the most imperfect soul such as the single sensed souls. In this state consciousness is in the dormant form due to the interference of *karma* obstacles.

The soul knows, performs, enjoys, suffers and illumines itself and other objects. Like a light it has no form of itself but it takes the form of the body. It is in this sense that the soul is said to occupy space in its pure states, the

soul as infinite bliss and infinite power. Except a few souls all other souls are in bondage because of *karma* or matter which has been accumulated in the past. The Jainas view that consciousness or soul has extension and the soul primarily is a living being which has consciousness in every part of the living body. Consciousness is the essential quality of the soul.

Proofs for the existence of Soul :

1. The existence of the soul is directly perceived by experiences such as “I feel pleasure, pain” etc., when a quality is perceived we say that along with it a substance is also perceived.
1. We can also prove the existence of the soul from inference. If we take a body as an instrument there must be someone to control it and that which controls the body is the soul.
1. The body also performs many actions that are guided; this enables us to infer the existence of soul as the guiding factor.

INANIMATE SUBSTANCE (OR) *AJIVA*

Among the extended substances we have seen *jiva* and its various facts. Now let us take a look into another category of extendable substance namely the inanimate substance or *ajiva*. Even these substances occupy space and is referred to as *astikaya* . The Jainas classify this kind of substance into four namely, *Pudgalastikaya*, *Akasastikaya*, *Dharmastikaya*, *Adharmastikaya*

Pudgalastikaya

The word “*pudgala*” means matter and since it occupies space it is *astikaya*. Etymologically it means that which is liable to integration and disintegration. Material substances combine together to form larger wholes and can also break up into smaller and smaller parts. The smallest part of matter which cannot be further divided is called an atom (*Anu*). *Pudgala* is made up of such atoms. The Jainas call atoms and combination of atoms by this single term *pudgala*. All material substances are produced by the combination of atoms. Our bodies and objects of nature are such compounds of material atoms. So even they are called as *pudgala*. Even mind, speech

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and breath are products of matter. The atoms are eternal and possess qualities like touch, taste smell and colour. Therefore we find these qualities in the compounds of atoms. Here according to Jainas, sound is not an original quality. It is an accidental modification of matter.

Dharmastikaya and Adharmastikaya

The terms dharma and adharmas should not mislead us into thinking about merits and demerits. Instead these two terms are used to denote two kinds of inanimate substances which are known and proved inferentially. They stand for mobility and immobility. The Jainas argue that the movement of a fish in the water, though initiated by the fish, would not be possible without the medium of water. Here water is a necessary condition. Similarly the movement of any soul or material thing needs a necessary condition without which movement would not be possible. Such a condition is dharma. Nevertheless, dharma cannot cause movement in a nonmoving object. It only favours the movement of objects in motion. On the other hand adharmas is the substance that helps in the immobility of objects or the restful state of objects, just as the shade of a tree helps the traveler to take rest. However adharmas cannot arrest the movement of any moving object. These two are pervasive in nature. In other words these two are passive conditions for movement and the state of rest respectively. Water cannot compel a fish to move nor can the shade compel a person to take rest. Similarly dharma and adharmas do not compel movement and immobility actively but help objects to move or not to move passively. The necessity for admitting these two categories seems probably to have been felt by the Jainas on account of their notion that the inner activity of jiva or the atoms, require for its exterior realization the help of some other entity. Moreover since the jivas were regarded as having inherent activity they would be found to be moving even at the time of liberation which is undesirable.

Akastikaya or Space

The function of *akasa* is to afford room for the existence of all extended substances. It is based on this category that the Jainas classify substances as *astikaya*. Soul, matter, *dharma* and *adharmā* exist in space. The existence of space is inferred and not perceived because substances which are extended can have extension only in space, and that space is called *akasa*. Here *akasa* is a necessary condition. Likewise, if we say that substances are those that pervade, then there must be something that is pervaded. That which pervades is called substance while that which is pervaded is space. Jainas distinguish two kinds of space namely *lokakasa* and *alokakasa*. *Lokakasa* stands for space containing the world and *alokakasa* stands for empty space that exists beyond *lokakasa*.

Time or *Kala*

It is the only non-extendable substance according to the Jainas. Time makes possible continuity modifications etc. Like space time is also inferred. It is inferred as the condition without which we cannot speak about continued existence of things or modification of things. For instance mango became ripe implies that mango was in an unripe state at one point of time which became ripe at a later time. But time according to Jainas is non-extendable (*anastikaya*) because time is an indivisible substance. It cannot be characterized by space. It is irreversable. The Jainas distinguish between real time (i.e) *paramartika kala* and empirical time *vyavaharika kala*. Continuity or duration is the measure of real time. But on the other hand, changes of all kinds characterize empirical time. According to the Jainas empirical time is conventional i.e. divided into hours, minutes and seconds. It is limited by a beginning and an end. Real time on the other hand, is eternal and formless.

JAINA ETHICS

This is the most important aspect of the Jaina philosophy. For them metaphysics or epistemology is useful only in so far as it helps man to right

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conduct. What is meant by right conduct? According to the Jainas right conduct enables man to liberate himself from bondage. Bondage in Indian philosophy means the liability of the individual to birth and all consequent sufferings. But the suffering individual is a conscious substance (*jiva*) who possesses infinite perception, infinite knowledge, infinite power and infinite bliss. Despite these perceptions the soul suffers in birth because of *karma* obstacles. If the soul has to regain its inherent qualities then these obstacles must be removed. This situation is like that of the sun's light which becomes brighter and brighter as soon as the clouds are cleared. In order to know how these obstacles can be cleared let us analyze what these obstacles are in reality. The Jainas assert that the obstacles are constituted by matter particles which infect the soul and overpower its natural qualities. In other words we can say that body which is made up of matter particles (*pudgala*) is responsible for limiting the soul. Each body is made up of a particular combination of matter particles which depend on the soul's passion. The *karma* or the sum of past life of the soul generates a craving which attracts particular *pudgala* to the soul. The soul becomes the efficient cause and *pudgala* becomes the material cause. It is our past *karmas* that determine the family in which we are born as well as the nature of our body such as its colour, shape, longevity, the number and nature of sense organs etc. For instance *gotra-karma* determines the family into which the soul is to be born and *ayush-karma* determines the length of life.

Liberation

Bondage, we have seen is the association of soul with matter and liberation therefore should be the complete dissociation of the two. This can be achieved by stopping the influx of new matter into the soul as well as by complete elimination of the old matter with which the soul has become already mingled. Passions of the soul lead to association. What is the cause of this passion? Passions spring from our ignorance about the real nature of our soul. It is knowledge that alone can remove ignorance. Therefore the Jainas stress the need for right knowledge of reality (*samyag-jnana*). Right

knowledge is the detailed cognition of the real nature of ego and non-ego, which is free from doubt, error uncertainty etc. It can be obtained only by studying carefully the teachings of the omniscient *Tirthankaras* or teachers who have already obtained liberation and therefore are fit to lead others out of bondage. When do we accept a knowledge? Only when we have a preliminary belief in that. Then that preliminary faith should be supported by right knowledge again for having right faith based on general acquaintance (*samyag-darsana*) in support of right knowledge. Right faith does not imply that one must blindly follow the *Tirthankaras*. But one must have the right attitude of respect towards truth. Further by studying the teachings of the *Tirthankaras* one can strengthen his belief. But these two are rendered useless unless they are followed by rigorous practice. Right conduct is the third indispensable (*samyag-caritra*) condition of liberation. It is this that enables one to stop the influx of new karmas and also to eradicate old ones. It consists in the control of passions, senses, thought, speech etc. Right conduct is therefore described as refraining from what is harmful and doing what is good. The Jaina prescription for right conduct: One must follow the five great vows namely the *panca-maha-vrata* for the perfection of right conduct. They are *Ahimsa*, *Sathyam*, *Asteyam*, *Brahamacaryam* and *Aparigraha*.

Ahimsa

It denotes abstinence from all injuries to life – either *trasa* or *sthavara*. That is why a Jaina *muni* breathes through a piece of cloth in order not to inhale or destroy any life in the air. It must be followed in thought, word and deed. That is why they practice extreme caution in speaking, walking or even in answering calls of nature so as to avoid injury to any life whatsoever. *Sathyam*: It is abstinence from falsehood. It is speaking what is true, good and pleasant. Otherwise truthfulness is of no use. To maintain this vow one must conquer greed, fear and anger. *Asteyam*: It refers to abstinence from stealing. Human life requires some form of wealth for their survival. Depriving another man of his wealth is morally wrong. By stealing his

belongings it deprives him of an essential condition of life. *Brahmacaryam*: This pertains to abstinence from sensual and casual pleasures. One must refrain himself from *karma* of any form altogether either in speech, talk or action. *Aparigraha*: This means abstinence from all kinds of attachments. It lies in giving up attachment for the objects of five senses.

Right faith, knowledge and conduct are inseparably bound up with one another and the progress and degeneration of the one affects the other two. A person must harmoniously develop all these three together. Only when the soul overcomes passions and *karmas* (both old and new) it becomes completely free from bondage to all forms of matter and reaches its inherent potentiality. It is finally here that the soul attains the fourfold path of perfection (*Ananta catustaya*) as follows: *Ananta Jnana* (infinite knowledge), *Ananta darsana* (infinite faith), *Ananta virya* (infinite power), *Ananta sukha* (infinite bliss). These three (right knowledge, right faith and right conduct) are known as *Triratnas* – or the three gems of Jainism.

12.5 LET US SUM UP

Carvaka philosophy or Indian materialism, one of the oldest doctrines in India already quite noted in the earliest text of Rig Veda, an anti-hegemonic counter-movement, has continued to influence Indian academia even into our modern times as we see in the philosophy of modern and contemporary Indian thinkers like Devatman and M.N. Roy. Some view Carvaka philosophy less as a constructive philosophy than as a reaction to the excess of ritualism, spiritualism, world-negating idealism, oppressive clericalism and inhuman casteism. However

this is not to state that the Carvaka system is philosophically insignificant and unsound as Dale Riepe observes that Carvaka's epistemological outlook is empirical, their metaphysics materialistic and ethics hedonistic.

Carvaka etymologically means 'sweet-tongued' (*caru+vak*). Carvaka was also called 'Lokayatya' which accepts only the material world as real. Brhaspati is the founder of the school. Some of the texts that refer to the

philosophy of Carvakas are Madvacharya's *Sarva-darsana-samgraha*, Sankara's *Sarva Siddanta-samgraha*, Krishn Misra's *Prabodha-chandrodaya*, the *Kamasutra* of Vatsayana, the *Nyayasutra* of Gautama—one of the earliest texts of Nyaya system and the Buddhist sources such as *Payasi Suttanta* and *Samanna-Phala-Sutta*.

The only means of knowledge the Carvakas accept is perception. And they openly question and deny the validity of means of knowledge such as inference and testimony. Carvakas do not believe in all the five elements of the material world. They deny the existence of Ether because it cannot be perceived. Carvakas do not deny consciousness but only its existence independent of the body. It is always found associated with the body and is destroyed with the body's disintegration. For them, consciousness is as a mere product of matter arising out of the combination of the four elements of matter under certain favourable conditions. Carvakas do not believe in God because they deny the existence of anything which is not material. Hence God who is supposed to be a supernatural and transcendental being is not a reality as God cannot be the object of perception, the only valid means of knowledge. Since this is the only life for me, I must make the best use of it. To get the best out of this only life, I have to enjoy this life and to seek the utmost pleasure. Carvakas reject religious rituals because they falsely promise people a good future life but in reality they are mechanisms of priests to exploit others and make a living out of it.

Buddhism as we see today is a big forest with such a lot of variety of trees in it. Though the schools and sects keep up their uniqueness, they all claim that they give the Master's teaching. Modern times when study of Buddhism was rejuvenated in Europe, a fresh scientific enquiry into what is later and what is the core was taken up. All unanimously agree on the so-called

four noble truths (*catur aryasatyani*) as Buddha's own words and contains a summary of his teaching and gives theoretical framework of philosophy for Buddhists everywhere. Among these truths, the first, the truth of suffering is

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the basis of Buddhist ontology. The second, the truth of the Origin of Suffering is the basis of Buddhist psychology or the ontology of the mental. The third, the truth of the cessation of suffering is the basis of Buddhism as a religion. The fourth, the truth of the path leading to cessation of suffering, is the basis of Buddhism as a moral and meditational practice. All the later developments in any of these fields have this same fundamental heritage – the vision of Buddha. It is presented as '*sarvam dukkam*', '*sarvam anatmam*' and '*sarvam anityam*'. If we ask the question why everything is suffering? The answer is because it is impermanent. Why is it impermanent? Because it is dependently originated. Why is it dependently originated? The answer is, it is like that. We experience it like that.

The main Hinayana Mahayana distinctions:

In Metaphysics: Hinayanists are radical pluralists but Mahayanists are radical absolutists. (non-dualistic advaya)

In Epistemology: Hinayanists are rationalists and realists. Mahayanists are mystical, super-rationalists who use dialectical criticism.

In Ethics: Hinayanists are egoistic individualistic aim at Arhathood. Mahayanists are Universal Salvationists aiming at enlightenment for the sake of others (bodhisattva, tathagata)

In religion: Hinayana becomes an order of Monks emphasising human aspect of Buddha. Mahayanists are more devotional, Buddha become object of worship on one side and on the other side the absolute metaphysical reality.

These general trends that we noted here in this general division influence one way or other the peculiarities of each of the school we examined above.

In **SCHOOL of JAINISM** we have tried to give a detailed historical

account of Jainism and an analysis into the various concepts of the Philosophy of the Jainism. We have discussed at first the Jaina epistemology. We have also analysed key concepts like *Syadvada*, *Anekantavada*, *Saptabhanginaya*, under the different kinds of judgments and finally have evaluated the concept and importance of *Ahimsa* along with the role of *Pancamahavrata*, in attaining liberation.

12.6 KEY WORDS

Carvaka: etymologically it means ‘sweet-tongued’ (*caru+vak*). Some hold that ‘carvaka’ has its etymology in ‘carva’ which means to chew or eat. ‘carva’ allegorically stands for chewing, grinding with the teeth, eating and swallowing virtues and vices.

Lokayatya: It is the combination of the two words ‘loka’ (The world) and ‘ayata’ (basis). This word expressed the belief of the ‘Carvakas that accepts only the reality of the material world.

BrihasPati: He is traditionally regarded as the founder of Carvaka school. *Lokayata-sutra* or *Carvaka-sutra* which was only referred to by many writers but never available as a text is generally attributed to him.

Dharmas (*dhamma* in Pali): in Buddhism are the elements of existence. These are grouped into 5 *Skandhas*, 18 *dhatu*s and 12 *ayatana*s and their subdivisions. They explain Buddhist ontology.

Reality: It means the sum total of elements (*dharmas*) with which everything is made of, and with in which we comprehend everything.

Religion: In Buddhism refers to spirituality, not to worship of personal God. In a broader sense it refers to a belief that liberation from a frustrating and painful existence or from eternally repeated existence is possible and can be achieved through appropriate mental and moral practices.

Dharma is a basic general term in Indian philosophy. Even in Buddhism it is used in four senses. 1) *Dharma* in the sense of one ultimate Reality (as it is

used in the word *Dharma-kaya*).

2) *Dharma* in the sense of scripture, doctrine, religion (as it is used in the word Buddhist *Dharma*). 3) *Dharma* in the sense of righteousness, virtue (as it is used in general sense). 4) *Dharma* in the sense of “elements of existence”. (in this sense it is generally used in plural)

Scholasticism is generally used in two senses: 1) philosophy in the service of religion (*angilla philosophie*), 2) excessive subtlety and artificiality in philosophical constructions. Scholasticism in Buddhism is to be taken in the second sense. Vaibhasikas were scholastic in this sense with 75 *dharmas*. The Sautrantikas were in favour of simplification thus they reduced the number of *dharmas* into 45.

Prajna Paramita refers to culmination of six spiritual qualities that help the practitioner for seeing the truth face to face (*vipasyana*). They are *dana* (charity), *sila* (withdrawing from all evil deeds), *ksanti* (forbearance), *virya* (enthusiasm), *dhyana* (concentration) and *prajna* (transcendental insight).

12.7 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Describe metaphysics of carvaka school.
2. Describe metaphysics of jainism.
3. Differentiate between the metaphysics of sankhya and vaishesika.
4. Explain buddhism and its impact.
5. Describe how all schools are different from each other

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12.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check your progress I

1. Refer to topic Carvaka
2. Refer to topic origin of the school
3. Refer to the literary sources of Carvakas

Check your progress II

1. Refer to topic four Noble truth.
2. Refer to Eightfold path.

UNIT 13 CAUSATION

STRUCTURE

- 13.0 Objectives
- 13.1 Introduction
- 13.2 Metaphysics
- 13.3 Theory of Causation
- 13.4 Epistemology
- 13.5 Bondage and Liberation
- 13.6 Let Us Sum Up
- 13.7 Key Words
- 13.8 Questions for review
- 13.9 Suggested readings and refernces
- 13.10 Answers to Check Your Progress

13.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit, you will learn the various issues and ideas pertaining to Sâmkhya Philosophy.

After working through this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the Sâmkhya theory of causation;
- elucidate the distinction between Purusa and Prakrti;
- discuss Sâmkhya views on evolution;
- analyze Sâmkhya account on pramânas (Sources of valid knowledge);
- illustrate Sâmkhya explanations on bandage and liberation; and
- discuss the Sâmkhya views on God.

13.1 INTRODUCTION

In this unit you will find the Sâmkhya's theory of causation, distinction between purusa and prakrti, discussion on the gunas of prakruti; sattva, rajas and tamaj, and a few more issues.

In the previous unit you had studied Vaisesika Philosophy in an elaborate manner. While studying Vaisesika School of thought you must have gone through the discussions on Vaisesika's metaphysics and categories, the concept of bondage and liberation, etc.

In this unit, you will find how Sâmkhya Philosophy argues for the cause of evolution of the world, the role of purusa and prakruti for the creation of the universe, valid sources of knowledge, and on the existence of God.

The Sâmkhya Philosophy is one among the oldest school in India Philosophy. This is so because the basic tenets of Sâmkhya can be seen in Nyâya, V aiúesika, Yoga, Jainism, and Vedânta. The founder of Sâmkhya Philosophy is 'Kapila' who has written the script 'Sâmkhya Sûtra'. This script is widely known as Sâmkhya Philosophy. It is commented by many scholars, out of those the significant commentary is known as 'Sâmkhya Kârîka' by Íúvarak?sna.

There are two views on the origin of this school. Some are believed that the word Sâmkhya is derived from the word 'Samkhyâ' which means number as well as right knowledge. Right knowledge is about understanding the reality by specifying the number of ultimate constituents of the universe. Others viewed that Sâmkhya means 'perfect knowledge' and that is about the reality. With these introductions now let us know Sâmkhya's metaphysics.

13.2 METAPHYSICS

The Sâmkhya Philosophy is regarded as dualistic realism. It is dualistic because it holds the doctrine of two ultimate realities; Prakrti and Purusas. Further, it maintains the plurality of Purusas (self) and the existence of matter, hence, treated as pluralistic. It is realism because they viewed that both matter and spirit are equally real. The Sâmkhya school expresses that the self (Purusa) and the non-self (Prakriti) are radically different from each other, as like, subject and object. As subject can never be the object,

similarly, an object can never be the subject.

In this regard, a few important questions are addressed here. Those are, 'what is the ultimate cause of an object?' and, 'what are the constituents of the universe?' In other words, what is the ultimate stuff of which the various objects of the world are made?

The Sâmkhya replies that Prakriti is the ultimate (first) cause of all objects, including our mind, body and sense organs. It is observed that every effect must have a cause. Cause and effect are two inseparable components stand for all sorts of creation in the cosmos. Hence, all objects of the world are bounded in the chain of cause-effect relation. This relation Sâmkhya named as 'satkâryavâda' and populated as 'theory of causation'.

13.3 THEORY OF CAUSATION

The Sâmkhya theory of causation is known as satkâryavâda. It explains the effect exists in its material cause prior to its production. For example, curd was existing in the milk before comes into existence. Hence, the effect is not a real beginning or a new creation. It is also named as 'parinâmavâda'. By refuting this view Nyâyikas said that effect is a new creation, otherwise why we say this is the effect and that was the cause. The detail analysis of Nyaya theory cause-effect relation (asatkâryavâda/ârambhavâda) is found in this Block, Unit-1: Nyaya Philosophy.

The following arguments uphold by Sâmkhya to support the theory satkâryavâda.

- i. If the effect does not exist in the cause prior to its operation, none can bring into existence out of the cause. For example, blue cannot be turned into yellow even by a thousand artists. The effect is related to its cause. Effect is nothing but the manifestation of the cause, as oil will be produced from oil seeds only. Thus, effect pre-exists in the

material cause in a latent or un-manifest condition.

- i. A particular effect can be produced out of a particular material cause. A mud jar can be produced out of clay only; cloth can be produced out of threads only. Thus, it proves that the effects are existing in the cause in a latent condition.

- i. If the effect is not related to its cause, then every effect would arise from every cause. But this does not happen. Every effect does not arise from every cause. For example, butter cannot be produced from sands, waters, or oils. It is produced from milk only.

- i. The effect pre-exists in the cause since it can be produced by a potent cause only. A potent cause has causal energy to produce a particular effect. The causal energy in this case is inferred from the perception of the effect. If the effect is not existent in the cause, then the causal energy can't be related to it. If the causal energy is unrelated to the effect, then any effect will arise from any cause. Hence, the effect must be pre-existent in its potent cause only.

- i. The effect pre-exists in the cause since it is identical in nature with its cause. The effect is not different from the cause. The cause is existent and therefore, the effect cannot be non-existent. Hence, effect inheres in its cause. This is so because there is no identity between entity and non-entity.

The Sâmkhya disagrees with Nyâyikas and said that if curd as an effect is a new creation and does not exist in its material cause (milk) prior to its production, then can we produce curd from some other liquids like oil, kerosene, diesel etc. Hence, each effect exists in its material cause prior to its production in a hidden form.

Here, a question may come to your mind, i.e. if every effect must have a

cause then what would be the cause of a material cause? By responding to this query Sâmkhya philosophy expressed that Prakriti is the first and ultimate cause of all objects of the world both gross and subtle.

Prakriti

Prakriti is the ultimate cause of the universe. It is regarded as the first cause. All effects of the universe are based upon it. Being the first element of the universe, Prakriti itself is uncaused, eternal, and all pervading. Hence, it is called “pradhâna”.

It can't be perceived but can be inferred from its effect. Thus, it is known as 'anumâ'. In the form of conscious elements, it is called jada, and in the form of the unmanifested objects, it is called 'avayakta'.

Differences between Prakriti and Objects

Objects are the effects of Prakriti. These are dependant, relative, many and non-eternal because they are created and destroyed. But Prakriti, on the other hand, has neither beginning nor end. It is unborn, independent, absolute, one, eternal and beyond creation and destruction. Objects are limited within the space-time continuum but Prakriti is beyond of it. Objects are manifest and composite but Prakriti is unmanifest and without parts. Thus, Vyâsa says that Prakriti is both 'is' and 'is-not'.

Proofs for the existence of Prakriti

There are five arguments offered by Isvarakrishna for the existence of Prakriti. These are as follows;

- i. The world is constituted of manifold of objects. The existence of all the objects must have a cause. This is so because they themselves can't be the cause of their creation. Further, they are limited, dependent, relative and have an end. Hence, the cause which creates them should be unlimited, exists beyond creation and destruction, independent and eternal. Such a cause is the Prakriti.

- i. The world is an amalgam of all varieties of objects. However, some common qualities are found among all the objects. As a result, pleasure, pain, and indifference subsist among all varieties of objects. This implies that there should be a common cause which possesses these three qualities (pleasure, pain and indifference) and share in all the objects once they created. This cause is Prakrti.

- i. The activity is generated in the potent cause. All effects arise out of causes in which they were present in an unmanifest form. Evolution means the manifestation of that which is involved. The world of objects which are effect must therefore be implicitly contained in some world cause.

- i. Every cause has its effect. Thus, cause and effect are distinct from each other although the effect exists in its material cause prior to its production (satkâryavâda). By implication therefore, the universe must have a cause.

This cause unmanifests the universe in its totality. This cause in nothing but the Prakrti.

- i. Sâmkhya satkâryavâda accepts the cause-effect relation as an inherence form which implies every effect inheres in its material cause. This holds that if the effect rolls back toward its cause, then it will dissolve in its cause. This helps to maintain the homogeneity in the universe. The balance universe from where everything manifold is regarded as Prakrti.

Gunās of Prakrti

The Sâmkhya Philosophy advocates three gunas of Prakrti. These are; Sattva, rajas and tamas. Prakrti is a state of equilibrium of these three

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gunas. The word 'guna' is understood here as quality or attribute. Now, let us know about these three gunas.

- i. **Sattva:** Sattva is that element of Prakrti which is of the nature of pleasure, light (laghu) and bright or illuminating (prakâsaka). The tendency towards conscious manifestation in the senses, the mind and the intellect; the luminosity of light and the power of reflection in a mirror or crystal are all due to the operation of the element of Sattva in the constitution of things. For example, blazing up a fire, upward course of vapour etc. Sattva is believed to be white.

- i. **Rajas:** Rajas is the principle of activity in things. Its colour is red. It is active because of its mobility and stimulation. It is also the nature of pain. For example, on account of rajas, fire spread; wind blows; the mind becomes restless, etc.

- i. **Tamas:** Tamas is the principle of passivity and negativity in things. Its colour is black. It is opposed to the Sattva guna because it is heavy, laziness, drowsiness. It produces ignorance and darkness and leads to confusion and bewilderment.

Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas contradict as well as cooperate among each other to produce an object. These three gunas are present in all the objects of the world. None of them exist alone. Among them each guna tries to dominate the other two. Hence, they can't exist in a tranquility state. As a result, they can't remain pure for a single moment. Since they are changing continuously, distortion is their nature.

There are two types of transformations occur in the gunas. These are, 'svarupa' and 'virupa'.

Svarupa

During pralaya or dissolution of the world, the gunas are changing within

themselves without disturbing the others. That is, Sattva changes into Sattva, rajas changes into rajas and tamaj changes into tamaj. Such transformation of the gunas is called ‘svarupaparinâma’ or change into the homogenous. In this stage, the gunas can neither create nor produce anything.

Virupa

In case of pralaya or dissolution of the world the gunas are in a state of constant flux and each tries to dominate the others. It is this flux of gunas that results in the formation of various objects. This kind of transformation is called virupa transformation or change into the heterogeneous. So, it is the starting point of the world’s evolution.

Check Your Progress 1

Notes: a) Space is given below for your answers.

- Compare your answer with the one given at the end of this unit.
- **Briefly explain three gunas of prakrti.**

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Purusa

According to the Sâmkhya Philosophy, Purusa or self is an eternal reality. Purusa is the self, subject and knower. It never be an object because, the existence of objects can be proved in some ways whereas, non-existence can’t be proved in anyways. Purusa is neither the body, nor the mind (mânas), neither ego (aha?kâara) nor intellect (buddhi). It is not the substance which has the quality of consciousness. It is itself pure-consciousness. It is the basis of all knowledge and is the supreme knower. It can’t be the object of knowledge. It is the observer, eternally free, the

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impartial spectator and peaceful. It is beyond the space-time continuum, change, and activity. It is the self enlightened, self-proved and hence, causasui. It is all pervading, formless, and eternal. Its existence can't be doubted because in its absence, all knowledge even doubt is not possible. It has been described as, devoid of three gunas, negative, inactive, solitary witness, observer, knower and of the nature of illumination. According to Sâmkhya Philosophy, the purusa is of the nature of pure consciousness and hence beyond the limits of Prakrti. It is free from distortions. It's objects changes but it itself never changes. It is above self-arrogance, aversion and attachment.

There are five arguments Sâmkhya has given for establishing the existence of purusa. These are as follows;

- a. All the worldly objects are meant for some one. This is so because the conscious Prakrti can't make use of them. Hence, all these substances are for Purusa or self. Prakrti evolves itself in order to serve the Purusa's end. The three gunas, Prakrti, and the subtle body, all are served to the Purusa.
- a. Substances of the universe are composed of three gunas. The purusa is the witness of three gunas and he is beyond from these gunas.
- a. Purusa is a pure consciousness which is beyond our experience and analysis. It is the substratum of all knowledge both positive and negative. There can be no experience without him. This is so because he is the sole authority of all experiential knowledge.
- a. Since Prakrti is unconscious, it can't enjoy her creation. Hence, a conscious element is needed to make use of them. Prakrti is the one to be enjoyed (bhogyâ) and so there must be an enjoyer (bhoktâ). This argument supports the existence of Purusa.

- a. There are persons who try to get relieved from all sorts of sufferings of the world. The desire for liberation and emancipation implies the existence of a person who can try for and obtain liberation. Hence, it is enforced to accept the existence of Purusa.

On the account of Sâmkhya, there are pluralities of self or purusa. All these Purusas are identical in their essences and they are embedded with consciousness. Hence, consciousness is found in all the selves. This view is similar to Jainism, and Mimansa because they believe in the plurality of selves.

Check Your Progress II

Notes: a)Space is given below for your answer.

Describe the characteristics of Purusa.

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Evolution

The world and worldly objects are created because of the contact between Prakrti and Purusa. The Prakrti alone can't create the world because it is material. In the same manner the Purusa can't create the world independently because he is inactive. Hence, the contact between Prakrti and Purusa is necessary for the evolution to start though they are possessing different and opposite natures.

An example can help you to understand the nature of Purusa and Prakrti in a better way and clear manner. The Prakrti is like a blind man and the Purusa is like a lame man cooperate each other to reach their destination. The lame man sits on the shoulders of the blind mind and pointing to him the way

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where to go and in which direction to move. In much the same manner, the inactive-eternal Purusa and the conscious Prakrti cooperate with each other in order to start the evolution.

Regarding their contact, the Sâmkhya says, there is no real contact took place between Prakrti and Purusa. But their mere closeness or nearness with each other disturbs the stability of the gunas of Prakrti. When these three gunas; sattva, rajas, tamas disturb and disrupt, they are constantly mixing and dissociating. As a consequence, evolution begins.

A sage named Kapila has described the order of creation which is accepted by the Sâmkhya Philosophy.

The order of creation is as follows.

- i. **Mahat**
- ii.

Mahat is the first product of evolution. It is cosmic in its nature. Besides this fact, it has psychological aspect in which it is called intellect or buddhi. Here, it is important to mention that buddhi should not be understood as the same as consciousness. The reason is buddhi is material whereas consciousness is eternal. An important function of buddhi is to take decision which is a part of memory act. This helps to distinguish between the known and the knower. Sattva is predominately found as an attribute of buddhi. Buddhi helps to identify the soul or the âtman which differs from all physical objects and their qualities.

i. Ahamkâra

Ahamkâra is understood as 'ego' in English. It is the second product of evolution. Ego is identified as "I" or "mine" feelings of an individual. Every individual has buddhi, and since ahamkâra is a practical element of buddhi, it is found in all individuals. Because of ego the purusa looks upon himself as an active agent, desire and strive for ends, and possesses characteristics. An individual perceives an object through sense organs. Then mind reflects on these perceptions

and determines their nature. Following this, the attitude of ‘mine’ and ‘for me’ is attributed to these objects. This is nothing but regarded as ‘ego’. In this product (ahamkâra), all these three gunas of prakruti operates.

i. Mânas

According to the Sâmkhya Philosophy, mânas or mind is neither eternal nor atomic. It is constituted with parts and thus can come into contact with the different sense organs simultaneously. Mind helps to analyze and synthesize the sense-data into determinate perceptions. Being an internal sense organ, it is aware of objects belonging to the past, present, and the future.

i. Jñânendriyas

Jñânendriyas are known as five sense organs; nose, ears, eyes, skin, and tongue. On Sâmkhya views, sense is an imperceptible energy or force which exists in the perceived organs and apprehends the object. This implies, the sense is not the ears but their power of hearing. Thus, the senses are not perceptible but can infer. They are informed from the functions that they perform. The five sense organs produce knowledge of touch, colour, smell, heard, and taste. All these are born because of the Purusa and they are the result of ego or ahamkâra.

i. Karmendriyas

Karmendriyas is understood as the five organs of action which reside in mouth, ears, feet, anus, and the sex organ. They perform the functions respectively as speech, hearing, movement, excretion, and reproduction. The cause of the creation of these organs is the desire of Purusa for his experience.

i. Tanmâtrâs

There are five tanmâtrâs; sabda or sound, sparsa or touch, rupa or form, rasa or taste, and gandha or smell. All are very subtle because

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they are the elements of the objects. Hence, they can't be perceived but inferred. The Sâmkhya School viewed that the five elements; earth, water, air, fire, and ether have their origin in the five tanmâtrâs.

- **Mahâbhutas**

There are five mahâbhutas found in the cosmos namely;

- Air or Vâyû
- Fire or Agni
- Akâsa or Ether
- Water or Jala
- Prathivi or Earth

Their respective qualities are; touch, colour, sound, taste, and smell. The Sâmkhya theory of evolution is illustrated in the following diagram for your clarity and better understanding.

Check Your Progress III

Notes: a) Space is given below for your answers.

- What is mahat?

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13.4 EPISTEMOLOGY

The Sâmkhya philosophy recognizes three independent sources of valid knowledge (Pramâna). These are; perception, inference, and verbal testimony (sabda). According to the Sâmkhya, self possess knowledge. To have knowledge of an object there should be contact between object and sense organs. Again, the connection must found between mind and sense

organs. Lastly, mind is related to mahat for cognition. Thus the mahat becomes transformed into the form of particular objects. Mahat being unconscious and physical entity can't generate knowledge alone. Hence, it requires a conscious and eternal entity like Purusa. Since Purusa is pure consciousness helps Prakrti to generate knowledge. The Sâmkhya Philosophy accepts two sorts of perception, savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka as Nyaya advocates. For detail discussion on savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka, please go to the Unit-1: Nyâya Philosophy.

Without deviating from Nyaya Philosophy, the Sâmkhya holds that vyâpti is found in all sorts of inference. For them, inference are of two sorts; i) affirmative (vita), ii) negative (avita). In case of the former, inferences are constituted of universal affirmative propositions. But in case of the later, it consists of universal negative propositions. The analysis of universal affirmative proposition and universal negative proposition are discussed in the Block.

The Sâmkhya accepts the five-membered syllogism of the Nyaya as the most adequate pattern of inference. The Sâmkhya School adores sabda as an independent source of valid knowledge. Sabda or verbal testimony is of two kinds, 'laukika' and 'vaidika'. The analysis of laukika and vaidika are found in Nyaya Philosophy of this Block.

13.5 BONDAGE AND LIBERATION

The self, who is eternal, pure conscious, and all pervading, due to its ignorance identifies itself with the mânas, ahmkara, and mahat which are the products of Prakrti. Thus, it experiences the worldly pain and suffering. The universe is constituted of manifold objects, and since objects are embedded with gunas and selves and even interrelated among them, suffering is unavoidable. This is so because the Sâmkhya claims that wherever there is guna there is suffering. Further, they said that the life in heaven is also controlled by the gunas.

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Since there are sufferings and bondage, there are also paths leads to liberation, emancipation or salvation. On Sâmkhya account, there are two sorts of liberation. These are;

i. Jivanmukti

i. Videhamukti

The self attains freedom from worldly suffering and realizes truth in one's life living in the earth is known as jivanmukti. In case of videhamukti, the self attains complete liberation from all sorts of sufferings. This is achieved after death only. Thus, videhamukti is known as kaivalya. This is understood as liberation from the gross body. The Sâmkhya theory of liberation is termed as 'apavarga', the purusartha or the summum bonum of life.

Check Your Progress IV

Notes: a) Space is given below for your answers.

- Compare your answer with the one given at the end of this unit.
- Explain the differences between jivanmulti and videhamukti.

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13.6 LET US SUM UP

The Sâmkhya philosophy is the oldest school among all the schools of Indian Philosophy. A sage named kapila was the founder of this school. This system is dualistic because it accepts two ultimate realities, Purusa and Prakrti. It advocates satkâryavâda, which expresses effect exists in its material cause prior to its production.

On the account of Samkhya,

Prakrti - It is eternal, unconscious, and active

Purusa- It is eternal, pure conscious, and inactive

There are three gunas found in Prakrti. These are sattva, rajas, and tamas.

Nearness between Prakrti and Purusa causes evolution. The order of creation is as follows:

1. Mahat

1. ahamkâra

1. Mânas

1. Five sense organs (jnânendriyas)

1. Five organs of action (karmendriyas)

1. Five subtle elements (tanmantrâs)

1. Five physical elements. (mahâbhutas)

Epistemology

The sâmkhya philosophy believes there are three independent sources of valid knowledge. These are; perception, inference, and verbal testimony.

Bondage and Liberation

According to the Sâmkhya school of thought, bondage is due to the attachment towards worldly objects and liberation is the dissociation from worldly suffering and pain. On Sâmkhya views, liberation is of two types.

i. Jivanmukti

i. Videhamukti

One can attain jivanmukti while living in the earth and possessing physical body whereas, videhamukti is attained only after death. Thus, videhamukti is known as kaivalya or the summum bonum of life.

13.7 KEY WORDS

Guna : Guna means ‘string’ or ‘a single thread or strand of a cord.’ In more abstract uses, it may mean ‘a subdivision, species, kind, quality,’ or an operational principle or tendency.

Evolution : Evolution, in biology, is change in the genetic material of a population of organisms through successive generations. Although the changes produced in a single generation are normally small, the accumulation of these differences over time can cause substantial changes in a population, a process that can result in the emergence of new species.

13.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What do you understand by theory of causation?
2. Difference between Jivanmukti and Videhamukti.
3. Explain three gunas of prakrti.
4. Elucidate the distinction between Purusa and Prakrti;
5. Discuss Sâmkhya views on evolution;
6. Describe Sâmkhya account on pramânas (Sources of valid knowledge);

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13.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress I

Three gunas of prakruti are sattva, rajas and tamas. Sattva is white, rajas is red and tamas is black in colour. These three gunas help for the production of objects in the world. In some objects they are found in homogeneous manner and in some cases heterogeneous manner.

Check Your Progress II

Purusa is eternal, inactive but embedded with pure consciousness. It is the enjoyer who enjoys all the products of the prakruti. It helps prakruti to produce objects in the world. The nearness between purusa and prakruti causes the evolution to start.

Check Your Progress III

Mahat is the first product of the prakruti. It has psychological aspect in which it is called intellect or buddhi. Buddhi helps to identify the soul or the atman which differs from all physical objects and their qualities.

Notes

Check Your Progress IV

Jivanmukti is attainable while living in the earth. It is the stage where one realizes the causes of suffering and detached from worldly objects. Videhamukti on the other hand, is attained after death only. It is the pure liberation where no sign of suffering and attachment is found. In this stage, the soul will be purely liberated

UNIT :14 THE SKEPTICISM ABOUT CATEGORIES: NAGARJUNA, JAYARASAN BHATA AND SRIHARSA

STRUCTURE

14.0 Objective

14.1 Introduction

14.2 Nagarjuna's Skepticism

14.3 Jayarasan Bhata's Skepticism

14.4 Sriharsa's Skepticism

14.5 Let's Sum Up

14.6 Keyword

14.7 Questions for reivew

14.8 Suggested Readings and Refernces

14.9 Answer To Check Your Progress

14.0 OBJECTIVE

In this unit we will detailed discuss the skeptical views of nagarjuna, jayarasan bhat and sriharsa.

14.1 INTRODUCTION

By cognitive scepticism here we mean a philosophical attitude which suspends the possibility of making conclusive statements concerning non-erring cognition or prama as it is called in Indian Philosophy for want of sufficiently warranted instrumental and casual grounds (or pramanas as it is

called in Indian Philosophy). A cognitive sceptic, does not go for 'theory - making'. Amidst the opposing claims he finds no better ground for his choice for one claim than its contra-claim. In philosophical circle, he questions or raises doubt about the validity of the 'knowledge claims' made by others. If we bear in mind this general characterization when we read Nagarjuna's philosophical treatises like Vighraha-vyavartani and Mulamadhyamaka Karika, we would be convinced that there is no logical or psychological obstruction or hardship to make an extension of the applicability of the term 'cognitive sceptic' to Nagarjuna. In his philosophical works Nagarjuna subjects the 'knowledge-claims' made by the Naiyayikas and others to severe dialectical criticism and shows that these claims are not supported by sufficient justification.

14.2 NAGARJUNA'S SKEPTISM

The philosophical opponent of the sceptic to coin a word from Matilal, may be called 'cognitivists'. (2) In Indian Philosophy they are mostly Naiyayikas who claim that with the help of justificatory grounds as casual instruments (pramanas) we can have the cognition of the objects of the knowledge (prameyas). In Akaspada Goutama's 'Nyayasutra' knowledge is considered as something that leads to attainment of the highest good (tattvajnanannihisreyasadhigamah). In Nyaya system of philosophy knowledge is taken as something which always points beyond itself. All the furniture of the world are classified under several sets of objects of knowledge (prameyas). A piece of cognition is valid if it can give us an indubitably true awareness of an object of knowledge. Nagarjuna devoted 20 verses from 31st to 51st in Vighrahavyavartani in order to refute the Nyaya concept of pramana. Nagarjuna's main concern here is not to say that what we know about the world is false; rather he maintains that the knowledge claims made by the cognitivists (Naiyayikas and others) are not supported by adequate logical grounds. The paper is divided into two broad sections .The first section deals mainly with the exposition of Nagarjunian charges against the concept pramana while the second is devoted to critical

evaluation of the Nagarjunian charges. The paper ends with some general remarks. The main contention of Nagarjunian scepticism is to set a limit to cognitive claim of the Naiyayikas. In other words, it is rather a critique to the soteriological claims on the basis of empirical foundation of cognitivists' theory of knowledge. It is a scepticism about the justification of knowing or pramana.

1 : No Criterion Argument

The pramanavadins (cognitivists) claim that it is possible to have indubitably true presentational cognition or (prama) on the basis of pramanas. A pramana is usually defined as the instrumental cause of an indubitable and unerring piece of presentational knowledge. All cognitivists in Indian Philosophy would agree that the acceptance of pramanas is something exclusively indispensable for any philosophical investigation, because if some 'rules of game' (as Wittgenstien in his 'Philosophical Investigations ' compares a philosophical enquiry as a form of linguistic game) are not accepted at the very outset a player would not be entitled to take a part in the game. In other words, he would be putting himself out of the court before the game begins. (3) A Nyaya cognivist Vatsyayana further argues that in philosophical debate, one is supposed to defend or reject certain thesis. Even for the rejection one would require this or that pramana. In other words, even the very denial of a certain pramana is possible only on the acceptance of certain other pramana and this precisely establishes the validity of pramana as such. And if once it is admitted that the validity of pramana as a variety of knowable (prakara), one is logically compelled to recognise three other varieties of knowables (prakara)-the agent of knowledge (pramata), object of knowledge (prameya) and knowledge par excellence (pramiti). (4) It is here a Nagarjunian philosopher would object that your very programme is defective. (5) If you say that prameyas or knowables are justified because of pramanas (ground) and pramanas are not questionable, then you are acting as a dogmatic in philosophising. If you accept the reality of pramanas without any justification, your very acceptance is an exercise of dogmatism. All the accounts of the cognitivists

may be broadly classified under two heads: (a) the pramanas are self-validating (svatah prasiddhih) that is to say they are intrinsically valid. (b) their validity is established on the basis of some other pramanas (paratah prasiddhih). Both these possible alternatives have been examined by Nagarjuna. The charge of no criterion centres the question: How is a cognitivist going to validate his standard or criterion (pramana) itself? It is said that pramana is valid on its own ground in terms of itself, that is no more than just begging the question and is a case of dogmatic enterprise. If it is said that pramana is validated in terms of another, that would immediately leave room for the charge of infinite regress. Now either way, according to a Nagarjunian sceptic, a cognitivist can not have adequate means to support the established status or truth-criteria of pramanas which lies at the foundation of cognitivist's truth-claims. Let us elaborate the arguments.

1.1 Charge of Inner-inconsistency and Dogmatism Explained

The point Nagarjuna elaborates is this that dogmatism and inconsistency of arguments would be automatic outcome if we admit pramanas as self-validating. Nagarjuna further argues that if we admit that pramanas are required for the justificatory grounds as well as instrumental cause for establishing the knowables (prameyas) but the pramanas themselves belong to a self-validating class, then we also accept that pramanas are placed in a 'privileged sacrosanct class'-that is to say, a clear-cut dichotomy is introduced between pramanas and prameyas. But a philosopher must explain, the justificatory grounds for such preferential treatment; he should not merely state the dichotomy but must explain the reason behind such dichotomy. This is what exactly Nagarjuna demands. 'If without assigning any reason pramanas are claimed to be self-validating then a sense of arbitrariness would be introduced and this acceptance of this without any justificatory certification is a clear case of dogmatic enterprise.' This is also a case of internal inconsistency and disaccord in cognitivists' arguments.

1.2 The Charge of Infinite Regress Revisited

Now if in order to avoid the charge of non-accordance and dogmatism, the

cognitivist adopts the second alternative that is a pramana may derive its validity or authority from another pramana of the same type or different type this would, according to Nagarjuna, instead of giving any justification for the acceptance of pramana simply invite the blemish of infinite regress (anavasthadosa). (6) For example, of the first alternative we may say that a perception say P1 is established through another perception say P2 and for the second, a perception say P, is established through an inference say F. But in either case of the theory of extrinsic validity, the blemish of 'infinite regress' would be inevitable. (7) These are the techniques about which the cognitivists themselves highly speak of, that is, if something is to be acceptable, there must be inner logical consistency between the justification and the claim and a justification must not be vitiated by the blemishes of circularity and infinite regress. The sceptic here is just reminding the cognitivists that claiming pramanas as self certified, you are committing logical inconsistency and claiming them as established by others you are either inviting the blemish of circularity or the blemish of infinite regress.

1.3 Analogical Arguments Refuted

However, Goutama in the Nyayasutra also employs the analogy of a lamp (pradipa) to meet possible charge of infinite regress. (8) He says that as a lamp reveals objects as well as itself, so the pramana (supportive grounds) reveal prameyas (knowables) as well as themselves. It is here Nagarjuna tries to point out faults and in 'Vigrahavyavartani' he devotes six verses in order to show that the analogy of light or fire is quite incapable of serving as a 'sapaksa' in the cognitivists' arguments. (9) In 'Vigrahavyavartani' verse 35, Nagarjuna argues that if pramanas were like light or fire which reveals itself as well as the presence of other subjects simultaneously then there would be no logical as well as practical difficulty in claiming that fire would also burn itself as it can burn other things. (10) But this is a contradiction in thinking as well as in the actual happenings. In view of this, the cognitivists' assumption that fire reveals itself as well as other objects' becomes doubtful and remains unestablished. It is further contended that if 'fire reveals itself as well as other object is true, then the proposition that 'darkness conceals the

existence of itself as well as other things' would also be true. (11) It is an admitted fact that although darkness conceals the presence of other things, it does not conceal the presence of itself. (Na caitad drstam tatra yaduktam / Svaparatmanau prakasayatyagnirititanna). (12) What is evident here is that in contrast with the cognitivists' light analogy, Nagarjuna constructs just contrary analogical argument to disprove the cognitivists' claim.

1.4 Blemishes of Interdependence and Circularity Detected

Nagarjuna further argues that if for the sake of argument we admit that pramanas are self-established, then it would imply that they are established even independent of prameyas (knowables). (13) But if a kind of pramana were established without reference to prameyas, then this particular type of pramana ceases to be worthy of the name pramana. If it is argued that pramanas are independent of prameyas, then these pramanas become pramanas of nothing. As pramana has always a relational character with prameya in cognitive situation, the thesis that 'pramanas are independently established' becomes refuted. If it is said that pramanas are established through prameyas and prameyas through pramanas, then a Nagarjunian sceptic would at once point out that neither of them have a self-nature (svabhava) of their own and therefore, should be treated as sunya (vacuous). (14) Again, it would be a case of proving what is already proved (siddhasadhana), because the tacit assumption is this, that prameyas are already established. (15) If prameyas were regarded as already established, the necessity of pramana itself for the establishment of prameyas becomes superfluous. If it is said that the validity of pramanas are prameyas dependent and the validity or establishment of prameya is pramana dependent then it amounts to committing the blemishes of interdependence and circularity. Nagarjuna laughs at the cognitivis because his view almost amounts to say that "the son is produced by the father and that father is produced by that son. But in this case who is that gives birth and who is that is born". (16) Therefore the criterion of mutual dependence rather shows that both pramanas and prameyas are devoid of any essence of their own (sunya). Since there is neither established pramana nor established prameya the so

called 'knowledge-claim' of the cognitivists becomes unwarranted. (17) All views (drsti) about the world, for Nagarjuna, becomes systematically misleading and therefore, they are to be rejected.

2 : A Cognitivist Critique of the Nagarjunian Critique of Pramana Considered

It has been seen that a cognitivist claims that it is possible on our part to know something with certitude and we can justify our claims by adequate supportive grounds. A Nagarjunian sceptic only gives caution to these and shows flaws of antinomies in cognitivists' reasonings. Let us now see how far the sceptical charges be answered from the cognitivistic viewpoint.

Vatsyayana would meet the sceptical charge of infinite regress by saying that it is not necessary that before functioning as an instrument a thing must be known first. For example, we become visually aware of something in front of us by our eyes, the sense of sight but we cannot see the senses itself. We do not question or doubt about the reality of eyes. This shows that in practical experience, the establishment of pramana does not arise and there is no scope for infinite regress, because their truth can be apprehended directly or immediately . A piece of cognition is said to be valid if practice based on the assumption of its truth leads to the attainment of desired end. What Udayana puts with regard to infinite doubt in another context seems to be relevant here. He is of opinion that "infinite series of doubt in principle is not possible. It could never be carried out, since the activity of doubting is possible only against the background of some area of certainty." (18) Vatsyayana further contends that there is no rigid distinction between prameya and pramana both of these have the same source - the root 'ma' (means 'to measure') and both of them are meaningful only in certain cognitive contexts. If we try to understand the significance of different 'case-inflections' in sanskrit language, it would be clear that these karakas stand for 'different role-playing' in the linguistic construction. (19) When something is called a pramana, we mean that it has the instrumental role in generating cognition and in case of prameya, it has the role of accusative case in a cognitive situation. With this background we think a Nyaya

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cognitivist may say that when something is playing the role of a pramana, psychologically we do not feel the necessity for pramana's validity or establishment.

But here, I think, a Nagarjunian sceptic may argue against the cognitivists' persuasion by saying that he does not see any good ground for introducing psychological proof when one is engaged in purely logical debate. Psychological proof can not be taken to be an adequate guarantee for objective truth-claims. And it is also true that a cognitive sceptic's suspension of judgement regarding what is real as mental act need not disturb his private life. He only exercises his reasoned suspension of judgement about reality when there is a suitable occasion for it.

The Naiyayika cognitivist may level another fresh charge against Nagarjunian sceptic by saying that it is impossible to carry out the infinite doubt regarding the validity of pramanas, because when one denies a thesis say P, as defective, he must have a thesis, it might be a counter-thesis, say 'not-P', that is not defective. Without involving oneself in theoretical inconsistency, one can not deny the validity of pramanas as such.

Uddyotkara in the 'Nyaya-vartika' carried this charge in a much more straightforward way and brings the charge of self-stultification against a cognitive sceptic. (20) The charge is this : If you deny everything, then you can not deny the fact that 'you are denying'. If you do not deny the fact that 'you are denying' then you are not denying everything.

What seems to me convincing here is that a cognitive sceptic like Nagarjuna would not mind for these charges. A close study of Nagarjuna's arguments would reveal that he would be pleasant in seeing that by this charge, the cognitivist misunderstands him again and are trying to grasp what the sceptic intends to convey. That is to say, what cannot be stated, one must not state it or advocate a theory about it. It is another significant aspect of Buddha's mysterious silence regarding metaphysical issues, the Madhyamika unfolds. In defence of Nagarjuna, one might argue that by sceptical arguments Nagarjuna examines all the possible views about the

establishment of pramanas and finds that to any 'pro-argument' for a doctrine, there can be 'contra-argument' and thus he does not have any other choice but to stop advancing another thesis regarding prama, prameya and pramana. He has engaged himself in epistemological debate because it is on the basis of such epistemology, different metaphysical theories can come into being. A cognitivist like Goutama, considers valid cognition of reals (tattva) as that which leads to the highest good (nirahimsa). Nagarjunian scepticism may be considered as a caution that points to the inadequacy of such soteriological claim on the basis of their epistemological stand.

As regards the cognitivists' charge of self-stultification, a cognitive sceptic like Nagarjuna would react that this comes out from a misunderstanding of the exact significance of his refutation. It is to use a term from classical Indian epistemology, a 'prasajya pratishedhah', that is to say, a rejection of the possibility without (even a least) implicatory significance to assert another or counter possibility. It is different from 'paryyudasapratishedhah'. In paryyudasa-pratishedhah' the assertion of the counter thesis motivates the very act of rejection of any thesis. (21) This consideration is enough to show that the cognitivists' charge of theoretical incoherence in sceptical rejection is not tenable.

From this it appears that theoretically scepticism is irrefutable. A cognitive sceptic like Nagarjuna would only try to unfold the drama of the logical consequences of the cognitivists' epistemological framework. To be more specific, Nagarjuna tries to undermine the foundations of speculative metaphysics. The language Nagarjuna uses is 'meta-language' and by this type of linguistic expression about statements that make 'objective truth-claims', he can answer the charge of self-stultification against him. As a result when all statements of 'object-level' are shown to be unwarranted, that does not affect the truth-status of the meta-level statement of Nagarjuna. The remedy suggested by Nagarjuna is the awareness of 'sunyata', the rejection of language empirical determinations as an adequate instrument for any veridical description of the real. Nagarjuna's dialectics merely "shows" the structure of reality but does not "say" or "assert" anything about reality. Had

he been acquainted in the linguistic phrasology of Wittgenstein, he might probably have expressed it in the same vein "whereof one can not speak, thereof one must be silent.'

3. Concluding Remarks

From what has been discussed in fore-going paragraphs, a crucial question may be raised at this point. How can such a (logically irrefutable) sceptical position be consistently carried out in practice ? Can it make 'adequate sense' in 'belief-behaviour'. Does it (the sceptical position) not overthrow the foundation of all practical activity ? Can we live without the guidance of some inherent position what we accept ? A cognitive sceptic of Nagarjuiian type might react to such questions by saying that it would be an exercise of dogmatism if something with reference to actual state of practics is introduced as the ultimate resort when somebody is engaged in purely theoretical discourse with his philosophical opponents.

It is however, true that a Nyaya cognitivist's pre-suppositions for pluralistic metaphysics and its description through epistemological frame-work seem to initiate the sceptical approach in Indian Philosophy in order to dismantle the main fabric of many dogmatic assertions. An important question may arise here : Can there be any commonly sharable point on which a Nyaya cognitivist and a Nagarjunian sceptic can meet ? Our humble answer to this question would be in the negative. When a Nagarjunian sceptic is asking for the pramana's pramana he is demanding for the absolute causal proof as the ground for claiming truth (in the absolute sense) regarding the object of knowledge. A cognitive sceptic uses the term 'indubitability' strictly in the logical sense 'which imputs the intrinsic doubtfulness of all contingent statements.' (24) He criticises the concepts required to justify any knowledge-claim. But a Nyaya cognitivist does not make cognitive claim in its absolutistic sense; he would rather say that he seeks pramana whenever he feels necessity for this in actual state of practice. For him, it is somehow 'nonsensical' to seek reason after reason, that is, to go on seeking where there is no 'psychological requirement' for this in actual state of practice. Again, for a Nyaya cognitivist, the concepts like pramana (causal means of

knowing), prameya (knowable) etc. are not absolute but relative to the context of their specific 'role playing'. (25) A pramana is considered as the causal and instrumental ground for yielding knowledge (prama) which is of the nature of an effect, in certain context about a certain knowable (prameya); it does not mean that in certain other contexts it can not act as a knowable (prameya). In view of this Nagarjuna's demand for explaining the cause of placing pramana in a 'sacrosanct class' seems; to be unwarranted. The same term seems to be used by the cognitivist and the sceptic in two different senses; the former uses it in the 'relative sense' whereas the later uses it in the 'absolute sense. For a Nyaya cognitivist, all logical queries are to be preceded by some psychological factors like 'dubiousness' about the exact character of the knowable and this state of doubt is to be eradicated by the application of a pramana (s) that can causally justify the truth of a specific cognitive episode as devoid of doubt. And an evidential justification in the sense of causal ways and means of knowing is considered as 'justification' as long as it is coherent with the practicability. But a Nagarjunian sceptic whose sole interest lies in 'refutation exclusively' does not care for this and devotes so much to clear the way to travel that he almost forgets the destination. Facing the difficulty in meeting the psychological ground for the endless logical enquiry, a Nagarjunian sceptic and the Nyaya cognitivist use 'reason' in different senses; for the former, it is 'pure theoretical reason' ; for the latter it is 'practice-oriented' reason that springs from 'our form of life' (26) It also appears that Nagarjuna's sceptical approach is an attempt to show the limitation of the applicability of 'practice-oriented' reason to assert the nature of reality with absolute certitude. Though a sceptic like Nagarjuna may say that in 'theoretically oriented' debate it is irrelevant to introduce the element of pragmatic efficacy; a Nyaya cognitivist may remind his sceptic friend here that without accepting the validity of some common principles even no 'theoretically oriented' debate can begin at all. But in turn, a Nagarjunian sceptic would say that he is ready to accept the validity of the so-called principles only as an 'ad hoc' arrangement which is to be rejected ultimately. But since there seems to be no commonly sharable platform for both a cognitive sceptic and a Nyaya

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cognitivist, does it suggest that the sceptic does leave the arena of knowledge emptyhanded? Our answer to this, would be in the negative. In fact, Nagarjuna's sceptical charges in Indian philosophy directly or indirectly; I believe, have been cautions to the tendency of 'closed-door thinking' on the part of some cognitivist and placed them on the alert. Aksapada Goutama claims knowledge as that which leads to the attainment of the highest good (nihsreyasah). Nagarjuna's sceptical arguments egarly point out that such soteriological assertions on the basis of empirical foundation of epistemological 'superstructure' are unwarranted. As a result of this probably in latter commentaries and subcommentaries on Nyaya philosophy we see that meticulous care have been taken to re-structure the definition of prama, pramana etc. (27) Opening the way of 'free enquiry' and shaking the ground for dogmatic faith cognitive scepticism of Nagarjuna type has directly or indirectly given momentum to clear 'hindrance to genuine' cognition. (28) The force of sceptical arguments makes many Indian philosophers perturbed as to whether it is possible to speak of truth and knowledge with emprical foundation. This seems to be a great disservice to the later development of epistemological subtleties in Indian Philosophy.

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(1) Scepticism is, indeed a wide term which may mean two board types of epistemogical attitude. In the wider sense it would mean an epistemological attitude that suspends all calaims for the possibility of knowledge and in this sense a sceptic carries doubt and "seeks nothing beyond uncertainty". But there is a special type of epistmological attitude/grounds through which we can dispute the validity of so-called "knowledge-claim" in all its aspects. The word "knowledge" has been used throughout this paper in order to mean (what is called prama in sanskrit in Indian epistemology) true and sure piece of presentational cognition and 'knowledge' in this sense is always known by certain casual ways and means of knowing (usually called in sanskrit pramana).

(2) Philosophers who claim the possibility of knowledge (pramana) on the basis of one or some casual instruments of knowing (pramana) are called

pramanavadins, the nearest word for which in western philosophy may be 'cognitivists'. All cognitivists agree that whatever be the case of a knowable, it must be yielded by certain pramanas. But Indian philosophical heritage is also gifted with some philosophers who do not admit the reality of pramana itself and consequently question all claims in favour of the possibility of knowledge on the basis of pramana. Nagarjuna, Jayarasi and Sriharsa are three important philosophers who do not accept the validity of any pramana and if the reality of pramana itself is questioned or refuted the claim to possibility of knowledge stands refuted. For details see. B. K. Matilal, Perception (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986) P. 64.

(3) Ludig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Trans. GEM Asncombe, Oxford Blackwell 1958 Sect. 65) P. 31

(4) Vatsyayana in his commentary on Goutama's Nyaya-sutra 1.1.1. thus says, "pramananata' rthapratipattu pravrttisamarthyadorthavatpramanam Arthavati ca pramane pramataprameyampramitivityarthavanti bhavanti Catusrucaivabvidhasu tattvamparisamapyate". It is to be noted here that all these four naming as pramana, premeya etc. are due to the particular 'prakara'. In other wards, something is a pramana in a particular unit of knowledge and it may play the role of prameya in some other unit of knowledge. But the Nagarjunian sceptic accepts pramana as something in the rigid sense of its function, that is to say always it acts as causal ways and means of knowing irrespective of variation in contexts of use.

(5) It is to be noted in this connection that in Indian philosophical heritage from early days various knowledge claims were made regarding ethical and religious matters. There were also thinkers like Sanjaya who questioned vehemently about the metaphysical assertions or claims. To meet such challenges in different phases of time various cognitivist account or pramana theories have come into existence. Gradually the very tradition of questioning the truth-claims with regard to metaphysical and moral matters led to the development of sceptical arguments against the possibility of any 'knowledge-claim'. The Nyaya cognitivists on the otherhand, developed a cognitivist attitude and claimed that 'what is existent is knowable, even

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nameable' But in order to know it, the existence of a pramana or various pramanas must be a priori admitted. They may be compared with axioms for a logical system and their validity is not questionable within this cognitivist system. For details about Sanjaya's method of philosophy, one may see my paper titled; Amaraviksepavada; The Philosophical Method of Sanjaya, Silchar, Journal of Assam University vol. 4, no 1, 1999.

(6) The Sanskrit word 'anavastha' literally means 'lack of a firm foundation. Nagarjuna brings this charge against paratah / paraparatah pramanyavada in the following words : "Anyair yadi pramanaih pramana sidhir bhavettadanavastha / Nadeh siddhitatrasti naiva madhyasyanantasya /- Vigrahavyavartani" (henceforth VV) No. 32.

(7) Nagarjuna notes all these possible instances in his vrtti (verse 51)

(8) It is interesting to note in the passing that Jayantabhatta in Nyayamanjari like other cognitivists also holds that knowledge (prama) is a piece of true and indubitable awareness. But the concept of indubitability has both psychological and logical senses of use. For the Nyaya, the psychological sense of use is satisfied by the element of 'pragmatic success' (arthakriyakaritva) and the logical sense of use is satisfied by introducing the causal justificatory grounds (pramanas). In the first sense the term; 'indubitable' is taken to mean that one is subjectively convinced that 'p' whereas in the second sense it imputes to contingent propositions, 'inherent dubitableness'. A Nagarjunian sceptic seems to capitalise mostly on the second sense and thus brings the charge of infinite regress. Vatsyayana, however tries to meet the sceptical challenge of infinite regress to psychological persuasion. He argues that when we prove A by B and B by C, it does not invite the blemish of infinite regress, because at certain level, say at C, the further question of validity (regarding C) becomes irrelevant. Where there is no query, there can not be any necessity of searching for a further justificatory ground.

(9) Sapaksa : Niscitasadhyavana pakkena saha vartamanah sapaksa - yathaparvate dhumena vanhi sadhane mahanasah' - Nyayakosah Ed. By M.

M. Bhimacharya Jhalakikar, revised by M. M. Vasudeva Sastri Abhankar, (Oriental Institute, Puna, 1929) P. 952.

(10) Yadi ca svaparatmanau tvadvavanena prakasyatyagnih / paramiva nanvatmanam svam paridhakasyatyapi hutasah // vv. No. 35.

(11) Yadi ca svaparatmanau tvadvavanena prakasyatyagnih / pracchadayisyati tamah svaparatmanau hutasaiva // vv. No. 36.

(12) Pradipah svaparatmanau samorkasyayate yad / tomo' pi svaparatmanau chadayisyatyasamsayam // Maddhyamika - karika-Ch.vii 12; also see in the commentry on Vighrahavyavartani verse No. 36.

(13) Anapeksya hi prameyanarthan yadi te pramanasidhiriti / nabhavanti kasyacidevamimanitanipramanam // v. v. No. 41

(14) Madhyamika-karika : 1.5 (Ed. P. L. Vaidya, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga 1960)

(15) Atha tu pramansiddhirbhavatyapekasyaiva te prameyani / Vyatyaya evam sati te dhruvam pramana prameyanam te pramanasiddhya premeya siddhih prameya siddhyaca / bhavati pramana siddhirnastyu bhayasyapi te siddhih// v. v. verse 45-6

(16) Pitra yadyutpadyah putriyadi tenaciva putrena / Utpadyah sa yadi pita vada tatrotpadyati kah kam ? Kasca pita kah putrastara tvam bruhi tavubhayapi ca/ Pitrputralaksanadharau yato bhavati no samdehah // v. v. verses 49-50

(17) Naiva svatah prasiddhirna parasparatah parapramanar va / Na bhavati na-ca prameyairna capyakasmat pramananam II v. v. No 51. Comparable :Na svatah na paratah no dvabhuyam napyahetutah / Utpannajatu vidyante bhavah kvacana kecan // Madhyamika karika 1. 1.

(18) Drstyadrstorna sandeho bhavabhava viniccayat / Adrstivadhine heto pratyakasamapi durlabam Nyayakusumanjali Ch. 3, Verse 6, (Ed. P. Updhyaya & D. Shastri, Varanasi, Chowkhamba, 1957).

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(19) See : Vatsyayana's commentary on Nyaya-sutra-2. 1.9. (Na pradipa prakasa siddhivat tat siddheh) By the sanskrit word 'na' the Naiyayika refutes the possibility of sceptical charge and then compares the casual means (pramana) with light. Though light is exclusively required for the illumination of other objects, light itself is sufficient for illumination. According to Vatsyayana the sceptical arguments shows that pramanas can not be accepted as proof for prameyas unless we admit pramanas as either apriori or simultaneous to prameyas and on examination none of the alternatives can be accepted. But this charge is not directly mentioned in Vigrahavyavartani nor does Vatsyayana mention any name as the propounder of this objection. However, we may subsume it under 'Visesahetusca vaktavyam'.

(20) Nyaya-vartika- 2.1.12. (Ed. V. P. Dvibedin, Varanasi, Chowkhamba, 1915) P. 189.

(21) Prasajya pratishedhah is similar to J. R. Searle's illocutionary negation which is meant to negate 'illocutionary force' (See, Speech Acts : An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, PP 32-3) Sabdakalpadruma (Vol. 3, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1967, P. 298 & 264 explanation goes thus : Apradhanyam vidheryatra pratishedhe pradhanata / prasajya pratishedho 'savkriyaya saha yatra nan // Pradhanyam hi vidheryatra pratishedhe' pradhanata / paryyudasa sa vijneyo yatrottarapadena nan //.

(27) It is to be noted here that we see some refinement in using philosophical concepts in the later writing of the same Nyaya School. When in the Navyanyaya (Neo-school of Nyaya) the term knowledge (prama) is prefixed by the term asandigdha (non-dubious) it does not mean 'knowledge must be certain', rather it implies that a genuine piece of knowledge (prama) will never be vitiated by the presence of 'dubiety' about the absence of knowledgehood (pramatva) and this is precisely meant by the saying 'apramanya jnananaskandita'. However, the Nyaya cognitivists in later days have tried to develop a casual theory of knowledge with many technicalities where a pramana is operative as intrumental case of generating knowledge

(prama) and there is no room for getting knowledge (as something 'non-dubious and truth hitting mental episode') from a faulty pramana or pseudo-pramana.

(28) For details see: Rashvihari Das : Philosophical Essays (Ed. R. Das, University of Calcutta, Calcutta 1994) PP. 1.8.21.

(29) To support our contention let us quote from S. N. Dasgupta, a noted historian of Indian Philosophy. Dasgupta states : "Unlike the older Nyaya, later Nyaya writers like Gangesa, Raghunatha and others were mainly occupied in investing suitable qualificatory adjuncts and phrases by which they could define their categories in such a way that the undersirable applications and uses of their definitions, pointed out by the criticism of their opponents could be avioded" -

Check Your Progress

1. What is nagarjuna's view on skepticism?

.....

14.3 JAYARĀŚI BHATṬA

Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, who most likely flourished between 800–840 probably in Southern India, was an Indian philosopher, a sceptic loosely affiliated to the materialist Cārvāka / Lokāyata school of thought, the author of one of most extraordinary philosophical works in India, the Tattvôpaplava-simha ('The Lion of the Dissolution of [all] Categories'). His main claim is that it is not possible to arrive at true knowledge, because one should first properly define basic criteria of validity for valid cognitive procedures, which is not possible without a prior true knowledge of reality against which we could test the procedures for validity etc. Clearly, our knowledge of reality and of objects depends on valid cognitive procedures. However, all valid cognitive procedures are either fundamentally flawed and ultimately unreliable or they

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require further valid cognitive procedures, and these stand in the same need etc. Therefore, we can neither formulate proper definitions of valid cognitive procedures nor define what reality is and what basic categories are. This is at least the case, he claims, with all the cognitive tools and epistemological categories which are now at our disposal.

The first serious attempt to date Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa was undertaken by Sukhlālājī Saṅghavī and Rasiklāl C. Pārīkh, who brought the *Tattvôpaplava-simha* to light, in their 1940 edition (p. iv-xi) of the treatise, assign the work to 8th century (p. x). This dating was slightly modified by Sukhlālājī Saṅghavī (1941) who placed Jayarāṣi's *Tattvôpaplava-simha* between 725-825, which, in turn, is accepted by Eli Franco (1987: 12–13). However, the latter, in the 'Preface to the second edition' of 1994, modifies the date of Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa and assigns him to the period of 770–830 on the basis of what he thinks are Jayarāṣi's indirect references (primarily terminological grounds) to the Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara (ca. 740–800).

In fact, that dating of the *Tattvôpaplava-simha* could be slightly modified to perhaps 800–840. I would place Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa after the Digambara Jaina philosopher Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa (c. 720–780) and before Vidyānanda Pātrakesarisvāmin (c. 850), a philosopher in the same tradition who commented on Akalaṅka. As Franco (1994: XI) himself notices, the Buddhist Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795) nowhere refers to Jayarāṣi in his encyclopaedic commentary of the *Tattva-saṅgraha*. Further, we find no mention of Jayarāṣi in the oeuvre of Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa, although he was very well acquainted with current ideas of his contemporaries. It would be especially surprising in the case of Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa not to mention an author who greatly influenced the way Jaina thinkers argued and formulated their thoughts, because both of them seem to belong to South India. On a few occasions Akalaṅka did have a chance to either allude or even directly refer to such an original thinker as Jayarāṣi certainly was, but he nowhere does it. A good instance is Akalaṅka's work *Aṣṭa-śatī* 'In Eight Hundred Lines' (itself a commentary on the work *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, 'An Examination of An Authoritative Person') of Samantabhadra, c. 580–640). In it, (the

commentary on verse 1.3 of *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, AṣṢp.2 = AṣS 29.20), Akalaṅka refers to a materialist argument: ‘[The opponent]: “For this reason it has been said that there is no omniscient person, because truth claims [of various teachers competing for primacy] turn out to be wrong cognitive criteria, inasmuch as there is no difference between them (i.e., all are equal in their convincing force). Since one accepts that [it is not possible to decide for or against a view among a few competing ones], there is nothing wrong [in rejecting the idea of an omniscient person].” [Akalaṅka:] Ergo this decision of some [thinkers, i.e., materialists] is itself void of any rational basis. For, as we know, the scope of perception [which could prove the materialist's rejection of an omniscient person] cannot itself demonstrate that there cannot be any other proof of an omniscient person, because this would have too far-reaching consequences. Neither can [the materialist prove that an omniscient person cannot exist] with the help of inference, because it has no validity [for him]’. Akalaṅka clearly has in mind a typical materialist philosopher who rejects the idea of omniscience, but at the same time accepts perception (*pratyakṣa*) as the only valid instrument of knowledge, while rejecting the validity of inference (*anumāna*). That is a standard account of a materialist (*Cārvāka* / *Lokāyata*) thinker in India and there is really nothing to suggest that what Akalaṅka had here in mind as the target of his criticism was a sceptic (like *Jayarāṣi*) who rejected the ultimate validity also of perception.

However, the account changes in what *Vidyānanda* (c. 850) has to say on Akalaṅka's passage. *Vidyānanda* is, to our knowledge, the first Indian philosopher to know of and to directly refer to *Jayarāṣi*. In his *Aṣṭa-sahasrī* ‘In Eight Thousand Lines’, *Vidyānanda* (AṣS 29.20-36.6) takes the passage “‘Since one accepts that [it is not possible to decide for or against a view among a few competing ones], there is nothing wrong [in rejecting the idea of an omniscient person].” [Akalaṅka:] Ergo this decision of some [thinkers, i.e., materialists] is itself void of any rational basis’ (*tathêṣṭatvād adoṣa ity ekeṣām aprāmāṅikaivêṣṭih*) as explicitly implying two kinds of approaches to the same question. First (AṣS 29.20 ff.), he says some nihilistic thinkers (*eke*) are the *Laukāyatika* (the followers of *Lokāyata*, the materialist school),

who do not admit any instrument of knowledge which would could go beyond the perceptible world, i.e., they accept perception as the only cognitive criterion. Second, Vidyānanda says (AṣS 31.2 ff.), there are also ‘those who propound the dissolution of [all] categories’ (tattvôpaplava-vādin), a term which could hardly be more univocal in its clearly referring to Jayarāśi. Had Akalaṅka known of Jayarāśi, his scepticism and rejection of the validity of perception also, he would have included him among those who rejected the idea of an omniscient being.

Native Place of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

As little as we know of the exact dates of his life even less we know about the place where he flourished, and we are actually left to speculations, for no hard evidence, such as inscriptions etc., can be found to help us. There are three points that might suggest Jayarāśi was of South India, all being rather weak. The strongest evidence is the circulation and reception of the *Tattvôpaplava-simha*: the first mention of the work is made by South Indian Digambara authors Vidyānanda (c. 850) and Anantavīrya (turn of 10th and 11th centuries). Another equally weak piece of evidence is that Jayarāśi's critical method of argument (see below), which the Jainas adopt, first penetrates the works of South Indian Digambara authors, incidentally the same who are the first to make reference to Jayarāśi. This method of critique becomes the standard one among Gujarati Jainas only at a later stage. The third argument in favour of South Indian origin of Jayarāśi (Samghavī-Pārīkh 1940, xi), even weaker than the two above, is his title Bhaṭṭa, regularly appended to the names of a number of South Indian philosophers and often used as an official title of South Indian Digambara high rank clerics (bhaṭṭa, bhaṭṭāraka). Jayarāśi's title might suggest he was both South Indian and a Brahmin by social class (varṇa). However, the title Bhaṭṭa is not exclusively used by Brahmins or exclusively in South India, though there is indeed a certain tendency of this kind. However, since there seems nothing at all to suggest that Jayarāśi was born in North India, even such slight hints gain some evidential weight.

Works of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

The only preserved work of Jayarāṣi is the *Tattvôpaplava-simha* ('The Lion of the Dissolution of [all] Categories'). Its palm leaf manuscript was discovered in 1926 in a manuscript library at Patan by Sukhlālji Saṅghavī and Rasiklāl C. Pārīkh, and the text remained virtually unknown until its publication in 1940.

The work was quite well known in mediaeval philosophical milieu, both in the South and North of India, but hardly ever treated in a way a serious and original philosophical treatise deserves: Indian philosophers of established traditions do not, as a rule, refer to the work directly or refute its contents, not to mention any attempt at the providing a genuine appraisal of the work or entering into discussion with its author. They simply ignored it.

Two reasons might be mentioned for such a situation. First, Indian philosophers did not principally engage in discussions with representatives of the materialist school, except for standardised dismissive refutations of a few basic materialist theories, which are mentioned by Indian philosophers in their works in order to render a 'complete' picture of the philosophical spectrum. These standardised, habitually repeated refutations were not applicable to Jayarāṣi, who was not a typical representative of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata school. New powerful philosophical machinery would have to be applied to engage in a discussion with Jayarāṣi. And that is precisely the second reason: the arguments Jayarāṣi consistently applies, his rigid and coherent lines of argumentation proved to be an extremely hard piece of cake to swallow for those whose views he criticised. It seems, therefore, that the general approach of Indian philosophers vis-à-vis Jayarāṣi was that of disregard and failure to notice the weight of his work. He is occasionally mentioned in a positive light when Indian authors acknowledge Jayarāṣi's powerful method of critical analysis, and these are primarily, or even exclusively, Jaina authors. Sometimes they even refer to Jayarāṣi as an expert in some fields, e.g. by Malliṣeṇa (c. 1229), who says: 'A refutation of all cognitive criteria in details should be consulted from the *Tattvôpaplava-simha*' (SVM, p.118.1-2).

The text of *Tattvôpaplava-simha* was preserved without any commentary

and it seems that its was never commented upon. We cannot say with absolute certainty whether he had any followers or whether he established an independent school, but that is not unlikely because we occasionally come across the expression *tattvôpaplava-vādin* in the plural: ‘those who propound the dissolution of [all] categories’ in philosophical literature, and across the single term *Tattvôpaplava* used as if it denoted a separate school.

It is not certain whether Jayarāśi composed any other work. He himself refers to a treatise entitled *Lakṣaṇa-sāra* (‘The Quintessence of the Definition [of Cognitive Criteria (*pramāṇa*)]’) on one occasion, while refuting the usage of the term ‘non-verbal’ (*avyapadeśya*) in the definition of the cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*, or ‘veridical instrument of knowledge’) of the Nyāya school. There, he says that the inapplicability of the term has already been shown in the *Lakṣaṇa-sāra* and one should consult that work. It is highly probable that he indeed refers to his own text for the simple reason that he generally does not mention any works of any other authors either in support of his own views or in favourable light, except for the materialist teacher Bṛhaspati and his *Bṛhaspati-sūtra*. Still, it is not impossible that the text he referred to under the title *Lakṣaṇa-sāra* might have been penned by another representative of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata school who had been held in esteem by Jayarāśi, e.g. his own guru.

Philosophical Affiliation of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

There has been some controversy concerning whether Jayarāśi could at all be ranked among the representatives of the Indian materialist school, i.e., among the Cārvākas / Lokāyatas. Until the publication of the *Tattvôpaplava-siṃha*, Jayarāśi was considered a typical representative of the materialist school. It all changed when the publication of the work in 1940 made the text available to scholars. The publication revealed that Jayarāśi's view are far from what one considered materialism and hardly compatible with what we so far knew about the schools of the Cārvākas / Lokāyatas.

Nonetheless, Sukhlālī Samghavī and Rasiklāl C. Pārīkh (1940: xi-xii) take the text as ‘a work of the Lokāyata or Cārvāka school, or to be more precise

– of a particular division of that school’, emphasising that Jayarāśi ‘is developing the doctrine of the orthodox (!) Lokāyata’. The tradition of ascribing the view to Saṃghavī and Pārīkh that the *Tattvōpaplava-simha* is ‘a genuine Cārvāka work’ relies rather on the misreading of what both the authors say: they are well aware that Jayarāśi develops an original and independent school within what he himself considered a materialist tradition. This view, adopted also by Ruben (1958), is somewhat modified by Franco (1987: 4–8).

Another line of researchers disagree that Jayarāśi belonged to the materialist tradition at all, typical proponents of this opinion being Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (1959), (1989) and Karel Werner (1995). Chattopadhyaya (1989) argues that since Jayarāśi criticises all philosophical views and schools, he cannot be reckoned as an adherent of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata tradition, because one can either be a materialist or sceptic; and clearly Jayarāśi's philosophical views do not fit into the typical materialist framework. Karel Werner (1995) seems to support such an approach, although with some reservations, but without any solid rational argument, except for an subjective impression.

There could hardly be a better source of information on the true affiliation of Jayarāśi than the author himself. He nowhere states in his work that he is a Cārvāka / Lokāyata, in which he does not differ from all other Indian authors who nowhere mention their philosophical affiliations in the form: ‘The author of the present work is Buddhist’ or ‘I am a follower of the Nyāya school’. In most cases, such affiliations are communicated through the opening sections, e.g. in the introductory verses (*maṅgalācaraṇa*), or in the colophons, but usually in an indirect manner, e.g. by paying homage to the Awakened One (*buddha*) or to a guru or Mahêśvara, or through some other hint, but it is hardly ever done directly, in an unequivocal manner. Unfortunately, the preserved text of *Tattvōpaplava-simha* does not contain any introductory verses (probably there were none), and the colophon contains no hints. The only concealed information in the opening section of the work could be found in the first verse that occurs in the very beginning

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which says: ‘The worldly path (laukiko mārghaḥ) should be followed.../ With respect to everyday practice of the world (loka-vyavahāra), the fool and the wise are similar’ (TUS, p.1.9–10 = Franco (1987: 68–6-7)), quoted from some other source, taken as authoritative by Jayarāśi. The expression ‘the worldly path’ (laukiko mārghaḥ) often occurs as a reference to the Lokāyata (‘the followers of the worldly [practice]’), e.g. by Haribhadra in his ŚVS1.64. Most importantly, however, Jayarāśi on several occasions quotes verses of Bṛhaspati in order to either support his own opinion or to show that there is no disagreement between the Tattvôpaplava-simha and the tradition of Bṛhaspati. Further, he explicitly mentions the materialist teacher by name and refers to him with reverence ‘Honourable Bṛhaspati’ (bhagavān bṛhaspatiḥ, TUS, p.45.10–11 = Franco (1987: 228.10)), the reverential term occurring only once in the whole work. This is rather unique, for Jayarāśi does not seem to follow any authorities or to quote passages and opinions which he unreservedly views in favourable light. There can hardly be any doubt, that Jayarāśi placed himself within that tradition and apparently acknowledged that he was originally trained within it.

Further, Jayarāśi criticises basically all philosophical schools with two exceptions: the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara and the Cārvāka / Lokāyata school. The reason for being silent on the tradition of Śaṅkara was that the latter was either contemporaneous or posterior to Jayarāśi, but there would have been no reason not to formulate any criticism against the Cārvāka / Lokāyata school, if that had not been Jayarāśi's own tradition.

Jayarāśi is generally very cautious not to express his own positive views and theories. But there may be an exception, it seems. On one occasion (in the Buddhist section, TUP, p.57–88 = Franco (1987: 269–271)), while refuting the view that ‘the first moment of consciousness [of the newly born], immediately after the exit from the mother's womb, is preceded by another moment of consciousness’, he concludes that ‘the first moment of consciousness in the womb etc. [i.e., of the newly born], must come from the combination of the elements’, which is a typically materialist view. It is however not quite clear how far this conclusion is brought up merely to

dismiss the theory of consciousness as a principle independent of the matter or the theory of the personal conscious continuum (santāna), and how far the view is Jayarāṣi's own.

There is also an external evidence corroborating to a certain degree the thesis about Cārvāka / Lokāyata affiliation of Jayarāṣi. Vidyānanda who first mentions Jayarāṣi brings some interesting details to light (alluded to above). In his Aṣṭa-śatī (AṣS 29.20-36.7), he explicitly indicates a category of nihilistic thinkers who reject a number of vital principles and claim that 'There is no [reliable] omniscient authority (tīrtha-kāra), there is no [reliable] cognitive criterion (pramāṇa), there is no [reliable] authoritative doctrine (samaya) or [reliable] Vedas, or any kind of [reliable] reasoning (tarka), because they contradict each other,' and he quotes a popular verse: 'Reasoning is not established, testimonies differ, there is no sage whose words are a cognitive criterion (i.e., authoritative), the essence of the moral law (dharma) is concealed in a secret place (i.e., is not available). The [proper] path is that taken by the majority of people'[1]. Whether the verse comes from an unidentified Lokāyata source, which is not impossible, or not, it is echoed by Jayarāṣi in the above mentioned verse at the beginning of his work and the expression 'the worldly path' (laukiko mārgaḥ). Interestingly, the verse has an obvious sceptical underpinning. The category of such 'nihilists' includes (1) the followers of the Lokāyata school (laukāyatika, AṣS 29.26), also known as the Cārvāka (AṣS 30.25), who are associated with the view that there is just one cognitive criterion, i.e. perception, and (2) the category of 'those who propound the dissolution of [all] categories' (tattvôpaplava-vādin, AṣS 31.2). Vidyānanda (AṣS 31.2 ff.) explains who the latter are: 'Some who are those who propound the dissolution of [all] categories take (1) all the categories of cognitive criteria such as perception etc. and (2) all the categories of the cognoscibles as dissolved (i.e., not established)'. Throughout his text, Vidyānanda keeps these two traditions – the Lokāyata and the Tattvôpaplava - separate, although he does acknowledge that they are genetically related, the main difference between them being whether one recognises at least one cognitive criterion (Cārvāka / Lokāyata) or none (Jayarāṣi).

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Jayarāśi can be therefore taken as a genuine representative of an offshoot of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata tradition, primarily because he himself thought he was a follower of Bṛhaspati's materialist tradition, and probably because he had originally been trained in the materialist system. It also seems very likely that the representatives of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata system occasionally had sceptical inclinations prior to Jayarāśi, which helped him to abandon typically materialist claims and undertake his sceptical project. However, neither he nor his work can be taken as typical representatives of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata school or a first-hand source of information about that tradition. Despite this, the work remains the only authentic, albeit not 'orthodox' treatise of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata tradition that has come down to us.

The Method and Philosophy of Jayarāśi

Jayarāśi can be classified as a sceptic, or even a methodological sceptic, who consistently avails himself of a particular method to analyse theories and the contents of propositions.

Use of Reductio Arguments

The point of departure of his methodology is a sophisticated and highly elaborated reductio type of argument (prasaṅga), developed earlier within the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism and its prominent adherent Nagārjuna (c. 150 CE).

In his method, Jayarāśi analyses a particular thesis T of his opponent by, first, listing all logical implications or all doctrinally possible conclusions C1, C2, C3, ... Cn, admissible within the opponent's system, that follow from thesis T. Then he demonstrates how and why each of such conclusions C1, C2, C3, ... Cn either leads to an undesired consequence (logically problematic or unwelcome within the opponent's system) or contradicts the initial thesis T:

$$(1) \quad T \rightarrow C1 \wedge C2 \wedge C3 \wedge \dots \wedge Cn$$

$$(2) \quad |C1| = 0$$

$$|C2| = 0$$

$$|C3| = 0$$

...

$$|Cn| = 0$$

$$(3) \quad |T| = 0$$

where '0' stands not simply for 'false' (logically), but may also stand for 'not admissible within the opponent's specific set of beliefs', or 'not compatible with the opponent's specific set of beliefs'. To analyse the truth value or admissibility of each of the conclusions C1, C2, C3, ... Cn, if their structure is complex, Jayarāṣi analyses the conclusions in their turn using exactly the same method.

What may look like a well-known logical law that underlies the reductio ad absurdum argument, i.e.,

$$[(\sim p \rightarrow q) \wedge \sim q] \rightarrow p,$$

or like other typical laws of the proof by contradiction, i.e.,

$$[(\sim p \rightarrow q) \wedge (\sim p \rightarrow \sim q)] \rightarrow p,$$

$$[\sim p \rightarrow (q \wedge \sim q)] \rightarrow p, \text{ or}$$

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$$[\sim p \rightarrow (q \equiv \sim q)] \rightarrow p ,$$

seems at first closely mirrored by Jayarāśi. However, his approach is significantly different in one particular aspect. First, Jayarāśi analyses positive theses in order to disprove them. Secondly, the reductio or the proof by contradiction, whereby p is rejected, does not commit one to admitting $\sim p$ in the sense of accepting a positive state of affairs contrary to p . Jayarāśi is satisfied merely with a rejection of a thesis, without postulating his own solution to a problem. In other words, when Jayarāśi disproves thesis T by demonstrating that its conclusions $C1, C2, C3, \dots Cn$ are all wrong (either false or doctrinally inadmissible), he does not commit himself to the contrary thesis $\sim T$ with some kind of ontological entailment. The better way to describe his method would be the following patterns:

$$[(p \rightarrow q) \wedge \sim q] \rightarrow \sim p,$$

$$[(p \rightarrow q) \wedge (p \rightarrow \sim q)] \rightarrow \sim p,$$

$$[p \rightarrow (q \wedge \sim q)] \rightarrow \sim p, \text{ or}$$

$$[p \rightarrow (q \equiv \sim q)] \rightarrow \sim p ,$$

To give an example, Jayarāśi first skilfully demonstrates that the universal cannot exist by mentioning three possible conclusions: If (T) the universal exists, then (C1) the universal is different from the individuals in which it is instantiated, (C2) it is not different from the individuals, or (C3) it is different from the individuals in some aspects and it is not different from the

individuals in other aspects. Each of these options is then analysed into further options, all being eventually shown as wrong or impossible. Since all the three conclusions C1, C2 and C3 are rejected, the initial thesis T ('the universal exists') is also rejected. However, he does not say what at all exists, if there are no universals.

In his method, Jayarāṣi does not mention all logically conceivable conclusions entailed by a thesis he wants to disprove. In most cases, he limits himself just to those implications which are relevant to the discussion with a particular philosophical school, and all other logical or thinkable implications of which we know that the opponent would never admit for a variety of reason are simply ignored.

Interestingly, the critical method of analysis of the *reductio* type (*prasaṅga*) which Jayarāṣi so amply uses is basically absent in the works of the Digambara philosopher Akalaṅka, whereas the method is regularly used by his commentator Vidyānanda and all subsequent Jaina thinkers, which may have its historical relevance and suggest that Jayarāṣi was posterior to Akalaṅka.

The reductionist tactics, which Jayarāṣi shared with the Mādhyamika Buddhists, was traditionally classified by Brahmanic philosophers, e.g. the Naiyāyikas, as an eristical dispute or refutation-only debate (*viṭaṅḍā*) and considered as a non-genuine argument, because the goal of an authentic debate was to strive for truth, understood of course in positive terms. Were such criticisms denying Jayarāṣi a genuine argumentative value justified? Clearly not, and for a variety of reasons, the most important being that the main objective of Jayarāṣi is indicated in the title of his treatise: the dissolution of all categories. How should we understand it? Was his approach purely negative, eristical, nihilistic or agnostic? His main objective, it seems, was not necessarily the strong claim that no truths can ever be known. Rather his intention was to show the fundamental dependence of our knowledge of reality on cognitive means and categories we accept more or less arbitrarily. The dissolution of all categories implies that the criteria on which all philosophical systems and theories of the world

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rest are in need of further evidence, which itself is not possible without adopting some of these categories or some other categories which again call for further evidence, but which categories and methods we chose is ultimately our arbitrary decision. To engage in what Brahmanic philosophers would call a 'genuine debate' (vāda) one would necessarily have to accept that such an arbitrary decision is ultimate and justified, thus giving up the further search for truth, even though the process would be infinite and doomed to terminate untimely. In other words, contradictions and inconsistencies are, in fact, inherently systemic in the sense that they are generated by a body of propositions each adopted arbitrary for this or other reason, and the systemic knowledge ultimately lacks reliable and coherent foundations. Just as with Pyrrhonism in Sextus' interpretation, Jayarāśi seems to be a perpetual investigator: he discards all theories and propositions that are neither consistent nor proof-tight, for which there is also no compelling evidence. But it would probably be far-fetched to claim that the idea of truth did not represent any value for him.

Scepticism and Definitions

Jayarāśi represents what has been once labelled epistemological scepticism, or ontological scepticism (Hankinson 1995, 13ff), i.e., the position in which one refuses to accept the truth of some proposition or to affirm the existence of something, without denying it, as distinguished from negative (ontological) dogmatism, i.e., the attitude in which one actually rejects the truth of some proposition and denies the existence of the alleged objects. Further, Jayarāśi's methodological scepticism should not be confused with what is covered by the term e.g. in the case of Descartes' approach to seek ultimately firm foundations after all beliefs liable to doubt have been successfully eliminated. Jayarāśi seeks neither ultimate foundations for his system or firm basis for his epistemology, ontology or ethics, because he never, even vaguely, intimates he would have any. He is satisfied with demonstrating that all we, the philosophers, have so far established, does not hold. But contrary to Decartes' methodological scepticism, Jayarāśi does not really cast doubt on what comes to us from the senses.

At the outset of his work (TUS 1), he points out the major deficiency of our knowledge: ‘To establish cognitive criteria (pramāṇa, instruments of knowledge) depends on proper definitions. Further, to establish objects of cognitive criteria depends on cognitive criteria. When proper definitions are absent, how is it possible that one would treat both the cognitive criteria and their objects as genuinely real?’ To adopt certain definitions we first have to adopt certain definitions and criteria of validity. That has to be done vis-à-vis the external reality and tested for validity with respect to phenomena that have all the appearance of real, for Indian philosophers en bloc accepted the correspondence theory of truth. To test the definitions, criteria of validity and cognitive criteria with respect to real objects, we should first know what these real objects really are. To know that we have to have reliable instruments of knowledge (cognitive criteria) and criteria of validity at our disposal. We land in vicious circle: we can neither know cognisable real objects nor determine what genuine cognitive criteria are, nor be actually able to define them without having the idea of validity first. Without it we cannot even properly distinguish between valid cognitive procedures and invalid ones.

Since it is vital to have a proper definition of a cognitive criterion, or a valid cognitive procedure and criterion of truth for philosophical enterprise, Jayarāśi analyses such definitions which were formulated within most important philosophical schools in India. The cognitive criteria whose various definitions are one by one examined are perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), presumption (arthāpatti), reasoning based on analogy (upamāna), negative proof based on absence (abhāva), equivalence (sambhāva), tradition (aitihya), and verbal or scriptural testimony (śabda, āgama). In terms of argumentative structure and nature, they all can be reduced to three: perception, inference and testimony. The philosophical schools which Jayarāśi most frequently refers to and criticises their definitions of the cognitive criteria are the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā as well as Buddhist and Jaina schools.

He demonstrates that no one so far has offered an irrefutable definition of

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perception (which does not have to mean that perception as such has to be completely unreliable). All definitions of perception are seriously flawed and we cannot rely on it in the way it is defined: we do not have even a reliable method or a dependable criterion to distinguish a genuine perception from a mirage, optical illusion or a mental image (e.g. in hallucination, reminiscence or dream). However, it is not the case that Jayarāśi argues that ‘there is simply no way ... to know that our sense-perceptions are true’ (King 1999: 19). What he is up to is to demonstrate that, given our present definitions of perception and categories on which our epistemology rests, there is no way to determine which of our sense-perceptions are true.

Inference relies on data provided by perception which makes inference doubtful. But inference the way it has so far been defined is flawed for a number of other reasons. There is no reliable way to relate properties or facts in a truth-conducive way. For instance, to infer the cause from the effect one would have to first to define what causality is, which as Jayarāśi demonstrates cannot be done with the categories we have at our disposal: there is actually no reliable way to relate A and B as cause and effect. Further, what do we relate in inference: universals with universals, universals with a particular, or a particular with a particular? Since universals do not exist, inferences which are based on such notions are intrinsically flawed. We are left with the idea that inferences depend on particular-to-particular relation. That being the case, there is no method to establish any kind of valid relationship between two particulars which could allow us to draw any sound inferences from single-instantiated cases. Further, inferences will have to rely on cases of inductive reasoning which are logically not valid and cannot be demonstrated to be universally valid. Also testimony of an authority cannot be a legitimate source of knowledge because, first, such testimony would have to rely on other cognitive criteria and, second, we would have no means to determine what a reliable testimony is or who an authoritative person can be. Therefore, given all available definitions and criteria, nothing can be known for certain.

Jayarāśi's undertaking is not restricted to the examination of valid cognitive

procedures and their definitions. In the course of his work, he analyses a number of fundamental ideas and demonstrates that their definitions are inadequate and they cannot exist as understood and defined by philosophers. These include such notions as validity and nonerroneousness, sublation of previous knowledge by a subsequent experience, universals, the relation of composite wholes to their parts, production of cognitions, ontological categories such as inherence of properties in their substrata, the nature of illusion, the definition of what exists (e.g. the real object's ability to execute causally efficient action, artha-kriyā), the nature of sense-object contact, memory and recollection, momentariness and permanence, conceptuality or conceptual state of mind, relation of the conceptual image in cognition to the external thing represented, the nature of consciousness (rejection of non-material character), rebirth and karmic retribution, causality, visible and invisible objects, absences, rules of inference etc. All these ideas, as Jayarāṣi demonstrates, stand in need of proper definition and as long as we do not have them cannot be maintained in their present form.

Positive Views

Jayarāṣi, as we noted, is cautious not to affirmatively state anything, and nowhere does he use such expressions as ‘thus it was established that’ (iti sthitam) or similar expressions typical of all other philosophical works. Despite this, can we reconstruct any positive views he affirms or is his scepticism all-embracing? It seems there a few such views. His clear rejection of karmic retribution, afterlife and the supernatural (‘human actions do no bring otherworldly results, such as rebirth in heaven etc.’) and the claim the ultimate reality for us is what we experience and what surrounds us concerns both metaphysics and ethics. Metaphysically, there is no supernatural reality of any relevance to us. Ethically, the only criterion to determine what is right and wrong is what people agree to accept as such (‘the worldly path should be followed’). Quite frequently, he uses examples of non-existent entities such as demons (piśāca), atoms (paramāṇu) and god (mahêśvara), taking their fictitious character for granted, which indicates that he apparently rejected invisible reality which is intrinsically beyond our

senses.

He plainly states that ‘universals do not exist’ (TUP, 4.5 ff.), which does not seem to be a mere thesis which he rejects just for the sake of argument, because throughout his work he will refer to this claim (‘we have already shown that universals do not exist’). Does his denial of universals mean that he was a nominalist? If so, in what sense? On another occasion (TUS 24) he criticises the view that composite macroscopic wholes cannot exist, and what exists instead are their parts only (a typical Buddhist nominalist position). He concludes there is no way to demonstrate that composite wholes are non-existent. Interestingly, he nowhere links the idea of composite wholes (and the paradox of the whole and its parts), which he seems to accept, to the idea of the universal (and the paradox of the universal and the particulars as its instantiations), which he clearly rejects. These two concepts, the wholes and universals, were generally analysed in India jointly as two aspects of the same problem: just as the whole exists (or does not exist) through its parts, in the very same way also the universal exists (or does not exist) through its particulars. Interestingly, Jayarāṣi never links these two issues, precisely because, it seems, he admitted the existence of macroscopic objects of our experience (i.e., composite wholes) whereas he rejected the existence of universals. Being a sceptic, he does seem to accept a ‘commonsensical view’ of the world that consists of such macroscopic objects, but not of invisible atoms or universals, demons and god. In line with this approach, he seemed also to maintain that consciousness is a product or combination of the four elements (see above). It should not come as a surprise to discover that all these views he shared with genuine materialists of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata tradition.

A truly sceptical thesis Jayarāṣi entertained was his assumption that all philosophical claims are always made within a particular set of beliefs, i.e., within a particular system which is based on arbitrarily accepted criteria, definitions and categories. His pragmatic, ‘commonsensical attitude’ is highlighted in a verse he quotes: ‘with respect to everyday practice of the world, the fool and the wise are similar’ (see above), because ultimately we

all have to rely on our experience and defective and partial knowledge of reality.

The conclusion of his work: ‘Thus, when all categories are completely dissolved in the above manner, all practical actions (which entails thought, speech and activity) can be enjoyable, without being reflected upon’, is quite meaningful. On the one hand it could be taken to imply some kind of a *carpe diem* attitude: given our limitations and intrinsic inability to know with certainty, the only option we are left with is to enjoy the world the way it appears to us. On the other hand, the statement could also suggest that what Jayarāṣi had in mind was that for all our practical activities, including thinking, verbal communication, behaviour or ordinary life, the world of our actions — as long as it is relevant to us — is ‘here and now’ and retains its ultimate validity, even though we are incapable of its proper philosophical analysis.

Check Your Progress II

1. What is the view of Jayarasi bhata on skepticism?

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2. What is the difference between the view of nagarjuna and Jayarasi bhata?

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14.4 ŚRĪHARṢA

Śrīharṣa is one of the most prominent Advaita philosophers from classical India. He is known at home and in the West in two different ways: traditionally, he follows the Advaita system and his arguments are read to

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buttress the non-dualism of the Brahman, rejecting the Nyāya realist categories that include both metaphysical categories and the epistemic system that validates these categories. While he is hardly a prominent figure in the West, whatever marginal study has emerged has assigned him a position of skepticism or non-realism. While his approach broadly resembles that of Nāgārjuna, and his work is highly regarded in the Advaita circle, his contribution to philosophical inquiry is yet to be fully explored. And this is a generational project, impossible to articulate in this small chapter. I have therefore limited myself to examination of only the first argument that primarily relates to the issue of virtue argumentation, and I will briefly mention some other arguments to make a broader comparative analysis.

Scholars have demonstrated a great hesitation to align the philosophy of Śrīharṣa with skepticism, and this is partly due to the opaqueness of the term itself. ‘Skepticism’ is invoked to prove or reject all kinds of arguments, and to label different types of philosophies. Although we are not living in the era of Giordano Bruno, most of us would still not prefer to wear the hat of skepticism. Many of the arguments of Śrīharṣa, and for that matter his Buddhist predecessor Nāgārjuna, can be identified as skeptical, particularly their approach to reasoning and their openness to question not just beliefs but also the very system of justification. In essence, the very rationality that grounds truth also leads to the suspension of all forms of judgment, including the very reliance on the system that establishes the sense of validity. Just like semantic or epistemic externalism responds to some of the skeptical arguments in the West, the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools developed their epistemology and philosophy of language to counter many of the arguments of Nāgārjuna or Śrīharṣa.

If skepticism is a thesis, Śrīharṣa is certainly not interested in establishing it. And if a precondition for one to be a skeptic is to maintain that knowledge is not possible, Śrīharṣa does not fall in this category either. He is simply interested in openness, not just about the categories for their reliance on system of justification, but also in the very system that confirms the existence of those categories and establishes truth claims. This radical

openness is by no means original to Śrīharṣa, as he comes in a chain of philosophers such as Nāgārjuna or Jayarāśi. Śrīharṣa does not initiate his discourse with the premise of doubt, and although he questions not just beliefs but also the system of judgment that justifies beliefs, he does not conclude that knowledge is impossible.

It does not take a skeptic to make the claim that our cognition does not always correspond to truth, or that our epistemic system is not free of flaws. If propositions are verified by our knowledge, an issue emerges, what is it that verifies knowledge? The fundamental divide in the Western tradition regarding knowledge is summed up in the tendencies that our knowledge is based on experience (empiricism), or on reason (rationalism). Some of the skeptical questions of our times are a direct consequence of the exchange between these two traditions with the issue at the center being whether reason or experience or both in some shared way give us veridical knowledge. Indian philosophical systems have never faced a serious chasm between empirical and rational analytical tendencies. For this reason, the ways skeptical arguments have evolved in the contemporary West have a very limited relevance, if our quest is to understand the philosophical underpinnings of the classical India. This is to say that the skeptical arguments derived from the central premise that impressions may not sufficiently explain our experience (Carneade or Hume) or the premise that epistemic systems beg their own justification (Sextus Empiricus) do not divide Indian philosophical schools. If we use the label of skepticism for describing the philosophies of these two giants, we need to keep these central premises in mind.

Check Your Progressiii

1. What is the view on skepticism by sriharsa?

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2. Berief dicussion of skepticism by nagarjuna, jayarasi bhata and sriharsa.

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14.5 LETS SUM UP

The three philosophers from classical India often cited for maintaining some form of skepticism, Nāgārjuna, Jayarāsi, and Śrīharṣa, come from three different schools: Madhyamaka Buddhism, Cārvāka materialism, and Advaita Vedanta. These philosophers have developed unique methods of their own for a dialectical practice. The prasaṅga or reductio ad absurdum arguments of Nāgārjuna lead his opponents to absurdity in accepting any of the possible alternatives. While he questions both the epistemic system and the categories themselves when adopting the reductive arguments, his philosophy is always grounded on the emptiness of the essential nature (śūnyatā). Jayarāsi questions both the categories and the system of justification, with an intent to support some form of hedonism. Śrīharṣa’s skepticism also has similar limits, with him questioning all the categories to eventually return to the foundational consciousness identical to the self or the Brahman. Although these philosophers have different motives, this does not preclude them from sharing similar argumentation. If the objective of skepticism is to demonstrate that knowledge is impossible, then surely these are not the philosophers to be in this camp. These philosophers, however, question our epistemic system and the dialectical process that examines the categories from different angles. Rather than abandoning reason altogether, these philosophers demand that reason itself deserves the same scrutiny that it applies to examining the categories.

14.6 KEY WORDS

Inference : An inference is a process of drawing conclusions based on the evidence. On the basis of some evidence or a “premise,” you infer a

conclusion.

Inherence refers to Empedocles' idea that the qualities of matter come from the relative proportions of each of the four elements entering into a thing.

Cognition : "the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses".

Skepticism: The attitude of doubting knowledge claims set forth in various areas. Skeptics have challenged the adequacy or reliability of these claims by asking what principles they are based upon or what they actually establish.

14.7 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Describe the theory of skepticism by nagarjuna.
2. Describe the theory of skepticism by sriharsa.
- 3 Differentiate between the theory of jayarasai bhat and nagarjuna.
4. Differentiate between the schools of these philosophers.
5. Explain the metaphysical view of nagarjuna.

14.8 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

L. Wittgenstein : Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus (Kegal Paul, London, 1947) P. 189.

According to J. W. N. Watkins, the pragmatic consideration or difficulty cannot be an adequate rebuttal for a sceptic engaged in cognitively (theoretically oriented) questioning. Question of 'praxis orientation' is also irrelevant here, because it is noncognitive. For details see : Science and Scepticism (Hutchinson, London, 1984) P. 36. One may also see in this

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context : R. N. Ozick : Philosophical Explanations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981)

Quinton distinguishes five uses of 'indubitableness' in philosophical enterprise. See : A. M. Quinton : The Nature of Things (London, 1975) PP. 144-9

See : Vatsyayana's commentary on 'Nyaya-Sutra 2.1.19

See : T. K. Sarkar : Knowledge, Truth and Justification (Calcutta, Allied Pub. & Jadavpur University, 1992) P. 203

14.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

CHECK YOUR PROGRESS I

1. Refer to the text of nagarajuna's skepticism.

CHECK YOUR PROGRESS II

1. Refer to the text of Jayarasi bhata's skepticism
2. Refer to the text of nagarjuna and Jayarasi bhata's skepticism.

CHECK YOUR PROGRESS III

1. Refer to the text of sriharsa's skepticism
2. Refer to the text of all the skepticism by three.